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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN HOUSING MARKETS AND FINANCIAL FRAGILITY
Deeksha Gupta
Itay Goldstein
Vincent Glode
This dissertation is motivated by the housing crisis of 2008. It consists of three chapters. In
the first chapter, “Too Much Skin-in-the-Game? The Effect of Mortgage Market Concentration
on Credit and House Prices,” I propose a new theory to help explain the housing crisis.
During the housing boom, a small number of institutions - the government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs) and a few banks - held most of U.S. mortgage risk. I develop a theory in
which such concentration of mortgage exposure can explain features of the housing crisis. I
show that large lenders with many outstanding mortgages have incentives to extend risky
credit to prop up house prices. An increase in concentration can lead to a boom with
worsening credit quality and a subsequent bust with widespread defaults.
In the second chapter, “Concentration and Lending in Mortgage Markets,” joint with
Ronel Elul and David Musto, we attempt to test the theory described in the first chapter.
We provide evidence that concentration in mortgage markets can create perverse lending
incentives. We exploit variation in the size of the GSEs’ outstanding mortgage exposure
across MSAs. Using a loan-level dataset, we provide evidence that the GSEs were more likely
to engage in high-risk activities in areas where they had a large exposure to outstanding
mortgages. We also provide evidence that this relationship is driven by an incentive to keep
house prices high.
In the final chapter, “Housing Booms and the Crowding-Out Effect,” joint with Itay
Goldstein, we study the effect that investment in real estate assets has on the economy.
We develop a theory in which housing price booms can sometimes lead to a crowding-out
v
of corporate investment. We show that an increase in real estate prices does not necessarily
increase aggregate investment even when firms actively use real estate assets as collateral to
borrow against and invest the proceeds in positive NPV projects. We argue that at times, it
can be optimal to decrease the price of housing rather than to support high housing prices
to stimulate the economy and characterize when this is the case.
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CHAPTER 1 : Too Much Skin-in-the-Game? The Effect of Mortgage Market
Concentration on Credit and House Prices
1.1. Introduction
In the 2000s, there was an unprecedented surge in risky lending to borrowers with low FICO
scores at high debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios. These mortgages were associated
with high default rates and ex-post did not seem to be profitable for credit suppliers.1
What motivated this high-risk, seemingly unprofitable lending? A common explanation is
that dispersion in mortgage holdings driven by securitization caused moral hazard problems
in mortgage origination. More specifically, since credit providers could sell off mortgages,
they no longer had skin-in-the-game in the mortgages they originated and therefore had a
reduced incentive to monitor and originate quality mortgages.2 This explanation has gained
traction in macro-prudential policy following the crisis, with the Dodd-Frank act requiring
a minimum level of risk retention by mortgage lenders.
However, during the housing boom, mortgage markets had a high level of concentration if
we consider broader exposure to the mortgage market, such as mortgage holdings rather
than just originations. In particular, the GSEs and a few banks had rising exposure to the
mortgage market through the 1990s and amassed a large concentration of mortgage risk in
the 2000s.3 The agencies’ share alone increased from about 7% of the U.S. mortgage market
in the 1980s to over 40% in the 2000s.4 Additionally, about 50% of all holdings of AAA
1Following the crisis of 2007, many private securitizers went out of business, banks such as Lehman
Brothers and Bear Sterns collapsed or had to be bailed out due to their exposure to the subprime market,
and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into government conservatorship.
2For theoretical models of this mechanism see Parlour and Plantin (2008) and Vanasco (2017).
3The GSEs’ exposure to mortgages came in the form of portfolio holdings of their own loans (about half of
which they held on to) and insurance guarantees on the securitized mortgages that they sold. Additionally,
the agencies were the single largest investors in the private securitization market purchasing about 30% of
the total dollar volume of private-label MBSes between 2003-2007 (Acharya, Richardson, Nieuwerburgh, and
White (2011)) and Adelino, Frame, and Gerardi (2016a).
4Appendix D plots the GSEs’ market share of and total dollar exposure to the US mortgage market from
1980-2008. Although the GSEs share of the mortgage market declined between 2002 and 2006, their dollar
exposure kept increasing during this time. In the model, the share and dollar exposure of mortgage lenders
co-move perfectly, but it is possible to get the results of the model even if the share of mortgage lenders
declines due to entry by new lenders. As long as the decline in their market power due to entry is not too
large, lenders will still have incentives to increase their dollar exposure to the market. Furthermore, one can
1
rated non-GSE mortgage-backed securities were concentrated amongst a few large complex
financial institutions (LCFIs) (Acharya et al. (2011)). In this paper, I develop a theory
of how this increase in concentration of mortgage risk can explain the surge in high-risk
lending and other important characteristics of the housing boom and bust.
The model can explain key empirical features of the recent housing crisis. In particular,
as mortgage markets become more concentrated, the model predicts a boom in credit
characterized by increasing house prices and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios. Credit quality
worsens over the life of the boom. A fundamental shock to a concentrated market can
lead to a collapse in real estate prices accompanied by large-scale defaults. For a short
period after the bust, lenders in concentrated markets continue to make high-risk loans.
Importantly, the model can explain the timing of high-risk lending that started in the 2000s
after the credit boom had already begun and the continuation of high-risk activity by the
GSEs in 2007 once mortgage markets began to slow down (Bhutta and Keys (2017)).
The key idea of the model is that if credit affects house prices and house prices in turn
affect the severity of default, large mortgage lenders internalize their effect on house prices
and consequently on default probabilities and losses when making lending decisions.5 More
specifically, prevailing house prices affect the profitability of previously issued mortgages
since borrowers are less likely to default when house prices are high and upon default
their house, which is collateral for lenders, is worth more. Lenders with a large amount
of mortgages on their books therefore have an incentive to keep house prices high when
they are due mortgage repayments. If lenders can influence house prices through increasing
view the market for GSE-eligible borrowers and non-GSE borrowers as segmented since only certain loans
were eligible for purchase by the GSEs. The GSEs retained market power in this segment even as there
was entry by private-label securitizers - primary originators would not sell a loan that was GSE-eligible to
a private-label securitizer instead. In this case, we can represent the aggregate US housing market as two
segmented markets each with large players (the GSEs in one and LCFIs in the other).
5There is a large amount of empirical support for these assumptions. Many papers have found a connection
between house prices and default. See Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008), Haughwout, Peach, and Tracy
(2008), Palmer (2013), Ferreira and Gyourko (2015). Further, many papers also provide evidence that
the availability of credit affects house prices. See Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005), Khandani, Lo,
and Merton (2009), Hubbard and Mayer (2009), Mayer (2011), Griffin and Maturana (2015), Landvoigt,
Piazzesi, and Schneider (2015), An and Yao (2016) and Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Nieuwerburgh (2017).
2
their supply of credit, they may find it optimal to extend credit to low-quality, high-risk
borrowers not because of the return they expect to make on the loan itself, but because
of the boost in house prices that comes from credit provision. Lenders trade off the loss
they make on the issuance of mortgages to these borrowers with the profits they make by
keeping house prices high on mortgages that are due repayment.
Concentration impacts both the quantity and quality of mortgage credit. In the model,
banks compete in a cournot-style framework - they decide how many mortgage loans to make
taking into account their effect on house prices. In most models of industrial organization,
as concentration increases, agents behave less like price-takers and the aggregate quantity
supplied of the good in question decreases.6 While this “Cournot” effect is present in the
model, there is a second effect of changes in concentration that is new, the “propping-up”
effect. As concentration increases, individual lenders acquire larger market shares which
creates an incentive to extend more credit to prop up house prices. If the propping-up
effect dominates the Cournot effect, the aggregate supply of credit increases as mortgage
markets become more concentrated. Furthermore, credit in more concentrated markets is
generally riskier than credit in less concentrated markets. In the model, I show that it is
possible for two areas with different levels of concentration to have the same level of credit
provision. However, the area with higher concentration will have lower quality credit with
higher default rates. The area with low concentration has credit provision due to a relatively
strong Cournot effect while the area with high concentration has a weak Cournot effect but
a strong propping-up effect. The marginal loan made in the area with higher concentration
is riskier since banks compromise on the return they earn from the expected loan repayment
due to the benefit they get from the resulting increase in house prices. If parameter values
allow for equal credit provision under two different levels of concentration, in the presence
of costly default a social planner would always prefer to make markets less concentrated.
This paper also contributes to an important debate on whether the housing crisis was driven
6See Tirole (1988).
3
by distortions in the supply of credit or by high house price expectations by lenders and
borrowers. Two central papers in this debate by Mian and Sufi (2009) and Adelino, Schoar,
and Severino (2016b) examine the relationship between income growth and the growth in
mortgage credit during the housing boom to address this question. In support of the credit-
supply view, Mian and Sufi (2009) find that income growth decoupled from the growth
in mortgage credit in the U.S. at the ZIP code-level. They point to innovations in the
provision of credit to low-quality borrowers as an explanation for their findings. In support
of the expectations view, Adelino et al. (2016b) find that at a borrower-level, income growth
did not decouple from the growth in mortgage credit, indicating that lenders did not face
distorted incentives to lend disproportionately to riskier borrowers.
Following a shock to concentration, the model can generate different correlations between
income-growth and the growth in mortgage credit depending on the level of aggregation of
the variables. Following an increase in mortgage market concentration, the model mortgage
credit and income growth can be negatively correlated when looking across areas (such
as ZIP codes), while at the same time being positively correlated when looking across
borrowers. In the model, lenders have relatively more market power in affecting housing
prices in areas with low income growth since in such areas without the availability of credit
there is little else to drive the demand for housing and keep house prices high. Therefore,
for each additional mortgage loan, the percentage increase in house prices and consequently
the return to propping up house prices is high. An increase in concentration can therefore
lead to a credit supply shock in areas where income growth is low, leading to a decoupling
of income growth from the growth in mortgage credit. However, banks’ incentives to lend
more to higher-quality borrowers do not fundamentally change. All else equal, a bank would
always prefer to make a loan to a high-quality borrower, if possible, as such a loan would
also serve to increase house prices. Therefore when looking at borrower-level data, the
growth in income and mortgage credit can remain positively correlated.7
7In follow-up papers, Mian and Sufi (2016) and Mian and Sufi (2015), Mian and Sufi argue that some of
Adelino et al. (2016b) results are driven by an improper calculation of total mortgage size and fraudulent
income over-statement. In Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2015), the authors respond to these critiques and
4
This paper contributes to macro-prudential policy discussion in the aftermath of the crises.
From a policy perspective, it is crucial to understand the different forces that can drive
housing booms and busts. With respect to the financial crisis, while steps have been taken
to address the issue of securitization leading to a lack of skin-in-the game, with the Dodd-
Frank act requiring a minimum level of risk retention by lenders, concentration in the
mortgage market has not been discussed much by regulators and has increased since the
crisis. In 2016, The Economist reported that the GSEs and Federal Housing Association
were funding about 65-80% of new mortgages. Further, the new regulations faced by banks
have made them move out of mortgage lending. As a result, mortgage origination has
become highly concentrated with new, independent firms Quicken Loans and Freedom
Mortgage originating roughly half of all new mortgages.8 At least some of these mortgages
appear to be highly risky and of questionable quality, with the report stating that 20% of
all loans since 2012 have LTV ratios of over 95%. Moreover, house prices have been rising
rapidly and have surpassed their peak during the boom. These patterns could be cause for
concern and this paper illustrates a channel that may be driving this.
This paper puts forward a theory that can explain the deterioration in lending standards
and its link to the growth of the secondary market because there was concentration in
the holdings of securitized loans. Papers by Ben-David (2011), Carrillo (2013), Garmaise
(2015) and Piskorski, Seru, and Witkin (2015) have shown that mortgage originators were
lowering underwriting standards, becoming more lax in loan screening and not monitoring
loans carefully in the years leading up to the 2008 crisis. Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig
(2011) connect this phenomenon to the development of the secondary market for mortgages.9
provide evidence that income over-statement does not drive their results. It is not the goal of this paper
to take a stance on what empirical facts are valid. Rather the paper is meant to highlight a theoretical
framework that can help with the economic interpretation of the correlation between income and mortgage
credit growth when looking at more micro versus aggregated data. If income and mortgage credit growth do
remain correlated at a borrower-level, this does not theoretically rule out the possibility of a credit supply
shock driving the crisis.
8Briefing: Housing in America. 2016. “Comradely Capitalism.” The Economist.
9Keys et al. (2011) find that loan performance was significantly worse for borrowers with a FICO score
of just above 620 which conformed to a rule-of-thumb that made loans with a FICO score of 620 and above
easier to securitize, than those just below. Also see Elul (2011) and Griffin and Maturana (2016).
5
While securitization did create a new security with potential information frictions and moral
hazard concerns, it also resulted in a large concentration of mortgage market exposure
with secondary market participants. In particular, the rise of securitization occurred after
Salomon Brothers created a mortgage trading operation and found investors for MBS.
Investor interest in MBS allowed the GSEs and some banks to grow their share of the
mortgage market by becoming the key players in MBS issuance. This second effect of
securitization has been largely overlooked by research into the housing crises.
Many recent papers provide support for the theory that large lenders were driving risky
lending. In a paper testing this theory, Elul, Gupta, and Musto (2017) find that in 2007 as
small private securitizers were withdrawing from the risky lending, the GSEs increased high-
LTV mortgage purchases in MSAs in which they had high outstanding mortgage exposure.
Additionally, Favara and Giannetti (2017) find that mortgage lenders in more concentrated
markets internalize house price drops coming from foreclosure externalities and are less
likely to foreclose on delinquent households. Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2012) find that
the decline in lending standards was driven by large lenders and that loan denial rates were
lower in areas that had a smaller number of competing lenders. Adelino et al. (2016a) find
that when private securitizers designed MBS pools for the agencies, loans in GSE pools were
riskier based on observable risk characteristics than loans in non-GSE pools. Nadauld and
Sherlund (2013) find that securitization of sub-prime mortgages increased 200% between
2003 and 2005 and was driven primarily by the five largest broker/dealer banks resulting
in a lowering of lending standards in the primary market.10
While this paper focuses on how the model applies to the housing boom and bust, the
mechanism is applicable more generally. As discussed above, the model can help explain why
we continue to see mortgage loans being made at high LTV ratios despite macro-prudential
regulation aimed at curbing risky lending. Another related application of the model is to
housing policy since 2009 aimed at stabilizing housing markets. In the aftermath of the
10Also see Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2014).
6
crisis, the government took on a large amount of mortgage exposure when the GSEs were
taken into conservatorship and the Federal Reserve Bank undertook large-scale purchases of
mortgage-backed securities as part of quantitative easing. Many government policies such as
the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), the The Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) and the continued purchase of mortgage-backed securities explicitly
stated keeping house prices from falling as one of their goals. In 2009, when announcing
some of these programs, President Obama said that “by bringing down foreclosure rates,
[these policies] will help to shore up housing prices for everyone.”11 This is in line with
propping-up incentives put forward in this paper.
I extend the model in various ways. First, I incorporate the possibility of banks propping
up prices by refinancing borrowers who are close to default rather than by making loans
to new borrowers. The same intuition as in the baseline model flows through - banks with
large outstanding mortgage exposure may refinance a mortgage by making a loan that is
negative NPV if the benefit from house price appreciation is large enough. Depending on
the expected repayment a bank can get from existing versus new borrowers, refinancing or
new lending can be preferable. Second, I extend the model to allow for lender heterogeneity
with a few large lenders making loans alongside smaller, dispersed lenders. In this case,
large lenders increase their share of the mortgage market over time, even if their market
power does not change. This is because as the mortgage holdings of large lenders builds
up over a boom period, they are incentivized to make riskier and riskier mortgages in an
attempt to prop up prices. Such an effect is not present for smaller lenders who act like
price-takers in the mortgage market. Therefore, the market share of large lenders increases
over a boom as they lend relatively more than small lenders. This can help explain the rise
in the exposure of banks and the GSEs to the mortgage market over the 1990s.
I additionally show that the model is robust to concentration in the mortgage market at
an originator level or at a secondary market level. At an originator level, Countrywide
11.“$275 Billion Plan Seeks to Address Housing Crisis.” The New York Times, 2009. Also see Bernanke’s
2012 FOMC Press Conference.
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Financial was increasing its share of the U.S. mortgage market during the boom and
accounted for about 15% of all mortgage origination in 2005. In the secondary market,
the GSEs were the largest participants in the U.S. mortgage market but did not originate
mortgages themselves. Rather their exposure to the mortgage market was through insurance
guarantees on MBS they sold to investors, through portfolio holdings of their own loans,
and through the purchase of private-labeled MBS. The key mechanism in the model simply
requires concentration in mortgage holdings. The basic model setup abstracts away from
the secondary market. However, I provide an equivalent version of the model in which
concentration is present in the secondary market rather than the primary originator market.
The key mechanism works as long as there is concentration in mortgage holdings at some
level and agents with exposure to mortgage payments have some market power. If secondary
market players own a large share of the mortgage market, they benefit from high house
prices. If they have market power, they can offer attractive prices on the secondary market
for riskier mortgages that will incentivize mortgage originators to then issue mortgages to
risky borrowers. Holders of these mortgages will suffer losses on these purchases but the
increase in house prices will be profitable for their outstanding mortgage exposure.
Finally, although the model is very stylized and abstracts away from many aspects of housing
markets, I perform a basic calibration of the model to the 1991-2009 US housing market. The
stylized model is able to match some key moments of the housing market and demonstrates
that changing concentration can produce significant differences in the likelihood of a credit
boom and bust, and the quantity and quality of credit expanded during the credit cycle.
Specifically, when concentration is set to approximately match the GSE market share, the
model is able to explain about half of the boom and bust in house prices and over 90% of
lending to sub-prime borrowers during the housing boom and bust.12 In a counterfactual
12In this paper, I focus on the private mandate of the GSEs to maximize profits for shareholders to explain
high-risk lending. Although the GSEs had private shareholders, they also had a public mandate to achieve
goals to support housing amongst low- and moderate-income households and in underserved areas. This
private/public nature of the the agencies may mean that their motivations were not purely profit-maximizing.
Acharya et al. (2011) argue that it is hard to explain GSE high-risk activity because of their public mandate
alone. They report that GSE adherence to their housing targets seemed to be voluntary - the GSEs missed
their housing targets on several occasions without any severe sanctions by regulators. Furthermore, the
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analysis of the calibrated model, I show that decreasing concentration by doubling the
number of competing lenders in the mortgage market would have reduced the fraction of
sub-prime lending in the housing boom and bust to 0. It would have also resulted in 30%
lower growth in house prices during the boom and 80% smaller decline in house prices
during the bust. This exercise suggests that the model could be quantitatively significant,
although precisely estimating the magnitude of propping-up incentives during the housing
boom and bust is beyond the scope of this paper.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 1 provides a review of the literature
related to this paper. Section 2 describes the main model setup. Section 3 illustrates the key
mechanism of how concentration can affect credit in a simple three-period model. Section
4 discusses the main infinite horizon model and explains how the model generates housing
booms and busts. Section 5 extends the model to incorporate concentration in secondary
rather than primary markets, refinancing of mortgage loans and lender heterogeneity. Section
6 provides details of the calibration exercise. The last section concludes. All proofs are in
the appendix to chaper 1.
1.2. Related Literature
Although the effect of concentration in markets on resulting prices and quantities is widely
studied in economics, research on the effect of concentration in mortgage markets on credit
and house prices jointly is relatively sparse. Scharfstein and Sunderam (2014), Fuster, Lo,
and Willen (2016) and Agarwal, Amromin, Chomsisengphet, Landvoigt, Piskorski, Seru,
and Yao (2017) study how competition in the mortgage market affects mortgage interest
rates, but take house prices as exogenous. Poterba (1984) and Himmelberg et al. (2005)
study how mortgage interest rates affect house prices, but assume perfectly competitive
mortgage markets. This paper combines these ideas and studies credit and house prices
when lenders internalize the impact their credit provision has on house prices.
largest housing target increases for the GSEs took place in 1996 and 2001, yet the increase in GSE high-risk
activity did not take place till later. See Elenev, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016) for a theory of
the quasi-government nature of the GSEs.
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This paper is related to the literature on how size can affect incentives to take on risk. The
main theory in this area of research is too-big-to-fail: large institutions take on excessive
risks because they expect to be bailed out by the government (Stern and Feldman (2004)).
In my paper, the key variable that causes institutions to take on mortgage risk is the size of
their mortgage exposure rather than the size of the institution. This yields cross-sectional
predictions, holding a lender fixed, and is consistent with empirical evidence. In a similar
vein, Bond and Leitner (2015) develop a theory in which buyers with large inventories
of assets, can make further asset purchases at loss-making prices because other market
participants use prices to infer information about the underlying asset value. In their model,
the buyer incurs a cost when the market value of his inventories falls too low and would
therefore like to keep market prices high. In my setting, there is no asymmetric information
and lenders with large outstanding mortgage make loans that are low-quality based on
observable risk. This can therefore help explain the rise of sub-prime lending, which had
observably higher LTV and DTI ratios and higher default rates than prime mortgages. In
related work, there are other papers that have linked size to risk-taking. Boyd and Nicolo´
(2005) develop a theory in which banks in concentrated markets make riskier loans as higher
interest rates charged by monopolistic banks make default by borrowers more likely due to
increased moral hazard when borrowers face higher interest rates.13 Milbradt (2012) models
how mark-to-market accounting can lead financial institutions to suspend trading. Kumar
and Seppi (1992) show that uniformed investors have incentives to manipulate the spot
price used to compute the cash settlement at delivery when they hold futures positions. My
model focuses instead on how outstanding exposure can increase incentives to extend credit
rather than cause a suspension of trade.
The paper also related to the literature on zombie-lending which documents that large
Japanese banks continued to provide credit to insolvent borrowers.14 According to this
literature, banks may continue to extend credit to under performing loans as it is costly for
13For empirical evidence of concentration increasing bank risk taking, see Nicolo´ (2001) and Nicolo´,
Bartholomew, Zaman, and Zephirin.
14See Hoshi (2006) and Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008).
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them to fall below their required capital levels, or because they wanted to avoid public
criticism. In this literature, a bank may make negative NPV loans because of other
externalities associated with continuing to extend credit. In my model, banks similarly
have a positive externality when they make new mortgage loans through the effect of credit
on house prices. The mechanism I propose arises naturally in the mortgage market because
of the durability of housing. Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor (2014) and Mian, Sufi, and
Verner (2017) show that a buildup in mortgage debt and real estate lending booms predict
future financial crises across time and countries. This paper points to a specific feature of
mortgages that creates incentive to engage in risky lending and can help explain why real
estate assets are central to periods of booms and busts.
This paper also contributes to the recent debate on whether the housing boom and collapse
was driven by a credit supply shock or by high house price expectations. The majority
of this debate has been empirical with Mian and Sufi (2009), Favara and Imbs (2015),
Griffin and Maturana (2015), Landvoigt et al. (2015) providing evidence supporting a
credit supply shock and with Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Gyourko (2013) and Adelino et al.
(2016b) arguing that an expectations based explanation fits the data better. The theoretical
literature reconciling observations from the crisis with either view is relatively sparse, and
typically requires either irrationality or misinformation to justify the housing boom. The
expectations-based view often requires that buyers and lenders in housing markets hold
over-optimistic views about future housing prices.15 In the case of a credit supply shock,
since borrowers, securitizers and the MBS buyers faced large losses in the crisis, it is hard to
explain why the credit supply shock happened without an overoptimism or misinformation
about the benefits of new ways to supply credit. This paper adds to this literature by
providing a theoretical framework that can reconcile many of the empirical findings driving
the current debate.
15Arguments in favor of this have been made by Cheng, Raina, and Xiong (2014), Shiller (2014) and
Glaeser and Nathanson (2015).
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1.3. The Model
The model is an infinite horizon, discrete time model with overlapping generations. A
number, N , of infinitely lived banks each with access to an equal share of borrowers make
mortgage loans to households. Each period t a new generation is born that lives for two
periods and consists of a continuum [0, 1] of households. Households from generation t derive
utility from consuming housing, kt ∈ {0, 1}, when they are young, and a consumption good
when they are old. Their life-time utility is given by:
u(kt, ct+1) = γkt + βct+1.
The extent to which households value housing consumption is captured by the preference
parameter, γ, and β < 1 is a discount factor.16 Households have access to a storage
technology which yields a return of 1.
There are two types of households: a proportion αnb of households (“non-borrowers”) receive
their endowment when they are young and the remaining households (“borrowers”) receive
their endowment when they are old. “Non-borrowers” from generation t are born with an
endowment ωnbt at t. They receive a positive endowment, ω
nb
t = e
nb, with probability φnbs
and 0 otherwise where s is a generation-specific income shock. “Borrowers” from generation
t receive an endowment ωbt at t+ 1. These households therefore need a mortgage to be able
to buy a house at t. There are two types of borrowers: proportion αbh of households
are high-quality borrowers and the remaining are low-quality borrowers, with the former
having a greater expected endowment. High and low-quality borrowers receive a positive
endowment ωbt = e
b with probability φbhs and φ
bl
s (< φ
bh
s ) respectively and 0 otherwise.
Each generation t has a generation-specific shock, st ∈ {R,P}, and can be born rich or
poor with q being the probability of a rich generation being born. In a rich generation, all
16Green and White (1997), Sekkat and Szafarz (2011) and Sodini, Nieuwerburgh, Vestman, and Lilienfeld-
toal (2016) provide estimates of the benefits of home-ownership.
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agents have a higher expected endowment than in a poor generation: φnbP < φ
nb
R , φ
bh
P < φ
bh
R
and φblP < φ
bl
R. At each time t, once a generation is born, the expected endowments of
its borrowers and non-borrowers are common knowledge. There is therefore no adverse
selection due to information frictions in the credit market.
1.3.1. Housing Market
The housing stock, ht, depreciates at rate δ per period where 0 < δ < 1. Each period,
competitive price-taking construction firms can produce new housing, nt, to add to the
existing stock of housing. Firms have a cost of producing houses, cht, which depends on both
the existing stock of housing and new houses produced. The cost to firm i of producing nit
new houses is chtn
i
t. This particular cost function delivers tractable solutions and captures
the idea that land availability is an important factor in the cost of housing construction.
Piazzesi and Schneider (2016) show that movements in the value of the residential housing
stock are primarily due to movements in the value of land. Knoll, Schularick, and Steger
(2017) provide evidence that rising land prices explain about 80 percent of global house
price appreciation since World War II. 17 The total supply of housing at time t is therefore
given by:
ht = (1− δ)ht−1 + nt.
The demand for housing is given by the number of mortgage loans borrowers get from banks,
hbt , and the number of houses purchased by non-borrowers, h
nb
t . I will make parameter
restrictions (outlined at the end of this section) to ensure that there is some new construction
every period. The price of housing, Pt, is then set to clear the housing market and is given
17The main results of the model also hold for a more general supply function in which construction costs
are affected differentially by new construction and by the exisiting stock of housing. More generally, the key
results of the model require that house prices increase when credit supply expands.
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by a linear function:
Pt = cht.
18
1.3.2. Mortgage Loans
At time t, a household i borrows kitPt at an interest rate, r
i
t(st+1), that can be contingent
on the future states of the world. At time t+1, if a household pays back its loan, it keeps its
house which it can sell to use the proceeds for consumption. If the household defaults on its
loan, the bank forecloses on the house and is entitled to the household’s endowment. In the
model, mortgage loans are therefore similar to adjustable rate mortgages with recourse.19
1.3.3. The Household’s Problem
Each period t, borrowers and non-borrowers from generation t decide whether to purchase
a house. Households also have access to a storage technology which gives a rate of return
of 1 at time t + 1. When deciding whether to purchase a house, non-borrowers account
for both the utility they get from housing consumption and the future price at which they
expect to sell their home (the proceeds of which are spent on the consumption good). At
time t, a non-borrower with endowment ωnbt ≥ Pt will buy 1 unit of housing if:
γ + β(1− δ)E[Pt+1] ≥ βPt.
Borrower households from generation t receive their endowment in the future and must
borrow from banks at time t to buy housing. At time t+1, a borrower who has successfully
18Each firm solves the following problem,
maxnit Ptn
i
t − chtnit
In equilibrium, firms will produce housing until Pt = cht.
19In a model with recourse, at time t, a household with a mortgage loan from generation t− 1, repays its
mortgage if its net worth is larger than the repayment amount
ωbt−1 + (1− δ)Pt ≥ Pt−1rit−1(st).
If the household defaults, the bank gets the maximum amount the household can repay, i.e., ωbt−1+(1−δ)Pt.
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obtained a mortgage will either successfully repay their mortgage and can then sell their
house, or default and lose their endowment and house. If a borrower’s bank charges him a
state-contingent interest rate of rt(st+1), then he will buy 1 unit of housing if:
γ + β(1− δ)E[Pt+1] ≥ βE[min{Pt(1 + rt(st+1)), ωbt + (1− δ)Pt+1}].
The LHS is the utility the household gains from living in the house in period t and the
proceeds the household gets from selling the house at t + 1. The RHS represents the net
cost of purchasing the house to the household. If the household does not have enough funds
to repay its mortgage, ωbt + (1 − δ)Pt+1 < Pt(1 + rt(st+1)), then it defaults and loses its
endowment and house.
1.3.4. The Bank’s Problem
There are N infinitely lived banks that can make mortgage loans to households. Each
period t, banks observe the income shock of the current generation and decide how many
loans to issue and at what interest rate. Each bank has access to an equal share, 1N , of
the mortgage market. The mortgage market is thus segmented implying that households
borrow from their local bank and do not shop around for mortgage rates. Therefore, each
bank has access to a group of borrowers without having to compete with other banks on
interest rates.20 Although banks do not compete directly on interest rates, they interact
strategically with each other due to the collective effect of their actions on house prices.
This gives rise to strategic substitution effects that are similar to those in models of Cournot
competition.
I solve the model in both the case when a bank cannot commit to future lending and in the
case when the bank can commit to future lending. Let V (st,m
h
t−1, rht−1,mlt−1, rlt−1, Pt−1, st−1)
be the value function of a bank at time t where st = {h, l} represents the income shock of
20Lacko and Pappalardo (2007) and Amel, Kennickell, and Moore (2008) provide empirical evidence that
supports this assumption. They find that consumers tend to bank locally and do not shop around for
mortgage rates.
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the generation born at time t, mjt−1 represents the number of mortgage loans that the bank
has made at time t− 1 to borrowers of type j = {h, l} at interest rate rjt−1, and Pt−1 is the
price of housing at time t − 1 (and a function of mht−1 and mlt−1). Then at time t, a bank
solves the following problem:
V (st−1, st,mht−1,m
l
t−1, r
h
t−1, r
l
t−1, Pt−1) = max
mht ≥0,mlt≥0,rht ,rlt∑
j={h,l}
mjt−1
(
φbjst min{Pt−1(1 + rjt−1), eb + (1− δ)Pt}+ (1− φbjst) min{Pt−1(1 + rjt−1), (1− δ)Pt}
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Repayment
−
∑
j={h,l}
mjtPt︸ ︷︷ ︸
New Lending
+βE
[
V (st, st+1,m
h
t ,m
l
t, r
h
t , r
l
t, Pt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Continuation Value
s.t. γ + β(1− δ)E[Pt+1] ≥ βE[min{Pt(1 + rt(st+1)), ωbt + (1− δ)Pt+1}]
mht ≤
1
N
αbh
mlt ≤
1
N
(1− αbh − αnb).
The first term in the bank’s payoff is the amount the bank earns on loans made to borrowers
from generation t−1 which are due for repayment at time t. House prices at time t affect the
bank’s payoff from outstanding loans in two ways: they affect borrower net-worth which
determines whether the borrower will repay or not; they also affect the bank’s payoff in
case of default. The second term is the cost of new lending and the final term is the bank’s
expected continuation value. The bank faces a borrower purchasing constraint - that given
the repayment schedule chosen by the bank, the borrower wants to get a mortgage. The
second and third constraints are the market share constraints of the bank.21
21Note that banks are taking into account the current and future lending decisions of all other banks when
making their own decision about how many loans to make. In a slight abuse of notation, the problem as it
is currently written does not make this explicit. Lending by other banks is embedded in the bank’s decision
when it accounts for current and future house prices.
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1.3.5. Parametric Restrictions
Given the [0, 1] continuum of households born every period, the maximum housing price is
c. To help understand the following parameter restrictions, it is useful to note that given
these restrictions, the price of housing in the economy will never fall below cφnbP α
nb. To
close out the model, I make the following parametric restrictions:
1. The private benefit of housing is large enough, i.e., γ ≥ β(c − c(1 − δ)φnbP αnb), to
guarantee that non-borrowers always demand housing and there is a positive interest
rate at which borrowers demand housing.
2. Non-borrower endowment is large enough, i.e., enb ≥ c, to guarantee that a non-
borrower who receives a positive endowment can always afford to buy a house. Since
non-borrowers in the model are proxying for outside housing demand, this assumption
guarantees that credit is never the sole driver of house prices.22
3. In the theoretical results, depreciation is not too low, i.e φnbP α
nb > 1− δ, to guarantee
that there is at least some new construction every period and that the bank’s problem
is thus continuous in house prices. In the calibrated version of the model, I do not
restrict the parameters to satisfy this assumption.
4. Low-quality borrower endowment is small enough, i.e.,
βφblRe
b + β(1− δ)c < cφnbP αnb,
to guarantee that it is never profitable for banks to lend to low-quality borrowers.
The assumption on new construction every period guarantees that price never falls
below cφnbP α
nb. This restriction helps to clarify the key mechanism of the model since
for any possible sequence of house prices and in any state, any mortgage loan made
22This also helps simplify the model solution as house prices will always increase with more credit. Banks
do not crowd non-borrowers out of the market by making house prices too expensive.
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to low-quality borrowers is NPV negative. Therefore, there is no reason a bank would
ever make loans to low-quality borrowers unless the return from propping up prices
is high enough.
Model Robustness: There are two key requirements for the results. First, house prices
affect a household’s ability or incentive to repay a mortgage such that higher housing prices
reduce the probability of default and/or the loss due to default. Second, credit provision
has an effect on house prices. The model is robust to modeling mortgage loans without
recourse and as fixed rate mortgages. The model is also robust to other market structures
as long as banks are able to make profits in one period and offset them with losses from
another. The model can also allow entry and exit so that banks lifetime profits are zero as
long as they can make profits or losses period-by-period.
1.4. Three-Period Model
To demonstrate the key mechanisms of the model I start by discussing the equilibrium in a
simplified three-period setting. This highlights how concentration affects both the quantity
and quality of credit. It also explains how, in concentrated markets, mortgage growth can
be negatively correlated with income growth across areas and positively correlated with
income growth across borrowers. Uncertainty in future lending opportunities and intra-
period borrower heterogeneity are not necessary to obtain the key results of the model,
and therefore I abstract away from both in this simplified model. The full model keeps
the intuition of the three-period model and is additionally able to produce boom and bust
cycles with features that characterized the recent housing crisis.
In the first period the economy is in a rich-state with only non-borrowers and high-quality
borrowers, and in the second period a poor-state hits with certainty in which there are only
non-borrowers and low-quality borrowers. In the final period, no new generation is born
and therefore I assume the price of housing falls to an endogenously specified liquidation
value, cφnbP α
nb ≥ κ ≥ 0. Since no high-quality borrowers are born in the second period, any
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t = 2 lending will only be to low-quality borrowers. Since by assumption low-quality loans
are negative NPV, banks only lend a positive amount at t = 2 if they find it profitable to
prop up house prices. This setup thus clearly demonstrates when a bank is incentivized to
sacrifice loan quality for the return to keeping house prices high.23
I characterize the results of the model both when banks cannot commit to a level of t = 2
lending when making loans at t = 1 and when banks can commit to future lending. As I
will discuss, in both cases the results are qualitatively similar but the economic intuition
for why banks want to prop up prices is different. In practice, there are reasons to think
that the GSEs were able to commit, at least in part, to future lending. Hurst, Keys, Seru,
and Vavra (2016) provide evidence that the GSEs faced political pressure that did not allow
them to make substantial changes to interest rates. These constraints could credibly allow
the GSEs to commit to future activity.
The three-period model can be solved by backward induction. Since no new generation is
born in the third period, banks do not lend at t = 3. In the second period, lending by any
given bank m2 is stated in the following lemma, where M
−i
2 is lending by all other banks
at t = 2.
Lemma 1.A In the three-period model, without commitment to future lending, a bank’s
period-2 lending, m2, is given by the following two cases.
Case 1: If φbhR e
b ≤ γβ ,
m2 = max
{
0,
m1(1− δ)
2
− φ
nb
P α+M
−i
2
2
+ β
φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ
2c
}
.
Case 2: If φbhR e
b > γβ ,
23In this three-period model, since t = 3 values are kappa and low-quality borrowers are only born at
t = 2, the fourth parametric restriction can be simplified to βφblP e
b + β(1− δ)κ < cφnbP αnb.
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m2 = max
{
0,
(1− φbhR )m1(1− δ)
2
− φ
nb
P α+M
−i
2
2
+ β
φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ
2c
}
.
In the three-period model, with commitment to future lending, a bank’s period-2 lending,
m2, is given by:
m2 = max
{
0,
m1(1− δ)
2
− φ
nb
P α+M
−i
2
2
+ β
φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ
2c
}
.
The loans a bank makes to low-quality borrowers, m2, is always increasing in outstanding
loans, m1. When m1 = 0 and the bank has no outstanding loans on its balance sheet, it
will never make any loans at t = 2 to low-quality borrowers and m2 = 0.
24 As the amount
of outstanding loans increases, m2 can become positive. If at t = 1, a bank is unable to
commit to a level of future lending, m2, then it props up house prices to improve its return
on loans that are delinquent - when the borrower is unable to return the full face-value
of the loan. By increasing house prices through credit expansion, a bank is able to earn
a higher return on defaulting loans since it has a claim on the house. If a bank is able
to commit to future lending, it props up prices to improve its return on delinquent loans
and additionally to increase the face-value it can charge on non-delinquent loans. With
commitment, a bank therefore has greater incentives to prop up prices.25
Loans to low-quality borrowers, m2, is also increasing in the future expected income of low-
quality borrowers, φblP e
b. It is decreasing in the housing demand coming from non-borrowers
and other banks, φnbP α
nb + M−i2 . A lower φ
nb
P α
nb + M−i2 implies that an individual bank
effectively has larger market power in influencing house prices since outside sources of
demand are lower. In other words, a lower φnbP α
nb+M−i2 implies a larger elasticity of house
24Since low-quality loans are assumed to be negative NPV, −φnbP αnb −M−i2 + β φ
bl
P e
b+(1−δ)κ
c
< 0.
25When φbhR e
b ≤ γ
β
, bank lending at t = 2 is identical with and without commitment. In this case, t = 1
borrowers are willing to repay the bank φbhR e
b + (1 − δ)P2 and by setting a face-value of the loan slightly
above this, banks can credibly raise house prices to improve their return on all outstanding loans at t = 2
by propping up prices. For more detail on this, see the appendix.
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prices to credit.26. This increases the net benefit that credit expansion by the bank has on
house prices.
At t = 1, a bank takes into account its lending at time t = 2 when determining how many
loans to make. In period 1, a bank’s lending is stated in the following lemma, where M−i1
is lending by all other banks at t = 1.
Lemma 1.B In the three-period model, without commitment to future lending, a bank’s
period-1 lending, m1, is given by the following two cases:
Case 1: If φbhR e
b ≤ γβ ,
m1 = max
{
0,min
{
β
c
(
φbhR e
b + (1− δ)P2
)− φnbR αnb −M−i1
2
,
(1− αnb)
N
}}
.
Case 2: If φbhR e
b > γβ ,
m1 = max
0,min

β
c
(
γ
β + (1− δ)P2
)
− φnbR αnb −M−i1
2−
(
β
2 (1− φbhR )φbhR (1− δ)2
)
.1{m2>0}
,
(1− αnb)
N

 .
In the three-period model, with commitment to future lending, a bank’s period-1 lending,
m1, is given by:
m1 = max
0,min

β
c
(
min{φbhR eb, γβ}+ (1− δ)P2
)
− φnbR αnb +M−i1
2
,
(1− αnb)
N

 .
In an equilibrium in which a bank props up house prices, if a bank lends more at t = 1,
26The elasticity of house prices is simply defined here as the percentage change in house prices for the
marginal mortgage loan
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it also increases its t = 2 lending. This pushes up housing prices at t = 2 (P2) in turn
increasing the amount of loans a bank makes at t = 1. There is thus a feedback loop
between t = 1 and t = 2 lending. Bank lending is also affected by the aggregate lending
of other banks. The number of loans a bank makes at t = 1 is decreasing in the number
of loans made by other banks, M−i1 , but increasing in the number of loans made by banks
in the future, M−i2 . The more loans other banks make at t = 1, the higher is the price of
housing at t = 1, making it more expensive for a bank to make mortgage loans. This causes
a bank to decrease the amount it lends. The more loans other banks make at t = 2, the
higher is the price of housing at t = 2, allowing banks to charge a larger interest rate on
loans made at t = 1 and increasing their incentive to lend at t = 1. There is thus strategic
substitution in bank lending within period but strategic complimenterities in bank lending
across periods. The full characterization of the equilibrium is discussed in the following
subsection.
Numerical Example: To help understand the mechanism, I run through a numerical
example with N = 1. I choose the following parameters: αnb = .7, δ = .4, eb = $200, 000,
φbhR = 1, φ
bl
P = .7, κ = $100, 000, c = $300, 000. Following the second parametric restriction,
enb ≥ c. For simplicity, I assume no discounting, i.e. β = 1, and also have no non-borrower
income shocks, i.e. φnbR = φ
nb
P = 1. I also assume γ ≥ φbhR eb, so that bank lending with and
without commitment are equivalent.27
Imagine a bank does not take into account the effect of house prices on the profitability of
its outstanding share of loans. Then in the second period, a bank will not prop-up prices. It
therefore makes no loans at t = 2 since all loans to low-quality borrowers are negative NPV.
Only non-borrowers will buy housing at t = 2. Therefore, housing demand in the second
period is hd2 = .7, and resulting house prices are ch
d
2 = $210, 000. We can check that loans to
low-quality borrowers are negative NPV. House prices at t = 3 are given by the liquidation
value κ = $100, 000 and low-quality borrowers’ expected endowment is φblP e
b = $100, 000.
27In this example, to guarantee that loans to low-quality borrowers are negative NPV, it is sufficient that
βφblP e
b + β(1− δ)κ < cφnbP αnb.
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If a bank was to lend to low-quality borrowers, it would have to pay $210, 000 at t = 2 and
receive an expected repayment of (1− δ)κ+ φblP eb = $200, 000 at t = 3.
If a bank is not propping up house prices, it will make no loans in period 2. In the first
period, the bank will make m1 = .19 loans.
28 Resulting house prices at t = 1, will be
chd1 = $268, 000. The cost of making t = 1 loans to a bank is $268, 000 and the expected
repayment from these loans is (1 − δ)P2 + φbhR eb = $326, 000. The total profits earned by
the bank are .19 ∗ (326, 000− 268, 000) = $11, 213.
Now, let’s consider what happens if the bank takes into account its outstanding share of
loans in the second period and wants to deviate to making t = 2 loans. Then if the bank’s
outstanding share is m1 = .19, a bank will find it optimal to make m2 = .04 loans. This
will increase t = 2 price to $222, 400. The bank earns an increased return of $1, 438 on its
outstanding loans while making a loss of −$926 on new lending at t = 2. Banks are able to
make this gain in profits at the expense of young non-borrowers. They are harmed by this
increase in price and suffer an aggregate loss of αnb ∗ ($222, 400−$210, 000) = $8, 680. This
loss of young non-borrowers is transferred to banks, old non-borrowers, and construction
firms.
The increase in house prices at t = 2, allows banks to make a greater return per loan they
make at t = 1. Banks are now able to get an expected repayment of $333, 440 instead of
$326, 000. This makes banks want to lend more at t = 1. This will in turn make the bank
want to lend more at t = 2 and so on and so forth. Eventually, the bank will increase t = 1
lending to .21 and t = 2 lending to .05. House prices at t = 2 will be $223, 516 and at t = 1
will be $271, 720. The total profits earned by the banks make from t = 1 loans is $12, 836
(an increase from $11, 213). The bank earns losses on t = 2 lending totaling −$1, 059 which
offsets some of these profits. Young non-borrowers at t = 2 account for the rest of the
transfer to banks.
28Loan amounts can be calculated using Lemma 1.
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1.4.1. Concentration and Credit
When concentration in mortgage holdings is low and each bank holds a small share of the
market, the return to propping up prices for any individual bank is low. Banks therefore
do not issue any loans to low-quality borrowers. As concentration increases, banks have
access to a larger share of high-quality borrowers at t = 1. In this case, they will issue loans
to risky borrowers to increase house prices and consequently the rents that they get from
high-quality borrowers. Formally, we can establish the following proposition,
Proposition 1 The three-period model has a unique equilibrium. There exists a cutoff, N ,
such that if N ≥ N , banks do not prop up houses prices and make no negative NPV loans.
If N < N , banks engage in risky lending to prop up house prices and supply a positive
amount of negative NPV loans.
When house prices at t = 2 are high, high-quality borrowers (who get a mortgage at t = 1)
make larger mortgage repayments to banks. This allows banks to earn greater rents from
them. As the market share of banks increases, they lend to more high-quality borrowers at
t = 1. This increases the effect of t = 2 house prices on their profitability. As concentration
increases, banks begin to make low-quality loans at t = 2 since credit expansion keeps house
prices high. As concentration decreases, banks begin to act more like price-takers in the
mortgage market and no longer make loans to prop up house prices.
Despite strategic complimenterities in bank lending across time, the equilibrium is unique.29
The uniqueness arises due to intra-temporal strategic substitution in bank lending. If other
banks pull back on lending at t = 2, an individual bank is incentivized to increase its own
lending at t = 2 and not cut back on its t = 1 lending enough to give arise to multiplicity.
There is therefore a unique equilibrium of the model.
29Typically the presence of strategic complimenterities gives rise to multiple equilibria. The typical reason
for multiplicity is as follows: when banks expect aggregate lending to be high at t = 2, they lend more at
t = 1, and the high t = 1 lending would lead to the high t = 2 lending that banks anticipated. Conversely,
when banks expect lending at t = 2 to be low, they lend less at t = 1 which in turn leads to low t = 2
lending as banks anticipated.
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As concentration increases aggregate credit can increase or decrease. There are two competing
effects. The first is a contemporaneous price effect. Large lenders internalize their effect
on house prices more than small lenders. The marginal increase in price when making
an additional loan affects large lenders’ cost of total lending more than that of small
lenders. Lenders in a concentrated market will therefore cut back on credit more than
lenders in a market with many small lenders. This effect is similar to a typical mechanism
in Cournot competition in which as concentration increases, the quantity of goods supplied
on the market decreases as suppliers internalize price effects more. As the number of
banks decreases, this “Cournot” effect leads to a decrease in credit supply. However, since
concentration also creates incentives to prop up prices, there is a second effect of change in
concentration on credit, the “propping-up” effect. Concentration increases banks’ incentives
to increase t = 2 prices through credit expansion and if this effect is large enough, it can
cause overall lending to increase.
The following corollary summarizes the effect of concentration on mortgage lending:
Corollary 1 In the unique equilibrium of the three-period model, as N decreases,
1. credit extended by any given bank to both high- and low-quality borrowers increases,
2. if N ≥ N and banks are not propping up prices, aggregate credit decreases,
3. if N < N and banks are propping up prices, aggregate credit can increase.
When N ≥ N and banks are not propping up housing prices, aggregate credit is always
decreasing with concentration because of the Cournot effect. As is typical in most models
of competition, as the number of banks decreases, banks behave more like price-takers and
are willing to issue more loans. As discussed above, when N < N , there is a second effect of
concentration on credit, the propping-up effect. As banks acquire larger market shares, they
issue more loans per bank at t = 1. This increases the incentive for banks to prop up prices
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and make negative NPV loans at t = 2. Higher t = 2 price further increase the incentive
to issue t = 1 loans and so on and so forth. As concentration increases, this feedback loop
can cause aggregate lending to increase.
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of concentration on house prices. As the market becomes
more concentrated and the number of banks decreases, banks begin to prop up house prices.
In this parametrization, credit increases with concentration in the region in which banks
prop up prices, as the propping-up effect dominates the Cournot effect. As concentration
decreases and N > N , banks stop propping up prices and the amount of credit increases as
competition in the market causes banks to behave more and more like price-takers.
Figure 1: Concentration and Credit.
The figure above plots total credit, measured by the number of households who get a mortgage, against the level of
concentration in the mortgage market. As we move along the x-axis, N increases and concentration decreases. The
parametrization is as follows: δ = .01, αnb = .2, φblP = .2, φ
bh
R = 1, φ
nb
P = .7, φ
nb
R = 1, eb = 2 ,κ = .45, γ = 4, c = 9.8.
Looking at Figure 1, we can see that it is possible for two areas with different levels of
concentration to have the same amount of aggregate credit. However, the composition of
this credit is different. In particular, the credit in the area with larger concentration is
riskier - a larger fraction of lending is to high-risk borrowers. Figure 2 overlays the first
graph with different credit risk characteristics - debt-to-income ratios and default rates.
As Figure 2 illustrates, although two areas with differing concentration can have the same
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aggregate credit, the credit in the area with higher concentration is riskier. When banks
are propping up prices, they extend credit to riskier households with high default rates and
make negative NPV mortgage loans. If there is an economic cost to high mortgage default
rates, this result suggests that a safer way to expand homeownership would be through
increased competition rather than through creating agencies that concentrate mortgage
risk. This may however come at the cost of lower income (and negative NPV) households
not getting credit.
Figure 2: Concentration and Credit Risk
The figures above plot the debt-to-income ratio and default rates on the right y-axis against concentration. As we
move along the x-axis, N increases and concentration decreases. The parametrization is as follows: δ = .01, αnb = .2,
φblP = .2, φ
bh
R = 1, φ
nb
P = .7, φ
nb
R = 1, eb = 2 ,κ = .45, γ = 4, c = 9.8.
The Effect of Various Model Primitives
A number of factors affect banks’ incentives to prop up house prices. When the expected
income of low-quality borrowers, φblP e
b, is high it is relatively more profitable to lend to
low-quality borrowers and banks have to take a smaller loss on these loans in their effort to
prop up prices. Therefore this increases the incentive to prop up house prices. When non-
borrower income growth in the poor state, φnbP , is low banks have relatively more market
power when it comes to affecting house prices, increasing the incentive to prop up prices.
Finally, when δ is low, houses are worth more in future periods increasing how much banks
and households value the future asset value of a house. As banks are incentivized to prop up
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prices more when these primitives change, the threshold level of concentration necessary for
banks to make high-risk loans decreases. The following corollary formalizes how N changes
with the various primitives of the model.
Corollary 2 In the three-period model, N increases as the expected income of low-quality
borrowers increases, as the depreciation rate decreases, and as non-borrower growth in the
poor state decreases. Formally,
∂N
∂φblP e
b
> 0,
∂N
∂δ
< 0 and
∂N
∂φnbP
< 0.
Asset Value of Housing
The key property of housing that gives rise to this mechanism is that housing is a durable
asset with future value. This is distinct from other goods that only serve a consumption
purpose. When δ = 1 and housing depreciates completely, banks and households do not
care about future house prices. There are no incentives to prop-up prices, and only the
Cournot effect remains. As δ decreases, the asset value of the house increases, causing
banks and households to value future house prices. This creates an incentive to prop up
prices when banks have a large enough exposure to the housing market. At low values of
δ, the incentives to prop up prices is stronger since housing is worth more upon repayment
leading to a higher value of N . Lower values of δ also increases household net worth upon
repayment and allow banks to charge larger repayments from households when making
mortgage loans increasing the total amount of credit banks are willing to supply. Figure 3
shows aggregate lending for different values of δ.
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Figure 3: Propping-up and the Asset Value of Housing
The figure above plots total credit, measured by the number of households who get a mortgage, against the level of
concentration in the mortgage market for different δs. As we move along the x-axis, N increases and concentration
decreases. The parametrization is as follows: αnb = .2, φblP = .2, φ
bh
R = 1, φ
nb
P = .7, φ
nb
R = 1, eb = 2 ,κ = .45, γ = 4,
c = 9.8.
Welfare
If there are no costs to default, the highest level of social welfare is achieved when the
maximum number of households get credit under the assumption that bank and construction
firm profits are remitted back to and are consumed by households. This is because when a
household purchases a house they achieve utility of γ from living in the house. The other
payments are simply transfers between the various agents in the model. The first best in
this model is when all households are home-owners. A constrained social planner who can
only increase home-ownership through incentivizing banks to lend would therefore choose
the level of concentration that maximizes credit provision.
We can add default costs to the model by assuming some deadweight losses per default d
which are not internalized by banks or households. These costs are social costs in the sense
that they are not internalized by banks or households and destroy the end-of-period utility
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of all households equally. We can imagine these costs are part of the net profits remitted to
households at the end of the period. If there are social costs to default, then if an increase in
concentration increases credit, this improves welfare if the net gain in utility by households
from consuming housing is higher than the deadweight losses due to default.
Recall from Figure 1, that it is possible to achieve the same level of aggregate credit for
two different levels of concentration. An important welfare insight of the model is that in
such a case, given any non-zero default costs, welfare is always higher in the area with lower
concentration. Formally,
Proposition 2 Let d be social costs of s default. If ∃ N1 < N ≤ N2 s.t. the total number
of households with access to credit is equal under both N1 and N2, then for any d > 0,
aggregate welfare is higher under N2 than N1.
This proposition is quite powerful because it is saying that for a large set of parameters,
it is optimal to increase competition and decrease concentration as long as there are any
costs to society of mortgage defaults, however small or large these costs might be. In this
case, the constrained social planner will always choose N2. The recent crisis has highlighted
that there can be large costs to mortgage defaults, and in that context this model would
generally advocate for a reduction in concentration.
1.4.2. Mortgage Growth and Income Growth
There has been an active debate on whether the housing boom and bust was driven by
a supply shock or by expectations of high future house prices. Much of this debate has
revolved around understanding the relationship between income growth and credit growth
during the housing boom. In support of the first hypothesis, Mian and Sufi (2009) find
that income growth decoupled from the growth in mortgage credit in the U.S. at the ZIP
code level. They stress that such a result is in line with the supply shock hypothesis since
lending seemed to have increased disproportionately to borrowers at the lower end of the
income distribution. In a paper, looking at more micro borrower-level data Adelino et al.
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(2016b) find that income and mortgage credit growth remained positively correlated at the
borrower-level. They argue that this is more in line with high house price expectations since
credit increased across the income distribution and was not disproportionately extended to
high-risk low-quality borrowers.
The model can simultaneously produce different correlations between income growth and
the growth in mortgage credit when looking at borrower-level data versus data that is
aggregated (e.g., to a ZIP code level). In the model, an exogenous increase in concentration
can cause a credit-supply shock that propagates through the expectation of higher future
house prices as large lenders have an incentive to prop up house prices. This can generate a
negative correlation between the growth in mortgage credit and income growth across areas
(eg. across ZIP codes) while still maintaining a positive correlation between the two at a
borrower-level. Specifically, consider a change in concentration when the number of banks
decreases from N1 > N to N2 < N such that banks move from not propping up prices at
t = 2 to propping up prices. Define ∆M as the change in mortgage credit following this
increase in concentration. Then, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Following an increase in concentration when the number of banks decreases
from N1 ≥ N to N2 < N and banks begin to prop up house prices, mortgage credit growth
is negatively correlated with non-borrower income growth in the poor state and positively
correlated with borrower income growth in the poor state i.e.,
∂∆M
φnbP
< 0, and
∂∆M
φblP
> 0.
As concentration increases the magnitude of the credit supply shock is largest in areas
that have the lowest growth in non-borrower income.30 All else equal, when non-borrower
income growth is low at t = 2 , the intra-period strategic substitution effect leads banks
to extend more credit. In the absence of other sources of demand to drive up housing
30Note that since N depends on φblP and φ
nb
P , this proposition only compares areas given an N1 and N2
s.t. N for each area falls within (N1, N2].
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prices, the effective market power of banks in the housing market is higher. As a result, for
every additional mortgage loan that banks extend to low-quality borrowers, the percentage
increase in housing prices is greater when non-borrower income growth is low. The returns
to propping up prices are therefore highest in areas with low-income growth. Looking at
borrower-level income growth, the return from making mortgage loans to borrowers is higher
when borrowers have larger expected income growth. All else equal, a bank would always
prefer to make a loan to a high-quality borrower, if possible, as such a loan would also serve
to increase house prices. The growth in mortgage credit is therefore positively correlated
to the growth in borrower income, φb.
Following an exogenous increase in concentration, this negative correlation between non-
borrower income and mortgage credit growth can cause areas with low-income growth to
experience larger credit-supply shocks than areas with higher income growth. Figure 4
illustrates such a case by plotting aggregate credit across an area with high versus low
income growth. In the region in which banks do not prop up prices, mortgage credit growth
is positively correlated to income growth. Banks only consider the return they make on the
mortgage loan itself, which increases when income growth is higher. When the mortgage
market is concentrated and banks are propping up prices, it is possible for credit to be
higher in areas with relatively low-income growth as the return to propping up prices is
higher in areas with low non-borrower income growth. In the example in Figure 4, imagine
an increase in concentration which causes the number of banks to go from 8 to 6. In this
case, the area with high-income growth will experience a decline in credit due to decreased
competition amongst banks. At the same time, the area with low-income growth will
experience a positive growth in credit due to an increase in the market power of banks.
At the borrower-level, the growth in mortgage credit and income growth can remain positively
correlated. In the simplified three-period model, I provide the intuition for this result
but do not show it explicitly as there is no inter-period heterogeneity amongst borrowers.
Appendix B outlines an example with inter-period borrower heterogeneity that shows how
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Figure 4: Income Growth and Mortgage Credit Growth
The figure above plots total credit, measured by the number of households who get a mortgage, against the level
of concentration in the mortgage market for different income growths between t = 1 and t = 2. As we move along
the x-axis, N increases and concentration decreases. The parametrization is as follows: δ = .01, αnb = .2, φblP = .2,
φbhR = 1, φ
nb
R = 1, eb = 2 ,κ = .45, γ = 4, c = 9.8. φ
nb
P is varied to get changes in income growth across the two plots
- it is equal to .73 is the high-income growth area and .7 in the low-income growth area.
the model can simultaneously produce a negative correlation between credit growth and
income growth amongst areas (such as ZIP codes) which maintaining a positive correlation
at the borrower-level.
Note that the empirical facts are not unequivocally agreed upon.31 It is outside the scope
and not the goal of this paper to take a stance on what empirical facts are valid and whether
in fact income and mortgage credit did or did not decouple across ZIP codes and across
borrowers. Therefore, the paper does not claim to explain the behavior of income and
mortgage credit growth during the crisis as the empirical agreement on these facts has yet
to be fully reached. Rather this paper informs the interpretation of these correlations by
providing a theoretical basis for understanding these correlations and how their meanings
can differ depending on the level of data aggregation.
31See Mian and Sufi (2016), Mian and Sufi (2015) and Adelino et al. (2015)
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In the three-period model, by construction in the last period house prices fall to κ demonstrating
that banks may lend to low-quality borrowers even if a crash in house prices is inevitable.
This helps illustrate the incentives banks have to prop up prices in the simplest possible
setup. In the infinite horizon model in Section 4, we get more realistic price processes for
housing prices and credit and can assess how concentration can lead to endogenous booms
and busts in house prices.
1.5. Infinite Horizon Model
I now solve the infinite-horizon model which gives rise to boom and bust cycles that
can explain various empirical facts that defined the housing crisis. In the full model,
there is intra-period heterogeneity: each period has both high- and low-quality borrowers.
Additionally, there is uncertainty about the state of the world: with probability q a rich
generation is born and with probability 1 − q a poor generation is born in which all
households have a lower expected income.
The path dependency of this problem can make it complicated to solve since in every
state banks have to decide how much to lend taking into account outstanding loans and
future lending. Furthermore, they also have to account for how the lending decisions of
other banks will affect both current and future house prices. Given the model setup, it
is possible to simplify a bank’s maximization in a similar way as the three-period model
to get a tractable problem.32 In the infinite horizon model, we can show that similar to
the model with three periods, once markets become concentrated banks have incentives to
prop up house prices. Furthermore, because of intra-period strategic substitution amongst
banks, the economy has a unique equilibrium despite strategic complimenterities in lending
across periods. Initialize initial loans to 0. Then we can establish the following proposition
analogous to the three-period case,
Proposition 4 The infinite-horizon model has a unique equilibrium. There exists a cutoff,
N , such that if N ≥ N , for any possible sequence of shocks, banks do not make any loans
32Details are provided in the appendix.
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to high-risk, low-quality borrowers to prop up prices. If N < N , there are a strictly positive
number of sequences of shocks in which banks will extend credit to high-risk, low-quality
borrowers to prop up house prices.
The key intuition for this proposition is identical to that in the three-period case. When N
is large, each individual bank has a small amount of loans on its books. Therefore banks do
not benefit from making loans that are unprofitable to push up house prices as the return
from propping up prices is low. As N increases and individual banks acquire larger market
shares, increasing house prices allows them to profit from a greater number of loans. This
increases the return from keeping house prices high. Therefore, as concentration increases,
the equilibrium begins to feature loans that are made to high-risk borrowers even if the loan
itself is negative NPV.
An important feature of the equilibrium is that conditional on the state of the economy,
lending per bank is increasing in its outstanding loans. Formally:
Corollary 3 Conditional on the state of the economy, aggregate lending Mt is increasing in
aggregate outstanding loans Mt−1. Lending per bank mt is similarly increasing in outstanding
loans mt−1 conditional on the state of the economy.
This feature of the equilibrium naturally generates housing boom and bust cycles and is
discussed in the remainder of this section.
1.5.1. Boom and Bust Cycles
An exogenous increase in concentration can lead to credit booms and busts with features
that match key empirical facts about the recent housing crisis.
Credit Boom, Rising House Prices and Rising DTI Ratios: In the equilibrium, the
amount of loans a bank makes is increasing in its outstanding loans, conditional on the state
of the economy. This feature of the equilibrium naturally gives rise to an increasing time-
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series of credit and house prices following a series of positive income shocks.33 This increase
in credit happens even though the “fundamentals” of the shock, the underlying income of
households, stays the same. The increase in credit is rather driven by the fact that lenders
find it profitable to increase credit expansion to prop up house prices as the size of their
outstanding exposure to the mortgage market increases. This effect is most pronounced for
lenders with access to a large number of potential borrowers since they make more loans
per bank, increasing the incentive to prop up prices in subsequent periods. Furthermore,
they are able to make a larger number of mortgages before being limited by the market
share constraint. They are therefore able to acquire larger and larger mortgage exposures,
increasing their incentive to prop up prices. High concentration can therefore cause credit
booms to be much larger than when concentration is low. Since the fundamentals of the
economy in terms of expected borrower income remain the same, the only thing that is
changing over time are house prices driven by greater credit expansion. The credit boom is
therefore accompanied by an increase in house prices and rising debt to income ratios.
Figure 5 shows how a credit boom and bust differ in high concentration versus low concentrat-
ion areas in an economy that has a series of consecutive high shocks followed by low shocks.
In this example, the area with a higher concentration has approximately 25% more credit
expanded at the height of the boom than the area with low concentration.
Rise in Risky Lending: The recent housing crisis had an unprecedented increase in
risky lending with mortgages being extended to borrowers with low FICO scores at high
DTI and LTV ratios. Figure 6 shows the composition of credit during the boom and bust
cycle. The right y-axis plots the percentage of credit extended to low-quality borrowers in
the credit boom. Not only do areas with high concentration have larger credit booms, the
composition of that credit is riskier. Also note that there is a boom in credit to high-quality
borrowers during rich-shocks in both high- and low- concentration areas. This is by virtue of
33For example, imagine that all banks start with 0 loans on their books and at t = 1 a high shock occurs
and banks make m1 > 0 loans. Then at t = 2 banks have m1 > 0 loans outstanding on their books. If at
t = 2 another high shock occurs, given that mt is increasing in mt−1 conditional on the state of the economy,
m2 > m1. And so on and so forth for any consecutive high shocks.
36
R R R R P P
States
0.48
0.52
0.56
0.6
0.64
Ag
gre
ga
te 
 Cr
ed
it
High Concentration: N=2
Low Concentration: N=4
Figure 5: Concentration and Credit Cycles
The figure above plots total credit, measured by the number of households who get a mortgage, across two areas with
different concentration for a series of income-shocks on the x-axis. Details of the parametrization are in Appendix C.
fundamentals being better during high shocks and is in line with findings by Adelino et al.
(2016b) that credit expansion increased across the income distribution during the credit
boom. However, the increase in outstanding loans in high concentration areas also creates
an incentive to prop up prices, leading to loans additionally being made to low-quality
borrowers. The overall composition of credit is therefore riskier in high concentration areas
during credit booms.
Timing of Risky Lending during Boom: The rise of risky lending happened in the
early- to mid-2000s even though house prices had been rising since the 1990s. Most theories
on the rise of risky lending do not account for the timing of the rise. For example, the
securitization of mortgages was common since the 1990s but the rise in risky lending was
not observed until later. As Figure 6 illustrates, the amount of risky lending increases over
the life of the credit boom and does not start immediately on entering a rich state. Since
low-quality loans are negative NPV, lending to risky borrowers is profitable only when the
return from propping up house prices is high. A lender’s portfolio needs to be large enough
for there to be an incentive to make risky loans. Since the number of outstanding loans
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Figure 6: Concentration and Credit Cycles - High-Risk Lending
The bars in the figure above plot the percentage of loans (right y-axis) made to high-risk, low-quality borrowers across
two areas with different concentration for a series of income-shocks on the x-axis. The lines plot total credit (left
y-axis), measured by the number of households who get a mortgage. Details of the parametrization are in Appendix
C.
increases over the life of the boom, high-risk lending will begin after the start of the boom
once the outstanding mortgage exposure is large enough. The exact timing of the start of
risky lending depends on the amount of concentration and the profitability of high- and
low-quality loans. As banks are incentivized to prop up prices, they will first saturate the
high-quality market and only then move on to riskier lending.
Continuation of Risky Lending after Boom: Lastly, Figure 6 illustrates that once a
low-shock hits the economy, lenders in the highly concentrated area continue to make risky
loans for a short time. Even though fundamentals in a poor state worsen, since large lenders
have a lot of outstanding loans, they have an incentive to keep lending to keep house prices
high. Essentially, large lenders react less to fundamental shocks than small lenders because
of the size of their balance sheet. In recent work, Elul, Gupta and Musto (2017) find that
the GSEs increased their risky activity in 2007 when markets began to slow down and when
private securitizers started withdrawing from the market. Additionally, Bhutta and Keys
(2017) find that private mortgage insurance issuance which allowed the GSEs to securitize
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loans with riskier fundamentals also increased in 2007 as the housing market was beginning
its downturn. Both papers also find that this seemed to be happening in areas where other
players were pulling out of markets. As house prices are likely to fall when other sources of
housing demand slow down, this is in line with my model predictions.
The model thus explains many facts about the recent housing crisis. As discussed earlier,
when Salomon Brothers got investors interested in MBS as an investment vehicle, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac grew their market share tremendously having a monopoly on prime
securitization and later became the biggest investors in private label MBS. This event can
be viewed as an exogenous increase to the GSEs market power, giving them access to large
share of potential borrowers. The model can help us understand the credit boom and bust
following this increase in GSE market power.
1.6. Extensions
This section discusses some extensions to establish some additional results and robustness
of the model mechanism.
Secondary Market Equivalency
During the housing boom, there was a large concentration in mortgage holdings at the GSE
level and amongst a few large banks who purchased many MBS. In the model described
so far, mortgage originators are assumed to be the final holders of these mortgages. The
baseline model can be reframed as an equivalent problem in which mortgage holders purchase
mortgages from a secondary market and do not originate any loans themselves. The key
mechanism works as long as there is concentration in mortgage holdings at some level and
agents with exposure to mortgage payments have some market power. If secondary market
players own a large share of the mortgage market, they want to keep house prices up. If they
have market power, they can offer attractive prices on the secondary market for sub-prime
mortgages that will incentivize mortgage originators to issue mortgages to risky borrowers.
Holders of these mortgages will suffer losses on these risky purchases but the increase in
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house prices will be profitable for their outstanding mortgage exposure.
The equivalent model is as follows. A continuum [0, 1−αnb] of banks competitively originate
mortgages and sell them to a secondary market. Each bank has access to one borrower in
the continuum of borrowers. Final mortgage holders purchase mortgages on the secondary
market from originators. Each holder has access to a fraction 1N of originators and thereby to
a fraction 1N of borrowers. Assuming mortgage originators follow an originate-to-distribute
model and do not hold mortgages is equivalent to assuming that their main source of
funding comes from secondary markets. The originate-to-distribute model was common
amongst mortgage originators during the housing boom (Purnanandam (2011)). Loutskina
and Strahan (2009) and An and Yao (2016) provide evidence that the GSEs were a key
source of liquidity provision for non-jumbo loans issued by banks.
A bank that originates mortgages is offered a secondary market price, Yt(r
j
t , ω
bj
t ), for a
mortgage originated at time t to a household j with expected endowment ωbjt at interest
rate rjt . An originator will make a mortgage loan to a borrower if:
Yt(r
j
t , ω
bj
t )− Pt ≥ 0.
Each period holders of mortgages will choose to post secondary market prices taking into
account their effect on originator decisions and how that influences housing prices. I assume
that secondary market holders can purchase mortgages at different rates from different
mortgage originators thereby allowing them to control how many mortgages of a type they
wish to purchase. Therefore, secondary market mortgage holders maximize the following,
where mjt−1 is the number of mortgages of type j{h, l} they purchased in the previous
period,
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γ + β(1− δ)E[Pt+1] ≥ βE[min{Pt(1 + rt(st+1)), ωbt + (1− δ)Pt+1}]
mht ≤
1
N
αbh
mlt ≤
1
N
(1− αbh − αnb).
The mortgage holder will pick Yt so that the originator is just willing to lend, implying
that Yt = Pt. Furthermore, they will choose an rt so that borrowers repay the maximum
they are willing to pay. This is equivalent to the problem faced by banks that hold onto
the mortgages they originate. The same logic can be applied if mortgages are resold on the
secondary market. The key requirement for the mechanism to work is that the final holder
of mortgages has some market power.
Refinancing
Since the model has one-period mortgage contracts, it abstracts away from the bank
choosing to refinance mortgage contracts to prevent defaults instead of issuing new mortgage
loans. Trivially, in the model if the bank could simply give an existing borrower who is due
to repay their mortgage loan a new mortgage this would be equal to writing down their
debt to a face-value of zero (the endowment in the low state). In this case, it is possible
to show that making a new borrower a mortgage loan rather than refinancing the existing
mortgage is always a dominant strategy as the bank can additionally harness the new
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borrower’s expected endowment. If it is not possible to make loans to new borrowers, the
same intuition for propping up prices applies and a bank will be willing to make a negative
NPV refinancing loan if it has large enough outstanding mortgage exposure.
The baseline three-period model can be extended to incorporate the possibility of refinancing
in a less trivial way. We can modify the model and assume that the generation born in
period-1 lives for three periods and gets utility from consumption in either the second or
the third period. The generation born at t = 1 therefore gets utility,
u(k1, c2, c3) = γk1 + βc2 + β
2c3
At t = 2, if a household from generation 1 gets an endowment of 0, with probability φbRP
they will receive an income of eb at t = 3. This captures the idea that some households may
have delayed income. At t = 2, a bank can either choose to make a new loan to prevent
defaults, or to refinance defaulting borrowers and issue them a new mortgage instead. For
simplicity, I assume that since the mortgage loan has recourse, a borrower who is in default
has to accept the bank’s refinancing offer at t = 2 if the new payment demanded does not
exceed the face-value of the loan multiplied by the discount factor β. In this case, a bank
would prefer to refinance an existing borrower rather than lend to prop up prices to a new
borrower if,
φbRP > φ
b
P
If φbRP < φ
b
P a bank would strictly prefer to make new loans rather than refinance existing
borrowers. The intuition for this is relatively straightforward. The bank will simply go for
whichever option is less negative NPV. This will depend on whether a loan to a new bad-
quality borrower or the existing borrower in default has higher expected future repayment.
The basic intuition is applicable to both refinancing and new loans. In line with this, Elul
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et al. (2017) find that the GSEs were more likely to make both high LTV refinancing and
purchase loans in areas where they had large outstanding exposure.
Lender Heterogeneity: Large and Small Lenders
During the housing boom and bust, while the GSEs and some large LCFIs acquired a large
share of the mortgage market, there were also smaller mortgage market participants. The
model can be extended to evaluate the case of some large lenders and many small, dispersed
lenders who behave like price-takers in the mortgage market. Specifically, I modify the
model to allow small, dispersed lenders to have access to a share s of households while large
lenders have access to the remaining ones.
The previous results and intuition all apply here. Furthermore, in a boom-bust cycle,
following a series of h shocks the effective market share of a large lender as measured by the
percentage share of all mortgages held by that lender over the total number of mortgages
outstanding, is increasing over time even though access to borrowers stays the same. This is
because as a large lender acquires more outstanding mortgages over the boom, the incentive
to prop up prices increases, leading the lender to increase credit. This effect is not present for
small lenders who are price-takers. The exposure of the large lender to the total mortgage
market therefore increases over time. This extension of the model matches the empirically
observed increase in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s market share over the housing boom.
I also calibrate this extended model to U.S. data. The calibration is discussed in section
6.1. As concentration increases, the size of the credit boom and extension of risky credit
also increase. Importantly, now the market share of large lenders increases over the boom.
Figure 7 shows a credit boom and busts in areas with differing concentration. It also
shows that the gain in effective market share of a large lender is lower when there are more
competing lenders.34
34This version of the calibration has the market share of large lenders decreasing upon the bust. The
effective market share may also increase if non-borrower demand and the provision of mortgages by small
price-taking lenders slows down.
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Figure 7: Concentration and Credit Cycles: Lender Heterogeneity
The panel on the right above plots the total amount of credit extended, measured by the number of households
who get a mortgage loan on the y-axis and the percentage of loans made to high-risk, low-quality borrowers, on the
right y-axis, across two areas with different concentration for a series of income-shocks on the x-axis. The panel on
the left shows the effective market share of large lenders across two areas with different concentration for a series of
income-shocks on the x-axis. Details of the parametrization are in Appendix C.
1.7. Calibration Exercise
I now calibrate the stylized model to the U.S. economy. The main purpose of this model is
to clearly illustrate the theory of how concentration in the mortgage market can create an
incentive to extend risky credit to keep house prices high and how that can produce credit
cycles with dynamics similar to that of the recent housing crisis. In doing so, the model
abstracts away from various aspects of mortgage markets, housing decisions by households,
details of mortgage contracts, etc. A deeper examination of the quantitative implications
of concentration on mortgage credit requires a more detailed quantitative model. However,
this calibration of the stylized model can help us address two questions. First, does the
model produce quantitatively significant credit and house price dynamics that match the
U.S. experience in the recent housing crisis? Second, does simply changing the level of
concentration produce significant variation in the path of credit and house prices? If the
answers to these questions are positive, then it provides support for this paper’s theory that
the housing boom and bust was driven by a change in concentration.
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The model is calibrated to to the 1991-2009 U.S. housing market with the boom quantities
aggregated across 1991-2006 and the bust quantities aggregated across 2007-2008. For this
exercise, I assume that the economy experienced a sequence of rich shocks in the boom
years followed by a sequence of poor shocks in the bust years. The rich and poor shocks are
mapped to Federal Reserve Economic Data on the growth rate of personal income. From
1991-2006 real median personal income growth at an annual rate of 1.5% while from 2007-
2009 it grew at an annual rate of -1.6%. Appendix C provides a detailed description of the
data.35
Table 12 in Appendix C summarizes the benchmark configuration of the model parameters.
Here, I discuss the parameters and results when calibrating the model with lender heterogen-
eity as that allows me to better target the GSE share of the mortgage market. As I lack
data on the exact market share of LCFIs, I do not attempt to capture their share in the
calibration. I choose s=.6 and N = 2 to roughly match the GSEs’ eventual market share
at the height of the boom. The income shocks of high- and low-quality borrowers in the
rich- and poor-states of the economy are chosen to match the default rates on prime and
sub-prime loans during the boom and bust. The fraction of high-quality borrowers is chosen
to match the fraction of prime versus sub-prime lending while the fraction of non-borrowers
is chosen to match the fraction of cash-only house purchases.
Table 13 in Appendix C compares the model-generated quantities for the calibration to
those in the data. A one-time change in concentration is able to match the house price
increase and decrease well, explaining approximately 45% of the boom in house prices. A
fundamental shock to the concentrated market explains about 30% of the bust in house
prices. It also does a good job of matching the fraction of sub-prime borrowers during
the boom explaining over 90% of the lending to sub-prime borrowers in the boom but
overestimates the lending to sub-prime borrowers slightly during the bust. This may be
partially driven by the fact that during 2007, the GSEs kept lending to high-risk borrowers
35Appendix C tables 15-17 also provide results for calibration of the benchmark model without lender
heterogeneity.
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but private securitizers started pulling out of the high-risk market.
Table 14 in Appendix C does a counterfactual analysis. I decrease concentration by doubling
N from 2 to 4 while keeping the other parameters of the benchmark calibration the same.
This change in concentration decreases the fraction of sub-prime lending in the boom to 0
in both the boom and bust. The boom also has 30% lower growth in house prices while the
bust has about 80% smaller decline in house prices.
The model can therefore produce quantitatively meaningful magnitudes and changes in
credit and prices when looking at the housing boom and bust. Moreover, changing concentra-
tion can result in significant changes to the model-implied credit boom and bust. This
suggests that concentration can be an important channel that contributes to credit cycles
and a more comprehensive quantitative exploration of this channel is interesting for future
research.
1.8. Conclusion
This paper provides a novel theory of how concentration in mortgage markets can affect
both the quantity and the quality of mortgage credit. Lenders with a large outstanding
mortgage exposure have incentives to extend risky credit to prop-up house prices. An
increase in concentration in mortgage markets can generate housing booms and busts with
features that match the recent U.S. housing crisis.
In the aftermath of the housing crisis, policy makers have wanted to design policy to curb
high-risk lending. However, the role that concentration can play in creating incentives to
extend risky mortgage credit has been largely overlooked in this process. The Economist
recently reported that concentration in mortgage markets has increased since the crisis
as a side-effect of new regulations faced by banks which have made them move out of
mortgage lending. Somewhat ironically, many of these regulations are intended to reduce
risky lending. The GSEs and the FHA are currently funding between 65-80% of new
mortgages, many of which appear to be highly risky. A fifth of all loans since 2012 have
46
LTV ratios of over 95%. This is comparable to the fraction of sub-prime lending in the
years before the housing collapse. As this paper demonstrates, such high concentration can
have a significant impact on both the quantity and quality of credit. It is therefore crucial
to comprehensively understand the different forces that incentivize high-risk lending when
designing policy.
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CHAPTER 2 : Concentration and Lending in Mortgage Markets
(with Ronel Elul and David Musto)
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System.
2.1. Introduction
The recent housing crisis has raised concerns about how housing markets should be designed
and regulated to limit excessive risk taking. One characterizing feature of the US housing
market during the boom and bust was the presence of institutions with large exposures to
the mortgage market - the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) and large complex
financial institutions (LCFIs). In 2007, when house prices started falling, these institutions
had amassed massive exposure to the US mortgage market. Much of this exposure consisted
of risky credit leading these institutions to either fail or require substantial government
intervention to continue operations. Although there has been concern over the large size
of such participants in the mortgage market, empirical research on the exact way in which
size affects the quality of credit in mortgage markets is limited.
In this paper, we show that the size of mortgage exposure can affect the quality of credit.
We start by documenting a striking expansion of risky lending by the GSEs, the two giants
of the real estate market, in 2007. This active increase in high-risk activity is surprising
as housing markets conditions had already started to deteroriate at this time and were
forecasted to keep worsening. In response to the decline in housing prices and rise in
defaults, smaller private-label securitizers were reducing risky lending as we would typically
expect. Moreover, the termination rates on these high-risk originations by the GSEs were
quite high making it hard to argue that the GSEs were expecting to profit from the future
performance of these loans. In fact, in October 2006, Richard Syron, the then chairman and
chief executive of Freddie Mac, October said that he was “concerned that foreclosure and
loss rates are going to increase” and expected to see “a bumpy landing at a national level”
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for the housing market. He also cautioned against going further out on the “risk curve”
and “betting on a turnaround in pricing.”
We provide evidence that this behaviour by the GSEs can be explained through a propping-
up channel (Gupta (2017)). The key idea is that if house prices affect the probability of
mortgage default, institutions with large outstanding exposure to mortgage markets benefit
from house prices staying high. If credit expansion increases house prices, lenders may
internalize their effect on house prices. This can cause institutions with large exposure to
the mortgage market, such as the GSEs, to extend high-risk credit. They are willing to
sacrifice some of the return they make on the loan itself for the boost in house prices that
comes from credit provision as high house prices affect the profitability of their outstanding
mortgage exposure. We posit that such incentives can explain the GSEs’ ramp-up of risky
lending at a time when such mortgages appeared to be the least profitable.
Using a loan-level dataset, we show that the GSEs engaged in riskier lending in MSAs in
which they had a higher proportion of outstanding mortgage exposure on their balance
sheet. We exploit variation in the size of the GSEs’ outstanding mortgage exposure across
MSAs in 2007. This allows us to control for institution-specific characteristics that can
affect lending such as risk-appetite, corporate governance, specific underwriting practices
etc. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the GSE share of outstanding mortgage
exposure in an MSA predicts new high-risk activity in that MSA.
We perform a number of tests to determine whether this relationship is driven by incentives
to keep house prices high and not by other factors that would affect both the outstanding
share and new risky activity. We expect propping-up incentives to be stronger when house
prices are more sensitive to credit. To test this, we use Saiz’s measure of house price elasticity
to see if the relationship between outstanding share and new high-risk originations stronger
in areas where the housing supply curve is more inelastic since this is where we expect
credit to have a stronger effect on house prices. In line with propping-up, we find that the
effect of outstanding mortgage exposure on risky originations is stronger in areas where the
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housing supply curve is inelastic. Since in these regressions, we are comparing GSE high-
risk activity in elastic versus inelastic MSAs conditional on their outstanding exposure, we
mitigate to some extent the concern raised in Davidoff (2015) that supply constraints are
correlated with unobserved demand factors. In 2007, relatively elastic MSAs experienced
greater demand shocks mitigating concerns that our results are driven by demand shocks.
Moreover, if demand for mortgages varied substantially across the MSAs we compare, it
is hard to explain why the GSEs amassed similar outstanding exposure at the beginning
of 2007. Since we are comparing MSAs in which GSE outstanding mortgage exposure is
similar at the start of 2007, we expect that demand factors across these MSAs should be
similar.
We also expect the incentive to prop-up to be stronger when the sensitivity of default to
house prices is high. To test this, we exploit variation in the composition of the GSEs’
outstanding portfolio. We measure the proportion of outstanding loans that have high
loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. We expect high LTV loans to be more sensitive to default
than low LTV loans, and therefore should expect to see a greater willingness to make risky
mortgages in MSAs in which more of the GSE portfolio is comprised of these loans. In line
with our hypothesis, we find that the GSEs are more likely to engage in high-risk lending,
when a larger proportion of their outstanding portfolio is composed of high-LTV loans.
We also examine the change in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s lending standards in MSAs in
which they had a high-outstanding share. We find that the GSEs lowered lending standards
in 2007 compared to 2006 in MSAs in which they had a greater outstanding share and this
effect was stronger in inelastic MSAs. To test this, We exploit a rule that if a mortgage
was made to a borrower with an origination FICO score of 620 or above, it was eligible
for the GSEs automated underwriting. Mortgages below the threshold, were subject to
additional underwriting by the GSEs and therefore were screened more carefully. Previous
research by Keys et al. (2011) has shown that there is a jump in the number of loans
made at the threshold and loans above the threshold performed worse than loans just
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below this threshold. Intuitively, a borrower with an origination FICO score of 619 should
be very similar in terms of risk to a borrower with an origination FICO score of 621.
However, because the borrower of 621 goes through an easier screening process due to
automated underwriting, while the borrower with an origination FICO score of 619 has
greater screening, the quality of loans right above the threshold is worse than right below.
Since the automated system was standardized across the country, the proportion of loans
just below the threshold to loans just above the threshold therefore tell us how strict the
GSEs manual underwriting was in an MSA. The lower the proportion, the stricter their
manual underwriting in the MSA. If the GSEs were increasing risky activity in MSAs in
which they had a higher outstanding share, we should see a smoothing out of this proportion
of the number of loans just below the threshold to the number of loans above. To test this,
we look at how the proportion of loans made below the threshold (origination FICO scores
610-619) to the number of loans made just above the threshold (origination FICO scores
620-629) changed from 2006 to 2007. We indeed see a smoothing of loans around the
threshold in MSAs in which the GSEs had a high outstanding share which we interpret
as evidence that the GSEs relaxed their underwriting standards for loans they manually
underwrote. We also find that this relationship is stronger in inelastic MSAs, in line with
propping-up incentives being stronger when house prices are more sensitive to credit.
Finally, we hope to control for demand-side factors by restricting our analysis to the first
half of 2007. By the end of 2006 there was a lot of guidance that house prices were set to
decline and that mortgage delinquencies were expected to increase.1 Risky lending in this
period is therefore unlikely to be driven by factors such as high house price expectations,
a high presence of willing investors for risky mortgages or many speculators wanting to
make money off continuing increases in house prices. Indeed, we document that the private
market cut back on its risky activity in 2007 possibly in response to fears of a housing bust.
We therefore do not believe that the GSEs lending decisions in this time were driven by
expectations that these high-risk mortgages would be profitable.
1Further details on this guidance are provided subsequently in the paper.
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Our paper has implications for the design on the housing market - in particular, how
incentives to lend differ between large versus small mortgage market participants. In the
aftermath of the financial crisis, a lot of focus has been on how to curb risky lending.
Although some steps have been taken to address issues such as the moral hazard concerns
connected to securitization and the under-capitalization of the banking sector, concentration
in mortgage markets has largely gone unaddressed. Mortgage markets are more concentrated
now than they were during the housing boom and bust. In 2016, The Economist reported
that government organizations are funding about 65-80% of new mortgages and Quicken
Loans and Freedom Mortgage are currently originating about half of all new mortgages.
A number of papers have found a connection between size and risky lending. Dell’Ariccia
et al. (2012) provide evidence that worsening lending standards in the housing boom were
driven by large lenders. They also find lower loan denial rates in areas with a smaller number
of competing lenders. Adelino et al. (2016a) find that based on observable risk characteristic
loans in GSE pools of private MBS were riskier than those in non-agency pools. Nadauld
and Sherlund (2013) provide evidence that the large increase in the securitization of sub-
prime mortgages can mostly be attributed to the five largest broker/dealer banks. We
contribute to this literature by finding evidence that large exposure to the mortgage market
can lead to risky mortgage activity and highlight a possible channel - the incentive to prop
up house prices as mortgage exposure grows- that could be driving this.
Theoretically, there are a few channels that can lead to a connection between size and
risky lending. As mentioned before, in this paper we test the theory that large mortgage
exposure can lead to risky activity to keep house prices high. Another channel that would
connect size and risky lending is if large institutions have an implicit bailout guarantee by
the government. In this paper, by focusing on the GSEs and exploiting variation in GSE
share in different MSAs, we can provide support for the theory of propping-up prices. Since
implicit bailout guarantees should vary across- but not within-institutions, our results can
not help speak to the theory of implicit-bailout guarantee that may be present for large
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institutions.
The GSEs were central to the American housing market during the housing boom and
bust and a large literature has studied the various ways in which the GSEs may have
contributed to the fragility of mortgage markets.2 The agencies had a dual mandate, low-
income housing targets, and the implicit subsidies they received from the government leading
to lower borrowing rates and implicit bailout guarantees. All these reasons could contribute
to GSE high-risk activity. To eliminate some of the concerns that these other factors are
driving our results, we choose to exploit variation in the GSE exposure amongst MSAs. If
for example, lower borrowing costs were the only cause of the agencies high-risk activity,
their outstanding exposure should not be connected to their high-risk activity. Amongst
other reasons for GSE lending, their low-income housing targets would vary across MSAs.
Acharya et al. (2011) report that GSE adherence to these targets seemed to be voluntary -
the GSEs missed their housing targets on several occasions without any severe sanctions by
regulators. We therefore find it unlikely that our results are driven by GSE housing goals.
Furthermore, if anything, we expect targets to be negatively correlated to GSE outstanding
exposure.
Although there is research on how concentration in mortgage markets can affect mortgage
interest rates and on how interest rates can affect housing prices, the intersection of the
two is surprisingly limited. Scharfstein and Sunderam (2014) and Fuster et al. (2016)
have evidence that mortgage interest rates and spreads in secondary markets are affected
by competition. However, they do not look at how this can affect house prices. A large
body of literature has studied the effect of credit on house prices. The user cost models
of Poterba (1984) incorporated mortgage interest rates as a determinant of house prices.
Empirically, papers by An and Yao (2016) Griffin and Maturana (2015), Landvoigt et al.
(2015), Hubbard and Mayer (2009), Himmelberg et al. (2005), Mayer (2011), Khandani
et al. (2009) and Favilukis et al. (2017) have found that house prices respond to mortgage
2See Acharya et al. (2011) for a comprehensive review.
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credit. We therefore think it quite natural to expand this literature by considering how
concentration in the mortgage market impacts credit and house prices.
Our paper is one of the few which combines these two literatures and studies how large
institutions may provide credit in response to their effect on house prices. In a paper
close to ours, Favara and Giannetti (2015) analyze the effects of size on the probability
of foreclosure and renegotiation of debt in mortgage markets. They find that mortgage
lenders seem to internalize house price drops coming from foreclosure externalities and are
less likely to foreclose on delinquent households in areas in which they have large outstanding
exposure of mortgages on their balance sheet. We complement their analysis by looking
at how internalizing pricing externalities effects the incentive of large lenders in mortgage
origination. We find that there can be a darker side to large balance sheet exposure as the
incentives of making risky loans can be higher in more concentrated markets.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data, provides
summary statistics and gives some background on the housing market in 2007. Section 2.3
describes the main analysis and our results. The last section concludes.
2.2. Data and Summary Statistics
We use loan-level data from Black Knight McDash (heretofore referred to as McDash).
These data have been used to study the determinants of mortgage default (Elul et al.,
2016), and the expansion of credit during the housing boom (Adelino, Schoar and Severino,
2016). These data are provided by the servicers of the loans, and the contributors include the
majority of the top servicers. We focus on first mortgages that are originated or outstanding
starting from 2005, since coverage of the McDash data was not as extensive prior to that
date (particularly for subprime loans), and continuing through 2008.
The McDash data cover about two thirds percent of all mortgage originations in these
years. We restrict attention owner-occupied homes and exclude multifamily properties. The
McDash data set is divided into a “static” file, with values that do not change over time,
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and a “dynamic” file. The static data set contains information obtained at the time of the
original underwriting, such as the loan amount at origination, house value at the origination
date, origination FICO score, documentation status (i.e., full-documentation versus low/no
documentation of income and assets), the source of the loan (e.g., whether it was broker-
originated), property location (zip code), type of loan (fixed-rate, ARM, prime, subprime,
IO, Option-ARM, etc.), and whether there is a penalty for prepayment. The dynamic
file is updated monthly. The most important dynamic variables for our analysis are the
current principal balance and the investor type: private-securitized, Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, portfolio, FHA. Because of the time it takes a loan to go through the securitization
pipeline, many mortgages are initially recorded as portfolio loans when they first appear in
the data set; therefore, we define the “investor type at origination” to be that reported at
six months from loan origination. We focus attention on loans purchased by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac (referred to as “GSE”) and Private securitized loans; the other investor types
are combined into the a single residual category. Finally, we also merge in the house prices
index3 at the zip code level from Corelogic HPITM (heretofore referred to as Corelogic), and
the housing supply measures from Saiz (2010).
Summary statistics for the key variables can be found in tables 1, 2 and 3. Table 1
summarizes the GSE and private-securitized share of the mortgage market and the high-risk
(high LTV, low origination FICO) composition of their portfolios at the end of 2006 at the
MSA-level. Table 2 summarizes the GSEs and private-securitized share of new originations
and their high-risk activity share of originations in the first half of 2007 at the MSA-level.
The GSEs increased their share of high-risk mortgage activity substantially in 2007. At the
end of 2006, 10% of GSE-securitized loans (purchases and refinances) consisted of mortgage
loans with LTV ratios of above 80% and 15% consisted of mortgage loans with origination
FICO scores of less than 660. In 2007, 30% of new GSE-securitized loans had an LTV ratio
of above 80% and 21% had origination FICO scores of less than 660.
3Using the December 2016 release.
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Table 3 shows the GSEs and private-securitizied share of new originations and their high-risk
activity share of originations separately for the first two quarters of 2007. The average GSE
loan worsened over 2007 with the high-LTV and low- origination FICO share of originations
increasing in the second quarter of 2007 relative to the first. A similar deterioration in
mortgage quality did not occur on the private-label side with the high-LTV share remaining
constant across the two quarters and the low origination FICO share of originations decreasing
from 51% in the first quarter of 2007 to 41% in the second quarter.
2.2.1. Background on the Housing Market and GSE Activity in 2007
In this section, we give an overview of the market sentiment about house prices at the
beginning of 2007. In particular, we want to establish that market participants were
predicting a decline in house prices and that institutions that were active in mortgage
markets were reacting to this outlook of the mortgage market and reducing risky activity.
We hope to make the case that it is hard to explain GSE high-risk activity at this time and
that new high-risk loans did not appear to be profitable ex-ante.
In October of 2006, Moody’s released a report stating that “The U.S. housing market
downturn is in full swing.” They predicted that “100 of the nation’s 379 metro areas have
a significant probability of experiencing price declines” with about 20 areas experiencing
double-digit crashes in house prices. In March of 2007, the NYtimes reported that the
Mortgage Bankers Association had shown a record number of homes entering the foreclosure
process and stated that the “troubled housing market” was expected to “weaken further”.
In March 2007, the Economist further reported that about 18% of homebuyers who took
out mortgages in 2006 were in negative equity and would face the “greatest difficulties”.
Investors and participants in the housing market showed signs of reacting to this outlooks.
Private securitizers started cutting back on high LTV lending in mid-2006. New Century
Financial’s stock fell to half its value in March of 2007. In March 2007, housing starts had
fallen 33% in two months and investors were reported to be “shunning subprime and all
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mortgages that seemed risky.”
Furthermore, there is evidence that the agencies themselves shared this bleak outlook on the
future of the housing market. As we mentioned earlier, in October 2006, Richard Syron, the
then chairman and chief executive of Freddie Mac, October was “concerned that foreclosure
and loss rates are going to increase” and expressed concern about “a bumpy landing at a
national level” for the housing market. He also cautioned against going further out on the
“risk curve” and “betting on a turnaround in pricing.” This makes it seem unlikely that
the GSEs were planning to “gamble for resurrection.”
Despite this negative forecast of the housing market, the GSEs increased their market share
of high LTV loans in 2007. At the same time, the private market for securitization withdrew
from these riskier markets. Figure 8 plots the fraction of all high-LTV (LTV > 80) loan
originations that were GSE and private-market originated (purchase and refinances). By
the end of 2007, the GSEs grew their share of high-LTV originations to about 70%, up from
50% at the start of 2006. This ramp-up in high-risk activity was not simply the GSEs being
passive and maintaining lending levels as the private-market cur back on lending. In figures
10 and 11, we plot the volume of new high-risk (LTV > 80) and lower-risk originations
(LTV ≤ 80). The GSEs increased their high-LTV originations three-fold while maintaining
the level of lower-risk originations. Figure 9 plots the total share of high-risk originations of
all GSE originations and this share almost doubled from the beginning of 2006 to the end
of 2007. The GSEs increase high-risk activity seems to have been a very active undertaking
at a time when they themselves seemed to have a bleak outlook of the housing market.
These high-risk mortgages appeared to perform badly ex-post for the GSEs. About 12% of
high-LTV mortgages purchased by the GSEs experienced bad terminations from origination
till date. This was an increase of over 50% from 2005 when the bad termination rate was
about 7%. Moreover, this number is likely understated as it includes mortgages that were
likely rescued from default by government policies such as the Home Affordable Refinance
Program (HARP) and the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). In figures 12
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and 13, we plot the fraction of GSE and private-label mortgages that were terminated badly.
The termination rate on high-LTV mortgages purchased by the GSEs was rising in 2007
as the GSEs expanded risky lending. At the same time, termination rates of private-label
MBSes actually started falling in mid-2006.
In 2007, market participants seemed to believe that delinquencies were on the rise and
house prices were going to decline. As we would expect, following this guidance, private
securitizers retreated from the market. Surprisingly, at the same time GSEs increased their
high-risk activity. In the next section, we provide evidence that this ramp-up in GSE high-
risk activity could have partially been driven by a want to keep house prices high in areas
where the GSEs had large outstanding mortgage exposure.
2.3. Main Analysis and Results
Our main hypothesis is that the GSEs had an incentive to prop-up house prices in MSAs
in which they had a high outstanding mortgage exposure. To the extent that credit affects
house prices, the GSEs would therefore ramp up lending activity in areas in which they have
a large number of outstanding mortgages. In this case, they may reduce lending standards
and make high-risk loans - not because of the return they earn from the loan itself, but
because of the benefit they get from increased house prices. The price externality associated
with lending, makes the GSEs more willing to issue a risky loan. To test our hypothesis,
we first run the following regression,
LTV 80+MSA = α+ β GSEshareMSA + MSA
LTV 80+y is the proportion of mortgages originated by the GSEs in the first half of 2007 that
had LTV>80 in MSA y. GSEsharey is the GSE share of all outstanding mortgages in MSA
y at the beginning of 2007. Figure 14 shows the variation in the GSE outstanding share
across MSAs. There is substantial variation that we are able to exploit in the regression,
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with the outstanding share varying between approximately 20% and 90%.
Column 1 of table 4 presents the results of the regression for all GSE originations (purchase
and refinancing). In line with our hypothesis, we find a positive and statistically significant
coefficient β. The estimates in column 1 show that a percentage point increase in the
outstanding share of the GSEs in an MSA implies a .48 percentage point increase in the
proportion of high-risk loans made by the GSEs.
The Sensitivity of Prices to Credit: This result could be driven by alternative explanations
- perhaps in areas where the GSEs were more concentrated, they understood the market
better and therefore were more suited to making risky loans. To further test our hypothesis
that risky lending was undertaken to help prop up house prices, we interact the GSEs
outstanding share with Saiz’s MSA-level measures of house price elasticities. In areas where
housing supply was inelastic, credit should have a greater effect on house prices. The
more sensitive house prices are to credit, the greater the returns to propping-up house
prices.Therefore, if the GSEs are making risky loans to help keep house prices high, we
should see a greater effect of outstanding share on GSE high-risk activity in areas with
inelastic housing supply. If house price responses have no effect on the GSE incentive to
make loans to risky borrowers, then we should not see any differential response of how the
outstanding share affects GSE lending in elastic versus inelastic MSAs. To test this, we run
the following regression
LTV 80+MSA = α+β1GSEshareMSA+β2 elasticityMSA+β3GSEshareMSA∗elasticityMSA+MSA
elasticityy is the Saiz measure of elasticity in MSA y. This measure can vary between 0
and 12, with a higher value signifying a more elastic MSA. Figure 16 shows the variation in
the Saiz measure of housing supply elasticity across MSAs. We are able to exploit a large
amount of variation. According to Saiz (2010), in land-constrained cities, elasticities are
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equal to and below 1. We therefore have a large number of elastic and inelastic MSAs in
our sample.
Column 2 of table 4 presents the results of the regression. We find a negative and significant
coefficient β3 in line with our hypothesis. Therefore, column 2 of Table 4 shows that the
likelihood that the GSEs will make high-risk loans for a given concentration of outstanding
loans is higher in areas where we expect the sensitivity of house prices with respect to
credit to be higher. This regression also has a significant and positive coefficient, β2. The
average elasticity across MSAs in our sample is 2.46. The estimates in column 1 show that
a 1 percentage point increase in the outstanding share of the GSEs in an MSA implies a
.17 percentage point increase in the proportion of high-risk loans made by the GSEs. In
relatively inelastic MSAs, with elasticites close to 1, a 1 percentage point increase in the
GSEs outstanding share in an MSA is associated with a .6 percentage point increase in the
proportion of high-risk loans made by the GSEs.
Since we are exploiting variation in housing supply elasticity across MSAs to proxy for
how sensitive house prices are to credit, our results are vulnerable to a recent argument
made by (Davidoff (2015)). He argues that housing supply elasticities are correlated with
unobserved housing demand as land-constrained areas (such as coastal cities) are also cities
that people want to move into as there are desirable from a lifestlke perspective. Our
particular focus on 2007 will likely not make our results unaffected by a greater housing
demand in inelastic MSAs. In 2007, there was relatively greater housing demand in elastic
rather than inelastic MSAs. We therefore do not have to worry about our results being
driven by greater unobserved housing demand in inelastic MSAs (Davidoff (2015)).
We repeat our analysis for purchase and refinance loans separately. Columns (3)-(6) of table
4 report this. The effects are present in both cases but the magnitudes for refinance loans
are higher. A 1 percentage point increase in the outstanding share of the GSEs in an MSA
implies a 5.9 percentage point increase in the proportion of high-risk refinance loans made
by the GSEs versus a 2.4 percentage point increase in the proportion of high-risk purchase
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loans. In the presence of foreclosure externalities, house prices would be in danger of falling
and refinancing loans can prevent this. This may be one factor driving the difference in
magnitudes.
We also repeat this analysis separately for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac instead of jointly
looking at their outstanding share and new GSE originations. Tables 5 and 6 present the
results of these regressions. We find similar results as before. Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac’s outstanding share predicts new high-LTV originations and this effect is stronger in
inelastic MSAs.
The Sensitivity of Default to Prices: If the GSEs were attempting to prop-up house prices
to avoid defaults on their outstanding portfolio of mortgages, this effect should be stronger
when the outstanding mortgages they own are more sensitive to default. To test this, we
include the high-LTV share of the GSE’s outstanding portfolio as an independent variable
and run the following regressions,
LTV 80+MSA =α+ β1GSEshareMSA + β2GSEportfolioLTV 80
+
MSA + MSA
GSEportfolioLTV 80+y is the high LTV fraction of the GSE’s outstanding portfolio. In line
with propping-up, we find a positive and significant coefficient β2. As before, we also run
these regressions separately for purchase and refinance loans and for Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac (tables 7 and 8). The results are similar with the effects generally being stronger for
refinancing loans than purchase loans. We also run the following specification to see if these
effects are stronger in inelastic MSAs versus elastic MSAs,
LTV 80+MSA = α+ β1GSEshareMSA + β2GSEportfolioLTV 80
+
MSA + β3 elasticityMSA+
β4GSEshareMSA ∗ elasticityMSA + β5GSEportfolioLTV 80+MSA ∗ elasticityMSA + MSA
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Our results are consistent with these effects being stronger in inelastic MSAs in which house
prices should be more sensitive to credit. We also obtain very high R-squares. We are able
to explain almost 70% of the variation in the proportion of high-LTV loans made by the
GSEs across MSAs.
Change in Lending Standards Over Time: Until now, all our analysis has been looking at
how outstanding share at the start of 2007 predicted new high-risk lending. We now look
at how lending standards changed within MSAs. We expect the decline in GSE lending
standards to be concentrated in MSAs in which they had a large oustanding share of
mortgages. We exploit a rule that if a mortgage was made to a borrower with an origination
FICO score of 620 or above, it was eligible for the GSEs automated underwriting. Mortgages
below the threshold, were subject to additional underwriting by the GSEs and therefore were
screened more carefully. Assuming the mortgages to borrowers with origination FICOs just
below the threshold had similar risk to mortgages just above the threshold, mortgages just
below the threshold should be denied more often if the manual underwriting is stricter
than the automated underwriting process. Keys et al. (2011) find that this is indeed
the case - they show that there is a significant jump in the number of loans securitized
above the threshold versus below and that the loans below the threshold seem to be better
screened. Since the automated system worked similarly nationwide, the proportion of loans
just below the threshold to loans just above the threshold tells us how strict the GSEs
manual underwriting was in an MSA. The lower the proportion, the stricter their manual
underwriting in the MSA. If the GSEs were increasing risky activity in MSAs in which they
had a higher outstanding share, we should see that their manual underwriting screening is
closer to their automated, laxer underwriting around the threshold. We should therefore
see an increase in the proportion of loans below the threshold to loans above the threshold.
This is equivalent to seeing a smoothing out of loans made around a 620 origination FICO.
To test this, we run the following regression,
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propchangey = α+ β1 Fanniesharey + β2 elasticityy + β3 Fanniesharey ∗ elasticityy + y
propchangey = α+ β1 Freddiesharey + β2 elasticityy + β3 Freddiesharey ∗ elasticityy + y
propchangey is the change in the proportion of loans below 620 to the loans above 620 in
MSA y between the first half of 2006 and the first half of 2007. The proportion of loans
around the threshold is calculated by dividing the number of loans made to borrowers with
origination FICO scores between 610 and 619 to the number of loans made to borrowers
with origination FICO scores between 620 and 629. A positive propchangey means that
relative to the first half of 2006, lending around the threshold has smoothed in the first half
of 2007. Fanniesharey and Fanniesharey are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s share of all
outstanding mortgages in MSA y at the beginning of 2007.
In line with our hypothesis, we find a positive and significant coefficient β1 and a negative
and significant coefficient β3 for both Fannie Mae, shown in Table 10, and Freddie Mac,
shown in Table 10. This implies that lending standards in 2007 fell in MSAs in which
the GSEs had a large outstanding share, and this fall in lending standards is greater in
relatively inelastic MSAs. As mentioned before, The average elasticity across MSAs in
our sample is 2.46. Table 10 shows that a 1 percentage point increase in Freddie Mac’s
outstanding share in an MSA with average elasticity is associated with a 1.3 percentage
point increase in the proportion of loans made by Freddie Mac below the threshold relative
to above the threshold between 2006 and 2007. In relatively inelastic MSAs with elasticities
equal to one, a 1 percentage point increase in Freddie Mac’s outstanding share in an MSA is
associated with a 2.9 percentage point increase in the proportion of loans made by Freddie
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Mac below the threshold relative to above the threshold between 2006 and 2007 in an MSA
with average elasticity. This magnitude is economically quite large and meaningful. For
Fannie Mae, a 1 percentage point increase in its outstanding share in an MSA with average
elasticity is associated with a .06 percentage point increase in the proportion of loans made
by Fannie Mae below the threshold relative to above the threshold between 2006 and 2007.
In inelastic MSAs, the magnitude of this effect increases substantially. In an MSA with an
elasticity close to 1, this increases to 1.69 percentage points.
This runs counter to the narrative that the GSEs were rushing to grab market share in MSAs
in which private-label markets were active and the GSEs had been pushed out, dropping
lending standards to do so. We find that the agencies in fact relaxe lending standards more
in MSAs in which they already had a large outstanding share of mortgages and in inelastic
MSAs.
2.4. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide evidence that concentration in mortgage markets can affect the
quality of credit. We test the hypothesis that institutions with a large outstanding exposure
to the mortgage market have incentives to extend risky credit to prop up house prices. To
discern the effect that different levels of mortgage market exposure can have on the quality
of credit, we exploit variation in the size of GSE exposure across MSAs.
We find that in 2007 when the housing boom ended and house prices started falling, the
GSEs increased high-risk mortgage activity in MSAs in which they had large outstanding
exposure to the mortgage market. We perform a number of tests to discern whether this
relationship is driven by incentives to keep house prices high and find evidence in line with
our hypothesis. In particular we find the effect of outstanding share on high-risk activity is
stronger in MSAs in which housing supply is relatively inelastic as it is in these MSAs that
we expect credit expansion to have a strong effect on house prices. Furthermore, we also
find that this effect is stronger when default rates are more sensitive to house prices. We
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also provide evidence that lending standards worsened in MSAs in which the GSEs had a
larger outstanding share.
Our paper has implications for the design on the housing market. We show that incentives
to lend differ between large versus small mortgage market participants. In the aftermath
of the financial crisis, policy makers have wanted to design policy measures that curb high-
risk lending. Concentration in mortgage markets has been largely overlooked. In 2016,
The Economist reported that markets are more concentrated now than they were during
the housing boom and bust. Government organizations are funding about 65-80% of new
mortgages and Quicken Loans and Freedom Mortgage are currently originating about half
of all new mortgages. Many of these new mortgages appear to be highly risky with 20% of
them having LTV ratios of over 95%. We hope to add to contribute to the macro-prudential
policy discussion on how to curb high-risk lending through this paper.
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2.5. Figures and Tables
GSE and Private-Label Share of High-Risk Activity
Figure 8: GSE and Private-Label Share of High-Risk Activity
The figure above plots the share of all high LTV loan originations, LTV > 80 at origination, that were GSE and
private-label originated from 2005 to 2007. Source: McDash.
Proportion of High-Risk Originations of Total GSE Originations
Figure 9: Proportion of High-Risk Originations of Total GSE Originations
The figure above plots the proportion of high LTV originations, LTV > 80 at origination, as a fraction of total GSE
originations from 2005 to 2007. Source: McDash.
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GSE and Private-Label High-Risk Originations
Figure 10: GSE and Private-Label High-Risk Originations
The figure above plots the number of high LTV loan originations, LTV > 80 at origination, by the GSEs and private-
label from 2005 to 2007. Source: McDash.
GSE and Private-Label Originations, LTV≤80
Figure 11: GSE and Private-Label Originations, LTV≤80
The figure above plots the number of loan originations, LTV ≤ 80 at origination, by the GSEs and private-label from
2005 to 2007. Source: McDash.
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GSE and Private-Label Termination Rates of High-Risk Loans
Figure 12: GSE and Private-Label Termination Rates of High-Risk Loans
The figure above plots the proportion of high LTV loans, LTV > 80 at origination, that subsequently had a bad
termination from 2006 to 2007, benchmarked to the first quarter of 2006. The x-axis is the quarter of origination.
Source: McDash.
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Private-Label Termination Rates of High-Risk
Loans
Figure 13: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Private-Label Termination Rates of High-Risk Loans
The figure above plots the proportion of high LTV loans, LTV > 80 at origination, that subsequently had a bad
termination from 2006 to 2007, benchmarked to the first quarter of 2006. The x-axis is the quarter of origination.
Source: McDash.
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Variation in GSE Outstanding Share by MSA
Figure 14: Variation in GSE Outstanding Share by MSA
The histogram above shows the variation in the GSE’s outstanding share across MSAs at the start of 2007. Source:
McDash.
Variation in Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Outstanding Share by MSA
Figure 15: Variation in Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Outstanding Share by MSA
The histograms above show the variation in the Fannie Mae’s (left panel) and Freddie Mac’s
(right panel) outstanding share across MSAs at the start of 2007. Source: McDash.
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Variation in Housing Supply Elasticities by MSA
Figure 16: Variation in Housing Supply Elasticities by MSA
The histogram above shows the variation in housing supply elasticities taken from Saiz (2010). Source: McDash.
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Table 1: Summary of GSE and Private-Label Mortgages Outstanding at start of 2007
Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
MSA-Level Mortgage Market Statistics
GSE Share of Mortgage Market .63 .10 .25 .88
Private Share of Mortgage Market .16 .06 .06 .41
Average LTV across MSA .58 .06 .43 .71
High LTV (> 80%) Fraction .17 .08 .03 .39
Low Origination FICO (< 660) Fraction .25 .08 .03 .49
GSE
Average LTV across MSA .54 .07 .31 .68
High LTV (> 80%) Fraction .10 .05 .02 .29
Low Origination FICO (< 660) Fraction .15 .05 .05 .28
Private-Label
Average LTV across MSA .67 .05 .45 .79
High LTV (> 80%) Fraction .24 .11 .04 .59
Low Origination FICO (< 660) Fraction .45 .13 .11 .72
Source: McDash and Corelogic HPITM
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Table 2: Summary of GSE and Private-Label Originations in first half of 2007
Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
MSA-Level Mortgage Market Statistics
GSE Share of Mortgage Market .65 .09 .28 .87
Private Share of Mortgage Market .16 .08 .05 .52
High LTV (> 80%) Fraction .40 .13 .07 .69
Low Origination FICO (< 660) Fraction .33 .08 .11 .57
GSE
High LTV (> 80%) Fraction .30 .12 .02 .60
Low Origination FICO (< 660) Fraction .21 .07 .06 .49
Private-Label
High LTV (> 80%) Fraction .35 .14 .03 .77
Low Origination FICO (< 660) Fraction .47 .15 .08 .85
Source: McDash
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Table 3: Summary of GSE and Private-Label Originations in first half of 2007 broken up
by quarter
Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
2007 Q2
MSA-Level Mortgage Market Statistics
GSE Share of Mortgage Market .68 .09 .31 .88
Private Share of Mortgage Market .11 .07 .03 .44
High LTV (> 80%) Fraction .42 .13 .08 .71
Low Origination FICO (< 660) Fraction .32 .08 .10 .56
GSE
High LTV (> 80%) Fraction .32 .12 .02 .62
Low Origination FICO (< 660) Fraction .22 .07 .07 .49
Private-Label
High LTV (> 80%) Fraction .35 .15 .02 .80
Low Origination FICO (< 660) Fraction .41 .16 .07 .85
2007 Q1
MSA-Level Mortgage Market Statistics
GSE Share of Mortgage Market .60 .09 .27 .84
Private Share of Mortgage Market .21 .08 .08 .60
High LTV (> 80%) Fraction .37 .13 .06 .66
Low Origination FICO (< 660) Fraction .34 .08 .12 .59
GSE
High LTV (> 80%) Fraction .27 .12 .01 .56
Low Origination FICO (< 660) Fraction .20 .06 .06 .49
Private-Label
High LTV (> 80%) Fraction .35 .15 .02 .76
Low Origination FICO (< 660) Fraction .51 .16 .06 .90
Source: McDash
73
Table 4: The Effect of Outstanding Loans and Price Elasticities on GSE High-Risk
Originations
The table reports the results for the following regressions,
LTV 80+MSA = α+ β GSEshareMSA + MSA
LTV 80+MSA = α+ β1GSEshareMSA + β2 elasticityMSA + β3GSEshareMSA ∗ elasticityMSA + MSA
LTV 80+y is the proportion of mortgages originated by the GSEs in the first half of 2007 that had LTV>80
in MSA y. GSEsharey is the GSE share of all outstanding mortgages in MSA y at the beginning of 2007.
elasticityy is the Saiz measure of elasticity in MSA y.
Purchase Loans Refinance Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GSEshare .48∗∗ .91∗∗∗ .24∗∗ .51∗∗∗ .59∗∗∗ .87∗∗∗
(2.44) (4.70) (2.27) (2.97) (3.24) (5.40)
elasticity .26∗∗∗ .13∗∗∗ .27∗∗∗
(5.75) (3.57) (6.28)
GSEshare x elasticity −.30∗∗∗ −.14∗∗ −.32∗∗∗
(−4.27) (−2.35) (−4.62)
Observations 275 234 275 234 275 234
R-squared 0.12 .62 0.04 .36 0.19 .65
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Standard errors calculated by weighting MSAs by the number of originations
Source: McDash
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Table 5: The Effect of Outstanding Loans and Price Elasticities on Fannie Mae High-Risk
Originations
The table reports the results for the following regressions,
LTV 80+MSA = α+ β FannieshareMSA + MSA
LTV 80+MSA = α+ β1 FannieshareMSA + β2 elasticityMSA + β3 FannieshareMSA ∗ elasticityMSA + MSA
LTV 80+y is the proportion of mortgages originated by Fannie Mae in the first half of 2007 that had
LTV>80 in MSA y. Fanniesharey is Fannie Mae’s share of all outstanding mortgages in MSA y at the
beginning of 2007. elasticityy is the Saiz measure of elasticity in MSA y.
Purchase Loans Refinance Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fannieshare .27 1.18∗∗∗ .13 .58∗ .41 1.16∗∗∗
(.91) (2.50) (.77) (1.61) (1.35) (2.91)
elasticity .24∗∗∗ .10∗∗ .24∗∗∗
(3.65) (2.20) (4.36)
Fannieshare x elasticity −.39∗∗∗ −.13 −.42∗∗∗
(−2.49) (−1.15) (−2.97)
Observations 275 234 275 234 275 234
R-squared 0.01 .55 0.01 .33 0.04 .57
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Standard errors calculated by weighting MSAs by the number of originations
Source: McDash
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Table 6: The Effect of Outstanding Loans and Price Elasticities on Freddie Mac High-Risk
Originations
The table reports the results for the following regressions,
LTV 80+MSA = α+ β FreddieshareMSA + MSA
LTV 80+MSA = α+ β1 FreddieshareMSA + β2 elasticityMSA + β3 FreddieshareMSA ∗ elasticityMSA + MSA
LTV 80+y is the proportion of mortgages originated by Freddie Mac in the first half of 2007 that had
LTV>80 in MSA y. Freddiesharey is Freddie Mac’s share of all outstanding mortgages in MSA y at the
beginning of 2007. elasticityy is the Saiz measure of elasticity in MSA y.
Purchase Loans Refinance Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Freddieshare .72∗∗∗ .98∗∗∗ .32∗∗ .34∗ .95∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗
(3.24) (3.80) (2.78) (1.73) (3.79) (4.99)
elasticity .13∗∗∗ .06∗∗∗ .16∗∗∗
(6.49) (3.82) (7.68)
Freddieshare x elasticity −.31∗∗∗ −.09 −.41∗∗∗
(−3.77) (−1.42) (−4.84)
Observations 275 234 275 234 275 234
R-squared 0.16 .57 0.04 .29 0.24 .64
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Standard errors calculated by weighting MSAs by the number of originations
Source: McDash
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Table 7: The Effect of Outstanding Portfolio Composition on GSE High-Risk Activity
The table reports the results for the following regressions,
LTV 80+MSA =α+ β1GSEshareMSA + β2GSEportfolioLTV 80
+
MSA + MSA
LTV 80+MSA =α+ β1GSEshareMSA + β2GSEportfolioLTV 80
+
MSA + β3 elasticityMSA+
β4GSEshareMSA ∗ elasticityMSA + β5GSEportfolioLTV 80+MSA ∗ elasticityMSA + MSA
LTV 80+y is the proportion of mortgages originated by the GSEs in the first half of 2007 that had LTV>80
in MSA y. GSEsharey is the GSE share of all outstanding mortgages in MSA y at the beginning of 2007.
GSEportfolioLTV 80+y is the high LTV fraction of the GSE’s outstanding portfolio. elasticityy is the Saiz
measure of elasticity in MSA y.
Purchase Loans Refinance Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GSEshare .29∗∗ .73∗∗∗ .14∗ .42∗∗ .36∗∗∗ .65∗∗∗
(2.14) (3.96) (1.62) (2.39) (2.78) (3.93)
GSEportfolioLTV80+ .13∗∗∗ .79∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ .51∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ .83∗∗∗
(4.16) (3.05) (5.32) (2.12) (4.01) (3.44)
elasticity .22∗∗∗ .09∗∗∗ .22∗∗∗
(5.42) (2.71) (5.72)
GSEshare x elasticity −.25∗∗∗ −.12∗∗ −.24∗∗∗
(−3.81) (−2.18) (−3.70)
GSEshareLTV80+ x elasticity −.05 −.11 −.11
(−.53) (.89) (−1.08)
Observations 269 230 269 230 269 230
R-squared .46 .70 .37 .49 .37 .73
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Standard errors calculated by weighting MSAs by the number of originations. Source: McDash
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Table 8: The Effect of Outstanding Portfolio Composition on Fannie Mae High-Risk
Activity
The table reports the results for the following regressions,
LTV 80+MSA =α+ β1 FannieshareMSA + β2 FannieportfolioLTV 80
+
MSA + MSA
LTV 80+MSA =α+ β1 FannieshareMSA + β2 FannieportfolioLTV 80
+
MSA + β3 elasticityMSA+
β4 FannieshareMSA ∗ elasticityMSA + β5 FannieportfolioLTV 80+MSA ∗ elasticityMSA + MSA
LTV 80+y is the proportion of mortgages originated by Fannie Mae in the first half of 2007 that had
LTV>80 in MSA y. GSEsharey is Fannie’s share of all outstanding mortgages in MSA y at the beginning
of 2007. FannieportfolioLTV 80+y is the high LTV fraction of Fannie’s outstanding portfolio. elasticityy is
the Saiz measure of elasticity in MSA y.
Purchase Loans Refinance Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fannieshare −.03 .64 .01 .23 −.01 .56
(−.14) (1.53) (.05) (.65) (−.06) (1.57)
FannieportfolioLTV80+ 1.49∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ .72∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗
(5.03) (3.82) (6.15) (2.95) (5.21) (4.53)
elasticity .18∗∗∗ .04 .18∗∗∗
(3.02) (.92) (3.62)
Fannieshare x elasticity −.24∗ −.04 −.25∗∗
(−1.74) (−.39) (−1.97)
FannieshareLTV80+ x elasticity −.23∗∗ .00 −.26∗∗∗
(−2.08) (.03) (−2.62)
Observations 269 230 269 230 269 230
R-squared .47 .66 .38 .46 .51 .70
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Standard errors calculated by weighting MSAs by the number of originations. Source: McDash
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Table 9: The Effect of Outstanding Portfolio Composition on Freddie Mac High-Risk
Activity
The table reports the results for the following regressions,
LTV 80+MSA =α+ β1 FreddieshareMSA + β2 FreddieportfolioLTV 80
+
MSA + MSA
LTV 80+MSA =α+ β1 FreddieshareMSA + β2 FreddieportfolioLTV 80
+
MSA + β3 elasticityMSA+
β4 FreddieshareMSA ∗ elasticityMSA + β5 FreddieportfolioLTV 80+MSA ∗ elasticityMSA + MSA
LTV 80+y is the proportion of mortgages originated by Freddie Mac in the first half of 2007 that had
LTV>80 in MSA y. GSEsharey is Freddie’s share of all outstanding mortgages in MSA y at the beginning
of 2007. FreddieportfolioLTV 80+y is the high LTV fraction of Freddie’s outstanding portfolio. elasticityy
is the Saiz measure of elasticity in MSA y.
Purchase Loans Refinance Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Freddieshare .67∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ .30∗∗∗ .49∗∗∗ .89∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗
(4.48) (4.79) (3.57) (2.56) (5.42) (5.93)
FreddieportfolioLTV80+ 1.06∗∗∗ .61∗∗∗ .90∗∗∗ .30∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ .72∗∗∗
(4.47) (3.39) (4.90) (1.52) (4.65) (3.86)
elasticity .11∗∗∗ .04 .14∗∗∗
(6.93) (2.52) (8.10)
Freddieshare x elasticity −.30∗∗∗ −.13∗∗ −.37∗∗∗
(−4.63) (−2.33) (−5.41)
FreddieshareLTV80+ x elasticity −.05 .20∗∗ −.06
(.61) (1.97) (−.66)
Observations 269 230 269 230 269 230
R-squared 43 .68 .27 .41 .49 .72
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Standard errors calculated by weighting MSAs by the number of originations. Source: McDash
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Table 10: The Effect of Outstanding Loans on Lending Standards for Fannie Mae
The table reports the output for the following two regressions,
propchangey = α+ β1 Fanniesharey + y
propchangey = α+ β1 Fanniesharey + β2 elasticityy + β3 Fanniesharey ∗ elasticityy + y
propchangey is the change in the proportion of loans below 620 to the loans above 620 in MSA y between
2006h1 and 2007h1. The proportion of loans around the threshold is calculated by dividing the number of
loans made to borrowers with origination FICO scores between 610 and 619 to the number of loans made
to borrowers with origination FICO scores between 620 and 629. A positive propchangey means that
relative to the first half of 2006, lending around the threshold has smoothed in the first half of 2007.
Fanniesharey is Fannie’s share of all outstanding mortgages in MSA y at the beginning of 2007.
elasticityy is the Saiz measure of elasticity in MSA y.
(1) (2)
propchange propchange
Fannieshare .24 2.80∗∗
(.36) (2.25)
elasticity .46∗∗∗
(3.43)
Fannieshare x elasticity −1.11∗∗∗
(-3.03)
Observations 273 232
R-squared 0.00 .07
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Source: McDash
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Table 11: The Effect of Outstanding Loans on Lending Standards for Freddie Mac
The table reports the output for the following two regressions,
propchangey = α+ β1 Freddiesharey + y
propchangey = α+ β1 Freddiesharey + β2 elasticityy + β3 Freddiesharey ∗ elasticityy + y
propchangey is the change in the proportion of loans below 620 to the loans above 620 in MSA y between
2006h1 and 2007h1. The proportion of loans around the threshold is calculated by dividing the number of
loans made to borrowers with origination FICO scores between 610 and 619 to the number of loans made
to borrowers with origination FICO scores between 620 and 629. A positive propchangey means that
relative to the first half of 2006, lending around the threshold has smoothed in the first half of 2007.
Freddiesharey is Freddie’s share of all outstanding mortgages in MSA y at the beginning of 2007.
elasticityy is the Saiz measure of elasticity in MSA y.
(1) (2)
propchange propchange
Freddieshare .47 3.91∗∗
(.67) (2.13)
elasticity .22∗
(1.87)
Freddieshare x elasticity −1.05∗∗
(-2.06)
Observations 270 230
R-squared 0.00 .01
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Source: McDash
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CHAPTER 3 : Housing Booms and the Crowding-Out Effect
(with Itay Goldstein)
3.1. Introduction
Many policies aim to subsidize investment in housing. A unique feature of subsidization
schemes in the housing market, as opposed to other markets, is that policy makers often care
not just about the amount of investment in housing but also about the impact of policy on
the level of house prices. In fact, following the collapse of the housing market in 2008, many
government interventions such as the large scale repurchase of mortgage-backed securities
were made with the explicit goal of supporting housing prices. The level of housing prices
matters since real estate equity is considered to be an important tool for investment and
wealth accumulation. The rationale behind this argument is that households and firms
obtain a durable asset when they purchase real estate and they can use this asset to obtain
funds to invest and build up their wealth. In a 2013 policy brief, the White House explained
the importance of these policy measures in stimulating the economy, “Housing wealth is
growing again, with owners’ equity up $2.8 trillion since hitting a low at the beginning
of 2009. This in turn has contributed to increased economic activity through consumer
spending, small business investment, and more.”
The typical channel through which high house prices lead to increased investment and
wealth accumulation is the collateral channel. Households and firms are able to borrow
against the value of real estate assets that they own and spend or invest the proceeds. This
leads to policy goals by the government taking the form of supporting real estate investment
and keeping house prices high in an attempt to keep the value of real estate equity high.
However, empirical research on the effect of high house prices on investment and wealth
accumulation has found mixed results. Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) and Gan (2007)
find a positive effect of increases in collateral value on investment of firms who own real
estate assets. On the other hand, recent work by Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay
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(2014) and Jorda et al. (2014) find that banks in areas that experienced a significant real
estate price boom, increased mortgage lending while simultaneously decreasing commercial
lending making the net effect of high house prices on investment ambiguous.
The mixed empirical evidence suggests that the collateral effect is not able to capture all the
dynamics of how increased house prices affect investment. Furthermore, standard economic
theory on subsidization policies typically cares about the final quantity of the good in the
market in question and not the level of prices.1 Since in housing markets the level of prices is
often a policy goal in itself, this approach may not apply to evaluating subsidization schemes
in the housing market. These issues call for a comprehensive framework for studying the
effect of house prices on investment and household wealth accumulation, the value of policies
trying to support high house prices and the form that housing market policies should take.
In this paper, we develop a model to understand the effect of house prices on investment
and highlight a novel channel that can cause high house prices to crowd-out investment
in the economy. In the model, a firm borrows from banks to invest in real estate and in
its own projects. The firm is financially constrained because of an inability to commit to
repaying loans using future income and therefore may not be able to invest in all positive
investment opportunities. The firm can use real estate as collateral to help it obtain loans
from a bank and can thereby relax its financial constraint. Real estate thus serves a dual
purpose as an asset in the model - giving the firm returns on investing and also relaxing
the firm’s borrowing constraint.
The market price of housing generates externalities on investment and subsequently household
wealth accumulation when the firm is financially constrained and cannot invest in all
productive NPV opportunities. An increase in housing prices allows firms to borrow
more against home-equity thus generating a positive externality on the funds available for
investment. However, an increase in housing prices also causes the cost of investment in real
1In other markets in which subsidies are common, such as staple foods or healthcare, the final policy goal
is usually about broad access to the good. Prices matter in only so far as how they affect the final level of
access to the good in question.
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estate to increase taking away funds that could be used to invest in the firm’s own projects.
This generates a negative externality on investment. When the firm is a price taker and
is financially constrained, these externalities prevent the first-best level of investment from
being achieved.
The key novel insight of the model is that an increase in real estate prices does not necessarily
increase investment even when the firm actively uses its real estate assets as collateral to
borrow against and invests the proceeds in positive NPV projects. In our model the typical
narrative of rising real estate prices helping to relax borrowing constraints by increasing
the value of collateral and thus encouraging greater lending and investment is indeed true.
However in addition to this, we also show that the effect of an increase in real estate prices
on aggregate investment can be negative due to a possible crowding-out of firm project
investment as firms are incentivized to invest more in real estate. While an increase in real
estate prices relaxes borrowing constraints, it also increases the amount of money that has
to be spent on new real estate purchases. This second effect takes resources away from
investment in firm projects in the presence of financial constraints and if big enough can
decrease the aggregate level of investment in the economy, subsequently reducing household
wealth.
This negative investment effect of a boom in asset prices is in opposition to the collateral
effect that is usually discussed in the literature. Our model is able to reconcile the differing
empirical findings of the collateral effect on investment since the effect of high housing prices
on investment can be positive or negative depending on the magnitude of the crowding-out
effect relative to the collateral effect. In particular, when the existing amount of real estate
equity is low before a house price boom and the future returns from investing in new real
estate assets are high, the crowding-out effect is relatively stronger than the collateral effect
and house price booms are bad for aggregate investment.
Our paper relates to recent studies on the inefficiencies that can arise from asset price booms
when agents do not internalize their effect on the price of assets. Lorenzoni (2008) develops
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a model in which credit booms lead to inefficient borrowing because atomistic entrepreneurs
do not internalize precuniary fire sale externalities. In this case, once a crisis hits there is
excessive contraction in investment and asset prices. Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) propose
a model in which agents over-borrow when they do not internalize how their borrowing
decisions affect the price of an asset that is also used as collateral. Private agents do not
internalize that fire sale of assets can cause a debt-deflation spiral leading to a large decline
is asset prices and a shrinking of the economy’s ability to borrow.
In all these papers, externalities arise because financial constraints depend on the market
value of assets and agents do not internalize how their choices affect these market values.
In these papers, negative effects of agent actions on investment are not observed during the
asset price boom. Rather, the negative effects on investment are realized when a bust occurs
due to fire sale externatlities. In contrast, in our model, the negative effects of price booms
on investment are realized during the boom phase itself, because investment in firm projects
can be crowded-out due to high house prices leading to under-investment during the boom
period. Our mechanism can thus help explain the findings in Chakraborty et al. (2014)
since the authors find that under-investment in some firms occurred during the house price
boom. In recent work, Hurst et al. (2016) find that the housing price boom reduced college
enrollment as young men instead chose to work in the construction sector, also supporting
a crowding-out story. Papers in which negative investment effects are realized only during
the bust of asset prices, are not able to explain these results.
Additionally, the literature has so far focused on how collateral constraints can generate
inefficiencies when agents are atomistic price-takers. Our paper focuses on inefficiencies that
come through both the collateral constraint and the budget constraint. The crowding-out
channel arises because firms don’t internalize that investing in real estate will cause house
prices to increase, tightening their budget constraints and leaving less money to invest in
their own projects. In our model the representative household cannot redistribute the profits
of construction companies to firms that are purchasing real estate causing this new budget
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constraint externality. In our model, we do not have heterogeneous agents and simply
require that the representative household is constrained in that they cannot immediately
redirect the funds that the firm spends on real estate back to the firm. Intuitively, this means
that when a firm buys a house, it does not immediately receive the amount it paid for the
house back to fund more investment. We believe this to be a constraint in a representative
agent framework that captures a realistic friction that is often present when firms make
investment decisions and as we demonstrate in the paper, this can give rise to important
externalities through the budget constraint.2
In our model, there may be either over- or under- investment depending on whether the
crowding-out effect or the collateral effect is stronger. In a similar vein, Davila and Korinek
(2017) develop a model in which heterogenous atomistic agents face financial constraints
and also obtain either over- or under-borrowing. Alongside firesale externalities, they
explore a second set of externalities which can lead to under-borrowing and investment in
equilibrium called distributive externalities. These arise because agents do not internalize
how equilibrium price changes affect the consumption and investment decisions of other
agents which may prevent optimal risk-sharing in the economy. In our framework, we
abstract away from fire sale externalities and also do not have distributive externalities as
all agents are risk-neutral and there is no uncertainty. Instead, we propose a new externality
that can also give rise to under-investment, i.e. the crowding-out effect.
We additionally analyze the optimal design of housing subsidization programs when govern-
ments wish to build household wealth and stimulate investment in the economy. Subsidization
policies are often targeted at increasing the demand for mortgages by either incentivizing
banks to lend more to the mortgage market or incentivizing the purchase of real estate.
Examples include the mortgage interest tax deduction, tax credits to first-time home buyers,
low insurance payments to qualify for government guarantees on mortgages in the United
States and right-to-buy and help-to-buy schemes in the United Kingdom. Contrary to this
2This friction is similar to a constraint in empirical banking papers in which the representative household
does not internalize that they are both the equity and debt holders of banks.
86
common practice, our analysis demonstrates that in many cases, it can be preferable to
actually tax investment in real estate and subsidize the supply of housing instead. Such
subsidies include but are not limited to subsidizing construction companies directly, a tax-
credit to the sellers of houses and decreasing red-tape around land rights.
An important insight of the model is that demand- and supply-side mortgage subsidization
policies affect real estate and firm project investment in distinct ways. Interestingly this
result goes against the traditional economic insight that it does not matter what side of
the market is taxed or subsidized - the real effects of such interventions are the same.
The difference between the two interventions arises in the model because of their opposite
effects on the price of housing. While demand-side subsidies increase the price of housing
by shifting the demand curve out, supply-side subsidies decrease the price of housing by
shifting the housing supply curve out. In the presence of financial constraints and price
externalities from housing, the real effects in the economy are not price-insensitive.
Supply- and demand- side subsidies are not equivalent in the model because they affect
the agents’ budget constraints differently when agents are financially constrained through
their effect on housing prices. When the collateral effect is stronger than the crowding out
effect, an increase in real estate prices helps encourage investment by relaxing borrowing
constraints since the value of the agents’ collateral increases. This makes demand-side
subsidies preferable. When the crowding-out effect dominates, a decrease in prices makes
housing cheaper for the agent to invest in thus aiding the financially constrained agent. This
channel makes supply-side subsidies preferable. Interestingly, we find that in our setting,
a social planner will want to combine expansionary supply-side policies like subsidies to
construction companies with contractionary demand-side policies such as a tax on household
real-estate investment and vice-versa. In particular, supply-side subsidies are optimally
combined with demand-side taxes when the return from real-estate investment is high
or alternatively when the government wishes to increase purchases of new houses over
increasing existing home-owner equity. This leads to a rather counter-intuitive implication
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of our framework - when the government believes that there are high returns from investment
in housing, it is optimal to tax investment in housing and subsidize the production of housing
due to the externalities generated by housing prices.
The model can also shed light on existing interventions in the housing market. Our model
predicts that policies such as the mortgage interest rate tax deduction, which affect the
demand-side of the housing market, may be ineffective in increasing home-ownership rates
since they increase the price of purchasing housing. Glaeser and Shapiro (2002), Hilber
and Turner (2014) and Hanson (2012) find evidence consistent with this. On the other
hand, the model predicts demand-side interventions which increase the price of housing
should help existing home-owners increase investment and consumption due to an increase
in home-owner equity. Keys, Piskorski, Seru, and Yao (2014) find evidence consistent
with this when examining demand-side interventions (lower mortgage rates) that targeted
indebted households. They find that households experience an increase in home-owner
equity following such interventions which they use to increase durable spending.3
Related Literature: The negative real crowding-out effect of price booms we find in
our paper relates to Tirole (1985) in which asset prices bubbles crowd out productive real
investment by raising interest rates and reducing firm incentives to invest. In a similar
vein, Farhi and Tirole (2012) find that the rise in interest rates might further restrict credit
availability for financially constrained firms. In our paper, we do not require a bubble to
produce the negative real effects accompanying a price boom. We simply require that the
agents is financially constrained. Our paper also contributes to the macro literature which
tries to understand the role of asset prices for the real economy and how price changes
amplify shocks to investment. Seminal papers in this field such as Bernanke and Gertler
(1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) discuss the amplification of negative shocks to asset
prices when these assets also serve as collateral for financially constrained agents. Our
proposed mechanism suggests that asset price booms may also serve to cause negative
3Also see Agarwal, Amromin, Chomsisengphet, Piskorski, Seru, and Yao (2015) and Agarwal, Amromin,
Ben-david, Chomsisengphet, Piskorski, and Seru (2016).
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shocks to investment.
Theoretically, our model highlights a substitution effect amongst investments in a world with
financial constraints which resembles the papers on internal capital markets by Stein (1997)
and Scharfstein and Stein (2000). In these papers, a financially constrained headquarters
makes an investment decision on how to allocate resources across divisions. A positive
shock to the investment opportunities in one division diverts resources away from other
divisions. In our model, agents face similar constrains and allocate resources to mortgages
at the expense of firm investment following price appreciations.
We also contribute to the way different policies affect household debt. Policies that decrease
the price of housing lead to the household having a smaller debt burden than policies
that increase the price of housing. This is because the crowding-out effect encourages
investment by effectively making the household richer while the collateral effect channel
increases investment by allowing the household to borrow more. In our framework, there are
no negative consequences of taking on debt. However, many recent papers have highlighted
the role high household debt plays in generating fragility and deeper recessions (Mian and
Sufi (2011), Mian, Sufi, and Verner (2015), Shularick and Taylor (2012)). Our paper can
contribute to this strand of literature by highlighting the effect different housing policies
have on household debt
Finally our paper contributes to a large and body of literature in economics on optimal
subsidies and taxation policies. To the best of our knowledge, there are not many papers
that consider the differences in subsidizing the supply versus the demand side of housing
markets. Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2008) argue that we must consider the supply side of
the housing market to understand fluctuations in housing cycles. They present a model in
which areas with more elastic housing supply have fewer and shorter housing bubbles. They
also do an empirical analysis in which they find that areas with a more inelastic housing
supply were the ones that experienced a large run-up in housing prices in the 1980s. Our
model predictions are in line with theirs, also predicting that housing prices in areas with
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a more elastic supply will be less affected by shifts in housing demand. However, we focus
on the optimal housing policy given different elasticities of the supply curve and actually
consider supply-side policies which may not cause a price boom at all in order to increase
homeownership. Another paper worth mentioning is by Romer (2000), in which he argues
that government policy programs aimed at increasing innovation should focus on subsidizing
the supply of scientists and engineers rather than the demand for them. Romer makes the
simple observation that if the supply of scientists and engineers is inelastic, subsidizing
their labor demand may simply push wages up without increasing the equilibrium amount
of innovation by much. He therefore recommends policies that would make the supply of
such labour more elastic. While this is obviously true in our model, we find a difference
in demand- and supply- side subsidies even if we keep the elasticity of the supply curve
constant. This is due to the fact that financial constraints respond differently to increases
versus decreases in price.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the main model. Section
3.3 discusses the features of the model equilibrium. Section 3.4 discusses a policy that can
achieve the first-best level of investment and welfare. Section 3.5 compares demand and
supply based policy interventions and discusses how the model can be applied to evaluate
existing policy interventions in the housing market. The last section concludes. All proofs
are in the Appendix to Chapter 3.
3.2. The Model
There are two dates (1, 2), a firm which can invest in its own projects or real estate, a
construction company which can build new houses, a representative bank which can make
loans to the firm to undertake investment and and a representative household who is the
final owner of the construction company and the firm. All agents are risk-neutral. At t = 1,
the firm owns liquid funds, ω, and an existing stock of real estate, B. The firm can use
this stock along with any new real estate purchases, xm, as collateral to borrow an amount
l from banks. The firm can use its liquid capital and the bank loan to invest in its own
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projects or real estate. It additionally has access to a storage technology that has a return
of 1.
At t = 1, a representative bank can make a loan, l, to the firm at interest rate rl to invest in
its own projects and real estate. Loans need to be collateralized because of moral hazard in
the repayment of loans. The firm can use its real estate stock as collateral and can commit
to repaying a portion of the value of this stock φ(B + xm)P at t = 2, where P represents
the price of housing in the economy and φ < 1. φ represents the degree of pledgability
of collateral. This formulation of the collateral constraint is similar to that in Gertler and
Karadi (2011) and in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015).4
Investing in its own project gives the firm a return of rf (xf ) at t = 2 for every xf units
invested at t = 1. The function rf has the following standard properties, r
′
f (xf ) > 0 and
r
′′
f (xf ) < 0 for all xf , r
′
f (0) = ∞ and r
′
f (∞) = 0. Investing in real estate gives the firm
a return rm(xm) at t = 2 for every xm units invested at t = 1. The function rm has the
following standard properties, r
′
m(xm) > 0 and r
′′
m(xm) < 0 for all xm, r
′
m(0) = ∞ and
r
′
m(∞) = 0. The price per-unit of housing, P , is determined by demand and supply in the
housing market. The representative construction firm takes the price of housing as given
and has a strictly increasing and convex cost of housing production given by K(xm).
The return from real estate can be interpreted as any return the firm makes from the use
of these assets in its production or sales activities. As an investment good, the return on
real estate can also reflect beneficial tax treatment of owning property. Alternatively, the
return from housing can be viewed as innovations in rental income which take the form of
savings for the firm when it owns its real estate assets rather than leasing.
All consumption takes place at t = 2 and profits are rebated back to the household. The
firm’s profits are rebated to the household at t = 2 once the investment returns are realized
4In particular, each period t, the firm can abscond immediately with the funds it borrows. In this case
the bank is able to recover a fraction φ of the firm’s real estate stock. For the bank to lend to the firm
therefore, l ≤ φ(B + xm)P .
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while the construction company’s profits can be rebated to the household in t = 1 or t = 2.
If the profits are rebated at t = 1, we assume that the household cannot channel them to
the firm to additionally invest. This is an important assumption of our model - resources
cannot be shuﬄed across the construction company and the firm. Intuitively this means
that when a firm purchases real estate assets, it does not immediately receive back the funds
it just spent on that purchase. We additionally assume that all agents are price-takers in
the economy. They therefore do not internalize their effect on P when making decisions.
The Firm: The firm borrows an amount l from banks and maximizes its profits, pif . It
therefore solves the following portfolio allocation problem, where xm, xf and xs are the
units of real estate, firm project investment and storage purchased:
max pif = max(xf ,xm,xs,l)≥0 rf (xf ) + rm(xm) + xs − l(1 + rl)
s.t xf + Pxm + xs ≤ ω + l
s.t l ≤ φ (B + xm)P
The first three terms in the firm’s t = 2 wealth represent the value of the firm’s investment
portfolio and the last term is the repayment that the firm must make at t = 2 to the
bank. The first constraint is the firm’s budget constraint while the second constraint is its
borrowing constraint.
The Construction Company: The construction company decides how many new houses
to construct at t = 1, xm, to maximize its profits, pic. It solves the following maximization
problem:
max pic = maxxm≥0 Pxm −K(xm)
The Bank: The representative bank competitively sets interest rates at t = 1. Since there
is no uncertainty in the economy, at t = 2 the firm’s profits are deterministic conditional on
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its chosen investment portfolio at t = 1. The bank will therefore never lend more than the
firm’s ability to repay and default will never occur. Competition between banks therefore
drives the equilibrium rate of interest on loans, rl, to 0.
The Household: The household is the final holder of the firm, construction company
and the bank in the model. Since competition drives bank profits to 0, the household’s final
utility is given by the sum of the profits of the firm , pif , and the construction company, pic.
3.2.1. Equilibrium
An equilibrium of this economy is given by, (i) The firm’s portfolio allocation xm, xf and xs
given the price of housing P , (ii) The construction company’s choice of housing production
xm given the price of housing P , (iii) Price P such that the housing market clears.
3.3. Equilibrium Analysis
We begin the analysis of the equilibrium in this model by outlining the first best level
of investment in the economy and a benchmark case in which the firm does not face any
financial constraints. In this benchmark case, the economy achieves the first best level of
investment and consumption. We then discuss the equilibrium when the firm is financially
constrained and show how price externalities in the housing market generate inefficiencies
in investment and consumption.
3.3.1. First Best
The first best level of investment in this economy maximizes the total resources available
to the household for consumption at t = 2. The unconstrained social planner wanting to
achieve this investment allocation solves,
max(xf ,xm)≥0 rf (xf ) + rm(xm)− xf −K(xm)
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The social planner has the following first order conditions,
r
′
f (xf ) = 1
r
′
m(xm) = K
′
(xm)
The first best level of investment in this economy are given by the the quantities of xm and
xf when the marginal return from investing is equal to the marginal cost of undertaking
the investment. We define x∗m and x∗f as the first best levels of investment in real estate
and the firm’s projects, i.e. r
′
m(x
∗
m)
K′ (x∗m)
= 1 and r
′
f (x
∗
f ) = 1.
3.3.2. Benchmark Equilibrium without Financial Constraints
We start by outlining a benchmark case in which the firm is not financially constrained.
In the model, this is equivalent to the firm being able to borrow from the bank without
the need for posting collateral as long as it has sufficient funds at t = 2 to cover its t = 1
loan. Therefore conditional on the expected return from an investment being above 1, the
firm can borrow the funds available to invest in it. The presence of the storage technology
ensures the firm never invests with an expected return of below 1 and therefore the firm has
no limit to the amount it can borrow. In the benchmark case, the firm solves the following
problem:
max(xf ,xm,xs,l)≥0 rf (xf ) + rm(xm) + xs − l(1 + rl)
s.t xf + Pxm + xs ≤ ω + l
Using the fact that rl = 0, the first order conditions yield the following equilibrium quantities
of real estate and firm project investment in the economy:
r
′
f (xf ) = 1
r
′
m(xm)
P
= 1
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Assuming households do not borrow simply to store (i.e. they have a weak preference for
not taking a loan), storage is used in equilibrium if ω ≥ Pxm + xf . If ω < Pxm + xf , then
the household will borrow an amount l = Pxm + xf − ω from banks to fund its additional
investment.
The first order condition for the construction company gives us the equilibrium quantity of
housing supplied:
K
′
(xm) = P
Market clearing implies that the level of investment chosen by the firm is equal to the
first first best level of investment in the economy. Therefore, a firm that is not financially
constrained invests in x∗m units of real estate and x∗f in its own projects.
From the above analysis, we can see that to achieve the first best level of investment the
unconstrained firm wants to borrow:
l = max{0,K ′(x∗m)x∗m + x∗f − ω}
In the model with financial constraints, the borrowing constraint on the firm allows it to
borrow a maximum of φK
′
(xm)(xm +B). Therefore even in the equilibrium with financial
constraints the first best level of investment can be achieved if:
K
′
(x∗m)x
∗
m + x
∗
f − ω ≤ φK
′
(x∗m)(x
∗
m +B)
When the above inequality holds, the firm is able to borrow enough to fund all productive
investment opportunities and achieves the first best level of investment. When the above
inequality does not hold, the firm has more positive NPV investment opportunities than
the funds necessary to invest in these opportunities. This is the pertinent case for when the
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level of house prices generate externalities on investment. Formally, we define the firm as
having “limited funds” when the following equation is satisfied:
K
′
(x∗m)x
∗
m + x
∗
f > φ(B + x
∗
m)K
′
(x∗m) + ω (Limited Funds)
The above equation implies that the firm is financially constrained and cannot invest in all
positive investment opportunities even if it borrows to its full capacity. Therefore the firm’s
borrowing constraint will bind in equilibrium. This is a key assumption that drives the main
results of the model. Since this is the pertinent case when the decentralized equilibrium is
inefficient, henceforth we will assume that the firm is constrained by limited funds. We will
discuss its importance in the following section and throughout the paper.
3.3.3. Equilibrium with Financial Constraints
We now move to the equilibrium analysis of the main model in which the firm is financially
constrained. At t = 1, the firm solves the following investment problem:
max(xf ,xm,xs,l)≥0 rf (xf ) + rm(xm) + xs − l(1 + rl)
s.t xf + Pxm + xs ≤ ω + l
s.t l ≤ φ (B + xm)P
If the Limited Funds assumption is satisfied, the firm’s borrowing constraint binds in
equilibrium and l = φ(B+xm)P . In this case, the household will never invest in the storage
technology since it has unexploited NPV projects at t = 1 that yield a return strictly greater
than 1. Using the fact that competition between banks and the deterministic setting causes
rl = 0, we can simplify the portfolio allocation problem to the following:
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max(xf ,xm)≥0 rf (xf ) + rm(xm)− φ(B + xm)P
s.t xf + (1− φ)Pxm ≤ ω + φBP
This yields the following first order conditions:
r
′
m(xm) = λP (1− φ) + φP
r
′
f (xf ) = λ
λ is the lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. We can combine the two FOCs to
obtain the following equation that determines the amount of investment given the price of
housing:
r
′
m(xm) = P (r
′
f (xf )(1− φ) + φ) (3.1)
Market clearing requires that P = K
′
(xm).
Constrained Social Planner Allocation: To establish the inefficiencies in the decentralized
equilibrium, we solve the constrained social planner’s problem in this economy. The constrained
social planner chooses the optimal investment for the firm that maximizes the representative
household’s final wealth. The constrained social planner in this economy takes into account
how housing prices affect the financial constraints of the firm but faces the same borrowing
and budget constraint as the firm. Additionally, the planner is also unable to reallocate
resources from the construction company to the firm to use for investment5. The social
planner therefore solves:
max(xf ,xm,xs)≥0 rf (xf ) + rm(xm) + xs − l(1 + rl) + pic(xm)
s.t xf + P (xm)xm + xs ≤ ω + l
s.t l ≤ φ (B + xm)P (xm)
5Note that the inability of the planner to reallocate resources from the construction company to the
firm is important since the construction profits do not show up in the right hand side of the firm’s budget
constraint.
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When the Limited Funds assumption is satisfied, the firm is financially constrained in
equilibrium, it’s borrowing constraint binds and xs = 0. Additionally using the fact that
rl = 0, this problem simplifies to:
max(xf ,xm)≥0 rf (xf ) + rm(xm)− φ(B + xm)P (xm) + P (xm)xm −K(xm)
s.t xf + P (xm)(1− φ)xm ≤ ω + φBP (xm)
The FOCs for the constrained social planner are:
r
′
f (xf ) = λ
r
′
m(xm) + P + P
′
xm −K ′(xm) = λ(P (1− φ) + P ′(1− φ)xm − P ′φB) + φP + φP ′(B + xm)
To compare the constrained social planner’s allocation to that of the household’s in the
decentralized equilibrium, we impose market clearing prices faced by the firm in equilibrium
i.e. K
′
(xm) = P . Then, the social planner’s optimal allocation is given by:
r
′
m(xm) = P (r
′
f (xf )(1− φ) + φ) + P
′
xm(r
′
f (xf )− 1)− P
′
φ(B + xm)(r
′
f (xf )− 1) (3.2)
Comparing (3.2) to the decentralized allocation in (3.1), we see that the two differ when
r
′
f (xf ) > 1
6. This is the case when the Limited Funds assumption holds and the firm is
not able to undertake all positive NPV projects. Comparing the social planner’s allocation
in (3.2) with the firm’s in (3.1), there are two additional terms on the RHS. The term
P
′
xm(r
′
f (xf )− 1) captures the crowding-out effect. As the firm demands more real estate,
the price of housing rises and it has to pay a greater amount for all units of real estate,
6The presence of the storage technology ensures that r
′
f (xf ) ≥ 1.
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leaving it with less funds to invest into firm projects. This decreases the optimal xm chosen
by the social planner. The term P
′
φ(B + xm)(r
′
f (xf ) − 1) captures the collateral effect.
As the firm demands more real estate, the price of housing rises and loosens the firm’s
borrowing constraint, giving it more funds to invest. This increases the optimal xm chosen
by the planner. Internalizing the price effects of housing therefore makes the constrained
social planner’s optimum differ from that of the firm’s when the household is financially
constrained. Therefore, the first welfare theorem does not hold in this case.7
Let xem be the decentralized equilibrium demand for housing and x
s
m be the optimal amount
of housing in the constrained social planner equilibrium. Based on the above analysis, we can
establish the following proposition on how the decentralized equilibrium allocation differs
from that of the constrained social planner. Given the generality of our functional forms,
for ease of exposition it is easier to express the condition in terms of high-level observables
rather than primitives.8 In a corollary to this proposition, we explain how primitives of the
model affect investment in the decentralized equilibrium.
Proposition 5 If xsm > φ(B + x
s
m), the crowding-out effect is larger than the collateral
effect. In this case, the decentralized equilibrium features inefficiently high investment in
housing and xsm < x
e
m.
Conversely, if xsm < φ(B+x
s
m), the crowding-out effect is smaller than the collateral effect.
In this case, the decentralized equilibrium features inefficiently low investment in housing
and xsm > x
e
m.
The inefficiency in the decentralized equilibrium in this model arises because the firm is
acting like a price-taker and does not internalize the effect real estate demand has on prices.
7The above analysis accounts for how a social planner would change the portfolio allocation picked by the
firm when the construction company acts competitively and picks K
′
(xm) = P . A similar analysis can be
done if the social planner was choosing how much the construction company produces with the firm acting
competitively and picking r
′
(xm) = P (r
′
f (xf )(1− φ) + φ).
8Davila and Korinek (2017) argue that this is usual in normative problems and note that that even
Ramsey’s characterization of optimal commodity taxes relies on demand elasticities that are endogenous to
the level of taxes.
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The price of housing affects both the value of the firm’s collateral and the amount of funds
the firm has to fund investment opportunities. When the existing amount of real estate is
high ( a high B), an increase in the price of housing affects the firm’s ability to borrow.
The social planner internalizes this effect and therefore wants to increase the demand for
real-estate investment to push up the aggregate price of housing. When the existing amount
of housing in the economy is low (a low B) or the firm is not able to use its housing as
collateral efficiently (a low φ), an increase in the amount of housing causes house prices to
be inefficiently high and resources have to be diverted away from investment in firm projects
when the firm faces borrowing constraints. The social planner internalizes this effect and
therefore wants to decrease the demand for real-estate investment to decrease the aggregate
price of housing.
Focusing on the primitives of the model, as B and φ increase, the firm can use housing more
efficiently as collateral to find other investment projects and has to give up less investment
in its own project per dollar spent on real estate purchases. We can establish the following
corollary to the above proposition on how the decentralized equilibrium allocation differs
from that of a planners based on model primitives:
Corollary 4 ∃ B s.t. when B > B, the constrained social planner wants to increase the
decentralized equilibrium investment in housing and when B < B the constrained social
planner wants to decrease the decentralized equilibrium investment in housing.
Similarly, ∃ φ s.t. when φ > φ, the constrained social planner wants to increase the
decentralized equilibrium investment in housing and when φ < φ the constrained social
planner wants to decrease the decentralized equilibrium investment in housing.
As discussed above, investing in real estate requires the firm to use funds that it can
otherwise invest in its own projects. This externality tightens the budget constraint of the
firm and can decrease investment in firm projects. At the same time, investing in real
estate increases the collateral value of the firm, allowing it to borrow more and giving it
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additional resources to invest in its projects. This can looses the firm’s budget constraint.
The net effect on firm investment depends on whether the crowding-out or the collateral
effect dominates. We can establish the following corollary to the above proposition about
the level of investment into the firm’s projects in the economy:
Corollary 5 If xsm > φ(B+x
s
m) then increasing housing investment crowds investment out
of firm projects. Conversely if xsm < φ(B + x
s
m) then increasing housing investment crowds
investment in to firm projects.
Using the budget constraint of the firm we can express the investment in the firm’s projects
in terms of the investment in real estate:
xf = ω + φBP (xm)− (1− φ)P (xm)xm
To study the effect that that increasing housing investment has on firm project investment
we take the derivative of firm investment w.r.t xm:
∂xf
∂xm
= φB
∂P
∂xm
− (1− φ) ∂
∂xm
(Pxm) (3.3)
An increase in the price of housing affects the firm’s investment into its own projects in two
ways as discussed above - the collateral effect and the crowding-out effect. The collateral
effect is captured by the first term on the right hand side of (3.3). An increase in the
price of housing loosens the firm’s borrowing constraint as the existing stock of real estate
is now worth more. The firm can therefore borrow more against its future income and
invest more in its projects at t = 1. The crowding-out effect is captured by the second
term of (3.3). The boom in the price of houses causes the firm to spend relatively more on
real estate purchases and therefore it must compensate by reducing the amount spent on
investing in its projects. Which effect dominates depends on relative increase in the value
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of collateral
(
∂
∂xm
φBP
)
versus the relative increase in the amount that the firms needs to
pay for the extra investment in real estate
(
(1− φ) ∂∂xm (Pxm)
)
. If the existing housing in
an economy is high, a small increase in price can relax borrowing constraints enough to lead
to a crowding-in of investment into the firm’s projects.
We can see that when φ = 0 and the firm cannot borrow at all against it’s real estate
stock, the collateral effect disappears and only the crowding-out effect remains. Increasing
investment in real estate therefore always leads to a substitution away from firm project
investment. When φ = 1, the crowding-out effect is zero and only the collateral effect
remains. In this case, increasing investment in housing always allows the firm to increase
investment into its own projects.
While the collateral effect has been widely discussed and studied in the literature, the
crowding-out effect that we propose is novel. This is because we focus on not just externalities
arising from the collateral constraint but also the budget constraint. The fact that resources
cannot be reallocated simultaneously between the construction company and firm is important
to this result. Otherwise for every dollar the construction company makes in revenue, the
dollar can be reallocated to the firm to invest, so that house prices have no net effect
on the budget constraint. In practice, we feel that the assumption that resources cannot
be frictionlessly moved around is extremely realistic as a firm which is making investment
decisions is unlikely to think that it will be reallocated funds it spends on various purchases.
3.4. Policy
One of the key takeaways of our model is that when the firm is financially constrained,
price effects in the real estate market are not welfare-neutral. Therefore when we consider
government interventions, how they affect the price of housing is critical. In our setting
housing price movements can create externalities on the firm’s investment in its projects.
Therefore when examining policies that tax or subsidize investment in real estate we must
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not only consider the resulting level of real estate investment, but also the resulting price
of housing as this affects the level of investment in firm projects.
To study different housing market policies in our setting, we consider government subsidies
or taxes to the real-estate sector and how they affect the total amount of investment in
the economy. This can be done by a demand side-subsidy (tax) which increases (decreases)
the t = 2 per-unit return on real estate by an amount rg. In practice most government
interventions such as the mortgage interest rate tax deduction to increase real-estate investm-
ent tend to fall into demand-side interventions. We also consider supply-side subsidies
(taxes) in the form of a per-unit subsidy (tax), b, that the government can give to construction
companies as an alternative intervention. The government must have a balanced budget
and households are taxed an amount τ at t = 2 to cover the cost of the subsidy. We assume
that all subsidy/taxation payments are made at t = 2 and that construction companies can
operate at a loss between period 1 and 2 without any additional costs.
A demand-side intervention, rg, changes the firm maximization problem as follows:
max(xf ,xm,xs,l)≥0 rf (xf ) + rm(xm) + rgxm + xs − l(1 + rl)
s.t xf + Pxm + xs ≤ ω + l
s.t l ≤ φ (B + xm)P
If the Limited Funds assumption is satisfied, taking the firm’s first order conditions the
amount of equilibrium investment given the price of housing is now determined by the
following equation:
r
′
m(xm) + rg = P (r
′
f (xf )(1− φ) + φ)
A supply-side intervention, b, changes the construction company’s maximization problem
as follows:
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maxxm≥0 (P + b)xm −K(xm)
Market clearing now requires that that P + b = K
′
(xm).
In the previous analysis, we show that when the limited funds assumption holds and the firm
is financially constrained, it chooses a different allocation than that chosen by a constrained
social planner who takes into account how investing in real estate changes the price of
housing. In this case, we can find a demand-based subsidization scheme that can restore
the constrained social planner optimum. The following proposition states this:
Proposition 6 A demand-based subsidization scheme in which r∗g = K”(xsm)(φB − (1 −
φ)xsm)(r
′
f (x
s
f )−1) and b∗ = 0 restores the socially optimum level of housing and firm project
investment chosen by the constrained social planner.
A demand tax, rg, essentially allows us to shift the firm’s demand for investment in real
estate to match the constrained social planner allocation. When the crowding-out effect
dominates, the social planner wants to reduce equilibrium investment in housing which can
be accomplished by taxing investment in real estate. Alternatively, when the collateral
effect dominates, we can restore the constrained social planner optimum by subsidizing
investment in real estate. A particularly interesting aspect of this proposition is that if
this investment-driven collateral effect is not large enough in the economy (a low B or φ),
the optimum policy for the government would be to have a negative tax on real estate
investment. The size of the government subsidy or tax is larger when quality of investment
opportunities in the firm sector (r
′
f ) is higher. This is because better firm projects increase
the social cost of the externality on investment coming from housing prices. The size of the
government subsidy or tax is also larger when the supply curve is more inelastic (K
′′
(xspm)).
This arises because of the non-neutrality of prices in the model. The price effects of housing
drive the investment externalities and a more inelastic supply curve leads to greater price
movements as we change the amount of real estate investment.
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We can thus restore the constrained social planner optimum by taxing or subsidizing real
estate investment. However, in our economy we can actually do better than the constrained
optimum and achieve the first best by exploiting the externalities of real estate prices on
investment. A tax or subsidy on the demand for housing shifts the household demand
for housing out via a subsidy when the collateral effect dominates, and shifts household
demand in via a tax when the crowding-out effect dominates. When b = 0, such a policy is
restricted to a housing quantity/price combination that is permitted by the housing supply
curve, i.e. K
′
(xm) = P . A tax or subsidy on the supply side of the housing market, allows
for additional shifts of the housing supply curve as well as the demand curve. This increases
the combination of price/quantity combinations that are permissible in equilibrium.
We can show that a combination of demand- and supply-side interventions can help restore
the first-best level of investment and consumption. Formally, we can establish the following
proposition:
Proposition 7 The first-best level of welfare can be achieved by a subsidy pair
{rg, b} =
{
x∗f − ω
φB − (1− φ)x∗m
− r′m(x∗m), r
′
(x∗m)−
x∗f − ω
φB − (1− φ)x∗m
}
This proposition is an important result of our paper and yields a very surprising insight.
In the presence of price externalities from housing, the optimal way to build wealth in the
economy is to combine expansionary housing supply subsidies with contractionary housing
demand taxes and vice-versa. From the proposition we can see that in the optimal subsidy
scheme rg = −b. This is simply due to the linearity of the demand and supply subsidies. In
equilibrium it has to be the case that K
′
(x∗m)− b = P = r
′
m(x
∗
m) + rg. Since at the optimal
level of housing investment K
′
(x∗m) = r
′
m(x
∗
m), this implies that −b = rg.
Since price externalities are the key source of inefficiency in the model, the optimal policy
needs to target price movements which require opposite subsidies to demand and supply.
The government’s problem can thus be thought of as wanting to achieve a certain price
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level at the optimal level of housing investment. Whenever the collateral effect is stronger
than the crowding-out effect at x∗m, the government taxes supply and subsidizes demand,
both of which put upward pressure on the price of housing. The price is increased until the
collateral value of housing is high enough such that the firm can borrow enough to fund
the optimal level of investment into its own projects. Conversely, when the crowding-out
effect is stronger than the collateral effect at x∗m the government needs to put downward
pressure on the price of housing to relax the firm’s budget constraint and provide it with
enough funds to undertake the optimal level of investment. In this case, the government
taxes demand and subsidizes supply, both of which put downward pressure on the price of
housing.
When the crowding-out effect is stronger at x∗m, i.e. when (1−φ)x∗m > φB, the government
wants to push house prices down which can be achieved through supply-side subsidies and
demand-side taxes. Thus, when x∗m is quite high relative to B and the government wants
to increase new housing purchases, we should be pushing housing prices down rather than
trying to support housing prices. This involves measures such as a tax on real estate
investment and rebates to construction companies.
This result highlights that when the return to new housing investment is high (high x∗m),
it is preferable to try and reduce the price of housing, rather than to make borrowing for
firms easier by allowing them to take on more leverage. Other arguments in the literature
also support household’s taking on less leverage. We get the same in our model but through
a completely different channel. We abstract away from the risk created by taking on more
leverage and show that even from a wealth accumulation perspective taking on leverage
may not be optimal for households and firms. This is driven by the fact that if additional
leverage is generated due to an increase in prices, that rise in prices also reduces the funds
available for a firm to invest in other productive opportunities. Reducing the costs of
downpayments of houses can instead free up funds and increase a firm’s ability to invest.
Demand subsidies in the model induce taking on leverage while supply subsidies cause a
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reduction in the leverage required. The crowding-out effect works as a counter to taking on
more leverage.
Implementation: The optimal policy in our model requires knowledge of x∗f and x
∗
m which
depend upon the exact functional forms rm and rf . These quantities are hard to determine
without a full structural model. In the model, when the crowding-out effect is stronger
than the collateral effect, housing prices should optimally be decreased. We can show that
the relative magnitude of the crowding-out effect and the collateral effect depend on three
parameters of the model, B, φ and xm, where xm is the observed level of new investment in
housing. These three parameters are sufficient to determine which effect is relatively larger,
we simply have to compare (1−φ)xm to φB. This determines whether we should subsidize
the supply of housing and tax the demand or vice-versa. This approach is limited in that
it cannot tell us the exact magnitude of the subsidies and taxes. However, these three
statistics are sufficient to guide us in the direction of the intervention and have the benefit
of being easily observable. This approach follows Chetty (2009) and derives formulas based
on sufficient statistics to guide policy without the need to estimate deeper parameters of
the model.
In the next section, we discuss supply- and demand-side interventions in more detail and
explain why the two are not equivalent in our framework. We also explain how the insights
from our theory can help us evaluate existing interventions in the housing market.
3.5. Comparing Demand and Supply Subsidies
Traditional economic theory has long established that under general conditions, it does not
matter whether we subsidize (tax) supply or demand from a welfare perspective. The gains
to consumers and suppliers are the same and depend only on the relative elasticities of the
supply and demand curves. However in our model, we find that taxing the supply and
demand sides of the market can be quite different due to the effects that are caused by
the increase or decrease in the price of housing when households and firms are financially
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constrained and when there is an inter-temporal opportunity cost of capital. In our model,
this cost is the presence of a second sector in the economy since this seems to be an
empirically relevant case. However, this cost can be much more general, and could include
labor income costs, costs associated with the moral hazard of lending such as monitoring
costs, etc.
In this economy, the introduction of subsidies (rg > 0) that increase the demand for real
estate always lead to an appreciation in the price of housing. The price for housing increases
because each additional home is more expensive to produce giving rise to an upward sloping
supply curve in the housing market. For the housing market to clear and respond to the
increase in demand, the price of housing must consequently appreciate. Conversely, the
introduction of subsidies (b > 0) that increase the supply for housing have an opposite
effect on price to that of demand subsidies. They lead to a decrease in the price of housing.
Supply side interventions hence do not cause the boom in housing prices that demand
subsidies do.
In most literature on externalities, the socially optimum level of the good in question
is affected by the existence of externalities. This level is typically independent of price
movements. However, in our paper the externalities themselves are generated due to
prices and therefore this causes demand- and supply- subsidies to have different welfare
implications. This will be discussed more and formalized in the rest of this section. Since
typically externalities lead the social planner to choose a particular optimal level of a good,
in this case housing, we will compare supply and demand subsidies holding fixed the level
of housing investment in the economy. This will help clarify the main forces in the model
that are driving the difference between these two policy interventions.
3.5.1. Demand and Supply Equivalence
As discussed earlier, in classic economic theory the welfare implications of taxing or subsidizing
the supply and demand side of the market are the same. We will therefore start this section
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with a discussion of when subsidizing the supply and the demand side of the market in
our model are welfare equivalent. We will then discuss which frictions cause the welfare
implications of these two policies to differ.
If the firm is not financially constrained, then demand and supply subsidization are equivalent
policies. For any level of real estate investment that can be achieved in the economy,
subsidizing either the supply or demand generate the same utility for the representative
household. This is because the firm will simply invest until all the productive investment
opportunities in the economy are realized. In the following propositions, U refers to the
utility of the representative household. We can then establish the following proposition:
Proposition 8 (Demand and Supply Equivalence) Suppose the firm is unconstrained.
Then for any r
′
g generates x
′
m, x
′
f and U
′
, there exists a b
′
that also generates x
′
m, x
′
f and
U
′
. The converse is also true.
Proposition 8 states the conditions under which supply and demand subsidies are welfare
equivalent. The firm in this model is financially constrained which prevents all productive
investment opportunities from being realized in equilibrium. Once this constraint is taken
away, the costs of being financially constrained i.e. the investment externalities that
investing more in housing causes on firm projects, dissapear as well. The welfare gains
from supply and demand subsidies therefore come from how they each affect the firm’s
ability to borrow and invest.
From proposition 8, we see that without financial constraints, subsidizing the demand-
and supply-side are welfare equivalent. The firm’s constraints prevent it from investing
in all productive investment opportunities. To understand the difference in the two policy
interventions, we therefore need to look at their effect on financial constraints and subsequent
investment in the economy. Having established when demand and supply subsidies produce
the same effects, we now establish two more propositions that explain why they differ in
our model.
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In the model, supply and demand respond to future government subsidies at t = 2. Demand
subsidies increase the demand for housing resulting in an increase in the price of housing
while supply subsidies increase the supply of housing resulting in a decrease in the price of
housing. Prices therefore respond to future subsidies. However, a key part of the benefits
and costs of subsidies are provided to households and firms through price movements.
Supply subsidies may allow the household to invest more by lowering the price of housing at
t = 1. This effectively makes the household relatively richer at t = 1 since taxes to pay for
the subsidies are paid in the future. Alternatively demand side subsidies directly increase
the value of collateral that households have by increasing the price of housing thus helping
them to borrow more.
In the absence of a collateral effect in the model demand subsidies will thus lose their
advantage over supply-side subsidies. The following proposition formalizes this result:
Proposition 9 If φ = 0, subsidizing (taxing) the supply (demand) side of the housing
market pareto dominates subsidizing (taxing) the demand (supply) side of the housing market.
That is, for any demand-subsidy r+g that is associated with utility U , there exists a supply-
subsidy b+ that generates higher U
′
> U and for any supply-tax b− that is associated with
utility U , there exists a demand-tax r−g that generates higher U
′
> U .
This proposition states that without a collateral effect, supply subsidies (demand taxes)
are always preferable to demand subsidies (supply taxes). The key assumptions driving
this result are financial constraints and an inter-temporal advantage of having more capital
early. In the case of our model, the advantage is being able to invest in positive NPV
projects of firms. When φ = 0. In this case the borrowing capacity of the firm does not
change with the price of housing. Therefore the introduction of demand subsidies will push
up price and always cause a reallocation of household investment in favor of mortgages and
away from firm investment due to a negative crowding-out effect. Supply subsidies, on other
hand, will free up household funds to invest in more projects by pushing the cost of housing
down and have a positive crowding-out effect.
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We can establish an analogous proposition for demand-based subsidization schemes. Namely:
Proposition 10 If φ = 1, subsidizing (taxing) the demand (supply) side of the housing
market pareto dominates subsidizing (taxing) the supply (demand) side of the housing market.
That is, for any supply-subsidy b+ that is associated with utility U , there exists a demand-
subsidy r+g that generates higher U
′
> U and for any demand-tax r−g that is associated with
utility U , there exists a supply-tax b− that generates higher U ′ > U .
When φ = 1, the firm is able to borrow against the full value of its real estate stock.
Therefore investment in housing does not require the firm to substitute away from funds
that it would otherwise use for investment in its projects. When φ = 1, the household can
effectively borrow to fund all its new housing purchases. This neutralizes the crowding-out
effect of price movements while keeping the stronger collateral effect that demand subsidies
have since they push up the price of housing.
It is worth noting that when φ = 1, and the firm can borrow up to the full value of its
housing stock from the bank and therefore the firm will choose the optimal level of housing.
However, if the limited funds assumption continues to hold, then the firm will still not
be able to pick the optimal level of investment in its own projects, still creating room for
government intervention.
3.5.2. Evaluating Existing Interventions
The above propositions highlight the usefulness of front-loading benefits and back-loading
costs of policies when there are intertemporal opportunity costs of capital. They can also
be used to evaluate the effectiveness of different interventions which affect the same side of
the market. As we discussed, Chaney et al. (2012) find that high housing prices increase
investment for real estate-owning firms through a loosening of their borrowing constraints.
In more recent work, Chakraborty et al. (2014) find that real estate price booms can crowd-
out investment in firms as more bank loans are used to purchase housing. In line with
these results, our theory predicts that policies which encourage house price booms would
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be beneficial for investment when the firms in the area with price booms already own real
estate (high B) but would crowd-out investment when firms do not already have sizeable
real estate assets.
Many interventions trying to support house prices are often targeted at households rather
than at firms. The theory can also provide insight into housing market policies that affect
household rather than firm-level investment. The firm in our model can be reinterpreted
as a household where the housing return is a convenience yield from consuming services
attributable to home-ownership, and the investment in firm projects can be interpreted as
household investment in non-real estate assets, such as the stock and bond market. Under
this interpretation, we can use insights from the model to help judge the effectiveness of
various interventions in the housing market. Consistent with the model predictions, Hilber
and Turner (2014) find that the mortgage interest rate tax deduction does not seem to be
an effective way to increase home-ownership rates. They further find that the mortgage
interest rate tax deduction seems to increase house prices and document a negative effect of
this increase on homeownership rates amongst downpayment-constrained households. This
effect seems to be particularly strong in areas where the supply of housing is relatively
inelastic. Our model can shed insight into these empirical findings as a demand-side policy
that back-loads benefits, such as the mortgage interest rate tax deduction, negatively affects
new housing investment by households who face financial constraints since such policies
push up the price of housing. Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) and Hanson (2012) also provide
evidence showing that the mortgage interest rate tax deduction seems to have little effect
on increasing home-ownership, particularly amongst financially constrained households.
Recent research has also looked at policies targeting home-owners in the aftermath of the
crisis. Agarwal et al. (2016) and Agarwal et al. (2015) evaluate the effectiveness of the
Home Affordable Modification Program and the Home Affordable Refinancing Program.
They find evidence that these programs increased house prices and had positive effects
on foreclosure rates, delinquencies on consumer debt and allowed indebted homeowners to
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increase spending on durable consumption. Keys et al. (2014) find that lower mortgage
rates in the aftermath of the housing crisis also led to a decrease in defaults and an increase
in spending on durable consumption particularly amongst constrained households. Since
these programs were targeted at existing home-owners rather than encouraging new home-
ownership, our model predicts that demand-side interventions that increase house prices
should prove effective in these cases. For households with existing home equity, an increase
in housing prices should relax collateral constraints allowing them to more easily pay down
debt and increase spending on durable consumption. In line with our model, the empirical
evidence suggests that these effects are mostly present in constrained households.
There are unfortunately less programs targeted at supply-side interventions in the housing
market and consequently less research investigating the effects of these on homeownership
rates and household consumption. However in a recent paper Sodini et al. (2016) study an
intervention in the Swedish housing market in which previously municipally owned buildings
were made available for purchase to residents at steep discounts relative to market prices.
This is similar to a supply-side intervention in our economy as the intervention leads to an
increase in housing supply via a lowering of the price of housing. They find that in this
case home-owners increase investment into the stock market in line with predictions from
our model, that decreasing the price of purchasing housing can free-up home-owner wealth
to invest in other sectors.
3.6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop a comprehensive framework for studying the effect of housing
policy on investment and wealth accumulation. We find that an increase in real estate
equity does not necessarily lead to efficient investment because high housing prices can
generate externalities on investment. In doing so, we highlight a novel theoretical channel
that can help explain empirical evidence on negative effects on investment during the boom
phase of housing prices. We also find that supply and demand subsidies are not equivalent
in the presence of price externalities. When the return to investing in real estate in the
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economy is high, the optimal policy involves an expansion of supply subsidies and a tax on
housing demand. We summarize below some of the key insights of the paper.
(i) Investment: We find that a housing price increase is only good for investment if the
existing stock of real estate ownership by firms is large. In this case, firms can use real
estate as collateral effectively and increasing house prices provide them the ability to
increase investment profitably. When the existing stock of housing is low, increasing
the price of housing can lead to negative externalities on investment and crowd-out
investment from firm projects even when the firm actively uses its real estate assets
as collateral to fund investment. In such a case, policies aimed at reducing the price
of housing are preferable for investment.
(ii) Price Externalities: A novel feature of our model is looking at price externalities in
a general equilibrium framework with externalities arising because of both a collateral
constraint and a budget constraint. When externalities exist because of prices the
standard result of the irrelevance of using supply or demand subsidies no longer applies
when subsidies and taxes are paid out and collected in the future. This is because
supply and demand curve movements move prices in the opposite direction.
(iii) Debt: Different policies in our model have different implications for the level of
household debt. A positive crowding-out effect effectively gives the firm more funds
at t = 1, leading it to achieve higher levels of investment without taking on additional
debt. In fact, due to downward price movements associated with a positive crowding-
out effect, debt may actually decrease. On the other hand, a positive collateral effect
allows the firm to achieve higher levels of investment by increasing its debt capacity.
In our framework, since there is no uncertainty or default, there are no negative
consequences to taking on more debt. However, many recent papers have found that
a buildup in debt can cause increased economic fragility. Our analysis contributes to
this literature by explaining how different housing policies can have different effects on
household and firm debt. In particular, if the government wishes to expand investment
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in real estate which is a common policy objective for many governments, focusing on
supply subsidies that have a positive crowding-out effect and negative collateral effect,
may be a more sustainable intervention.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Appendix to Chapter 1
Appendix A - Proofs of Key Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1. The three-period model can be solved by backwards induction.
Since no new generation is born at t = 3, banks do not lend at t = 3. Additionally, the
price of housing at t = 3 is given by the liquidation value κ. At t = 2, a bank solves,
max
m2≥0
m1
(
φbhR min{P1(1 + r1), eb + (1− δ)P2}+ (1− φbhR ) min{P1(1 + r1), (1− δ)P2}
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Repayment Oustanding Loans
− m2P2︸ ︷︷ ︸
New Lending
+ β m2
(
φblP min{P2(1 + r2), eb + (1− δ)κ}+ (1− φblP ) min{P2(1 + r2), (1− δ)κ}
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Repayment of New Loans
s.t. γ + β(1− δ)κ ≥ βE[min{P2(1 + r2), ωb2 + (1− δ)κ}]
0 ≤ m2 ≤ 1
N
(1− αnb).
In the following analysis, I refer to the first constraint faced by the bank as the borrower
purchasing constraint. The above problem can be simplified by focusing on the bank’s
choice of interest rate. Since banks have monopoly power over their borrowers when setting
interest rates and loans have full recourse, a bank will charge the maximum interest rate
that borrowers are willing to pay.
I start by considering the bank’s choice of interest rate at t = 1. If a bank can not commit
to future lending, there are two cases depending on the relative values of φbhR and γ.
Case 1: If φbhR e
b ≤ γβ , at t = 1 a bank will charge borrowers,
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P1(1 + r1) > e
b + (1− δ)P2.
In this case, a proportion φbhR of bank borrowers receive a positive endowment, have net
worth equal to eb + (1− δ)P2 and repay the bank eb + (1− δ)P2 while the remaining do not
get an endowment, default and the bank gets (1 − δ)P2. In expectation, borrowers repay
the bank φbhR e
b+(1−δ)P2 which satisfies their purchasing constraint. In the model without
commitment to t = 2 lending when banks make t = 1 loans, banks can only credibly prop
up house prices to improve their return on loans when the borrower cannot repay the full
face-value of the loan. The bank will therefore choose a face-value that is strictly higher
than eb + (1− δ)P2.
Case 2: If φbhR e
b > γβ , a bank will charge,
P1(1 + r1) =
γ
βφbhR
+ (1− δ)P2.
In this case, a proportion φbhR of bank borrowers receive a positive endowment, have net
worth equal to eb + (1 − δ)P2 and repay the bank in full γβφbhR + (1 − δ)P2 while the
remaining do not get an endowment, default and the bank gets (1 − δ)P2. Borrowers
repay the bank γβ + (1− δ)P2 in expectation which just satisfies their purchasing constraint.
Note that in this case, a bank cannot charge a higher face-value because borrowers with
a positive endowment would be able to repay the higher face-value and this would violate
their purchasing constraint. A bank will therefore only be able to improve its return on all
defaulting loans from a proportion (1− φbhR ) of borrowers.
By similar reasoning, the interest rate a bank will charge borrowers at t = 2 is s.t. P2(1 +
r2) ≥ eb + (1 − δ)κ. The assumption on low-quality loans being unprofitable implies that
φblP e
b < γβ .
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The equilibrium solution in both cases is similar. In Case 1, I can write an equivalent
maximization problem for the bank at time 2 only incorporating the portion of its profits
from outstanding loans that will be affected by its t = 2 lending,
max
m2≥0
m1(1− δ)P2 −m2P2 + βm2
(
φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ
)
s.t. 0 ≤ m2 ≤ 1
N
(1− αnb).
Define M−i2 as the total lending by all other banks at t = 2. Then, taking the FOC, the
optimal number of loans issued by the bank at t = 2, m2, is given by,
m2 = max
0, m1(1− δ)− φnbP αnb −M−i2 + β
φblP e
b+(1−δ)κ
c
2
 .
Note that m2 is always less than
1
N (1 − αnb) so the maximum constraint on m2 never
binds. This is because the assumption on low-quality loans always being negative NPV
gives implies that −φnbP αnb −M−i2 + β φ
bl
P e
b+(1−δ)κ
c < 0 and m1 always have to be less than
1
N (1− αnb) due to bank’s t = 1 lending constraint.
At t = 1 a bank takes into account its lending at time t = 2 and solves,
max
m1≥0
−m1P1(m1) + βm1
(
φbhR e
b + (1− δ)P2(m1)
)
− βm2(m1)P2(m1)
+ β2m2(m1)
(
φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ
)
s.t. m1 ≤ 1
N
(1− αnb).
I now solve for m1 when m2 > 0 and when m2 = 0. The first order condition for both, gives
the following choice of m1 for the bank,
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m1 = max
{
0,min
{
β
c
(
φbhR e
b + (1− δ)c(φnbP αnb +M−i2 +m2)
)− φnbR αnb −M−i1
2
,
1− αnb
N
}}
.
Note that the above solution is under the assumption that at t = 2, other banks take m2 as
given. This approach assumes that deviations at t = 1 from equilibrium are not observable.
An alternative approach involved other banks taking m2 as a function of m1 at t = 2, in
which case at t = 1 when a bank chooses m1, it would also take into account its decision
on M−i2 . The model solution if equilibrium deviations are observable is similar but less
tractable.
In Case 2, I can similarly write an equivalent maximization problem for the bank at time
2 only incorporating the portion of its profits from outstanding loans that will be affected
by its t = 2 lending,
max
m2≥0
(1− φbhR )m1(1− δ)P2 −m2P2 + βm2
(
φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ
)
s.t. 0 ≤ m2 ≤ 1
N
(1− αnb).
Taking the FOC, the optimal number of loans issued by the bank at t = 2, m2, is given by,
m2 = max
0, (1− φbhR )m1(1− δ)− φnbP αnb −M−i2 + β
φblP e
b+(1−δ)κ
c
2
 .
The constraint m2 ≤ 1N (1−αnb) will not bind for the same reason as in Case 1. At t = 1 a
bank takes into account its lending at time t = 2 and solves,
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max
m1≥0
−m1P1(m1) + βm1
(
γ
β
+ (1− δ)P2(m1)
)
− βm2(m1)P2(m1)
+ β2m2(m1)
(
φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ
)
s.t. m1 ≤ 1
N
(1− αnb).
Taking the first order condition, the bank’s choice of m1 when m2 > 0 is given by,
m1 = max
0,min

β
c
(
γ
β + (1− δ)c(φnbP αnb +M−i2 +m2)
)
− φnbR αnb −M−i1
2− β2 (1− φbhR )φbhR (1− δ)2
,
1− αnb
N

 .
When m2 = 0, the bank’s choice of m1 is given by,
m1 = max
0,min

β
c
(
γ
β + (1− δ)c(φnbP αnb +M−i2 +m2)
)
− φnbR αnb −M−i1
2
,
1− αnb
N

 .
With commitment, the solution is similar. If φbhR e
b ≤ γβ , at t = 1 a bank will charge
borrowers,
P1(1 + r1) ≥ eb + (1− δ)P2.
The bank can set the interest rate equal to eb + (1 − δ)P2. The bank now solves for both
m1 and m2 at t = 1. It therefore solves,
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max
m1,m2≥0
−m1P1(m1) + βm1
(
φbhR e
b + (1− δ)P2(m2)
)
− βm2P2(m2)
+ β2m2
(
φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ
)
s.t. m1,m2 ≤ 1
N
(1− αnb).
The first order conditions give,
m1 = max
{
0,min
{
β
c
(
φbhR e
b + (1− δ)c(φnbP αnb +M−i2 +m2)
)− φnbR αnb −M−i1
2
,
1− αnb
N
}}
.
m2 = max
0, m1(1− δ)− φnbP αnb −M−i2 + β
φblP e
b+(1−δ)κ
c
2
 .
If φbhR e
b > γβ , at t = 1 a bank will charge borrowers,
P1(1 + r1) =
γ
βφbhR
+ (1− δ)P2.
The bank now solves for both m1 and m2 at t = 1. It therefore solves,
max
m1,m2≥0
−m1P1(m1) + βm1
(
γ
β
+ (1− δ)P2(m2)
)
− βm2P2(m2)
+ β2m2
(
φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ
)
s.t. m1,m2 ≤ 1
N
(1− αnb).
The first order conditions give,
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m1 = max
0,min

β
c
(
γ
β + (1− δ)c(φnbP αnb +M−i2 +m2)
)
− φnbR αnb −M−i1
2
,
1− αnb
N

 .
m2 = max
0, m1(1− δ)− φnbP αnb −M−i2 + β
φblP e
b+(1−δ)κ
c
2
 .
Proof of Proposition 1. I start the proof by showing that an equilibrium in symmetric
strategies exists and then show that this equilibrium is unique. I work through Case 1
in which the bank can not commit to future lending. Case 2 and the equilibrium with
commitment can be proved similarly.
I first consider equilibria in which all banks are propping up prices (m2 > 0), and then
equilibria in which no bank is propping up prices. I later show that these are the only two
possible equilibria, as an equilibrium in which some banks prop up prices and some do not,
does not exist.
First, I consider equilibria in which all banks prop up house prices (m2 > 0). Then, using
Lemma 1, at t = 2, a bank’s choice of m2 and m1 are given by,
m2 =
m1(1− δ)− φnbP αnb −M−i2 + β φ
bl
P e
b+(1−δ)κ
c
2
.
m1 = min
{
β
c
(
φbhR e
b + (1− δ)c(φnbP αnb +M−i2 +m2)
)− φnbR αnb −M−i1
2
,
1− αnb
N
}
.
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If m1 = 0, m2 can never be greater than 0, therefore we can drop the minimum constraint
from m1.
In a symmetric equilibrium, M−i2 = (N − 1)m2 and M−i1 = (N − 1)m1. Substituting these
into the above expressions, m1 and m2 are given by,
m2 =
m1(1− δ)− φnbP αnb + β φ
bl
P e
b+(1−δ)κ
c
N + 1
.
m1 = min
 1N + 1− β(1− δ)2 N(N+1)
β 1− δ
2
φnbP αnb + (N − 1)
(
−φnbP αnb + β φ
bl
P e
b+(1−δ)κ
c
)
N + 1

+β2
1− δ
2c
(φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ) + β
c
φbhR e
b − φnbR αnb
)
,
1− αnb
N
}
.
For N ≥ 1 The denominator of the RHS is increasing in N , while the numerator is decreasing
in N since by assumption −φnbP αnb + β φ
bl
P e
b+(1−δ)κ
c < 0. Therefore m1 is decreasing in N .
This is an equilibrium as long as banks want to make m2 > 0 at t = 2. This is the case
when,
m1(1− δ)− φnbP αnb + β
φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ
c
> 0.
Rearranging,
m1 >
φnbP α
nb − β φblP eb+(1−δ)κc
1− δ .
Define N as the value of N at which m1 =
φnbP α
nb−β φ
bl
P e
b+(1−δ)κ
c
1−δ . This is given by,
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φnbP α
nb − β φblP eb+(1−δ)κc
1− δ = min
{
β
c
(
φbhR e
b + (1− δ)cφnbP αnb
)− φnbR αnb
N + 1
,
1− αnb
N
}
.
This can be rearranged to give the following expression for N ,
N = min
 βc
(
(1− δ)φbhR eb + (1− δ)2cφnbP αnb + φblP eb + (1− δ)κ
)− αnb((1− δ)φnbR + φnbP )
φnbP α
nb − β φblP eb+(1−δ)κc
,
(1− αnb)(1− δ)
φnbP α
nb − β φblP eb+(1−δ)κc
 .
Since m1 is decreasing in N , when N < N , an equilibrium in symmetric strategies in which
banks prop up prices exists.
Uniqueness: I now show that when all banks are propping up prices, the symmetric
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. We can write any given bank’s t = 1 and t = 2
optimal lending in terms of prices,
m2 = m1(1− δ)− P2
c
+
β
c
(
φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ
)
.
m1 = min
{
β
c
φblP e
b +
β
c
(1− δ)P2 − P1
c
,
1− αnb
N
}
.
Since all banks face the same P1 and P2, if this equilibrium exists, all players must be
behaving symmetrically. When banks are behaving symmetrically the equilibrium solution
is unique (calculated above). Therefore, the symmetric equilibrium is the unique equilibrium
when banks are propping up house prices.
I now consider equilibria in which banks do not prop up house prices. Similar to the case
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before, I first establish an equilibrium in symmetric strategies is which banks do not prop
up prices and then show that this is the unique equilibrium.
When the bank is not propping up prices, m2 = 0. In this case P2 = cα
nbφnbP . At t = 1, a
bank solves,
maxm1 −m1P1(m1) + βm1(φbhR eb + (1− δ)cαnbφnbP ).
The FOC is given by,
−cm1 − c(αnbφnbR +m1 +M−i1 ) + βφbhR eb + β(1− δ)cαnbφnbP = 0.
m1 = max
0,min
β
φbhR e
b
c + β(1− δ)αnbφnbP − αnbφnbR −M−i1
2
,
1− αnb
N

 .
In a symmetric equilibrium,
m1 = max
0,min
β
φbhR e
b
c + β(1− δ)αnbφnbP − αnbφnbR
N + 1
,
1− αnb
N

 .
This is an equilibrium as long as banks do not want to make m2 > 0 at t = 2. This is the
case when,
m1(1− δ)− φnbP αnb + β
φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ
c
≤ 0.
This is satisfied whenever N ≥ N .
Uniqueness: Uniqueness follows as it did before when banks are not propping up prices.
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We can write any given bank’s t = 1 and t = 2 optimal lending in terms of prices,
m2 = 0.
m1 = max
{
0,min
{
β
c
φblP e
b +
β
c
(1− δ)P2 − P1
c
,
1− αnb
N
}}
.
Since all banks face the same P1 and P2, if this equilibrium exists, all players must be
behaving symmetrically. When banks are behaving symmetrically the equilibrium solution
is unique (calculated above). Therefore, the symmetric equilibrium is the unique equilibrium
when banks are propping up house prices.
To complete the proof, I also need to rule out the case when some banks are propping up
prices and some are not. I prove this by contradiction. Imagine bank i is propping up prices
and bank j is not. Then at t = 1,
mi1 = min
{
β
c
φblP e
b +
β
c
(1− δ)P2 − P1
c
,
1− αnb
N
}
.
mj1 = max
{
0,min
{
β
c
φblP e
b +
β
c
(1− δ)P2 − P1
c
,
1− αnb
N
}}
.
These expressions imply that mi1 = m
j
1. However,if this is the case, m
j
2 = m
i
1 which is a
contradiction. Therefore, in any equilibrium either all banks will be propping up prices, or
no bank will be propping up prices.
For Case 2 without commitment, the proposition can be proven in a similar way. In this
case, N is given by the following expression,
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N = min
 βc
(
(1− δ)(1− φbhR )φbhR eb + (1− δ)2(1− φbhR )cφnbP αnb + φblP eb + (1− δ)κ
)
φnbP α
nb − β φblP eb+(1−δ)κc
−α
nb((1− δ)(1− φbhR )φnbR + φnbP )
φnbP α
nb − β φblP eb+(1−δ)κc
,
(1− αnb)(1− φbhR )(1− δ)
φnbP α
nb − β φblP eb+(1−δ)κc
 .
With commitment, N is given by,
N = min {
β
c
(
(1− δ) min
{
φbhR e
b, γβ
}
+ (1− δ)2cφnbP αnb + φblP eb + (1− δ)κ
)
− αnb((1− δ)φnbR + φnbP )
φnbP α
nb − β φblP eb+(1−δ)κc
,
(1− αnb)(1− δ)
φnbP α
nb − β φblP eb+(1−δ)κc
 .
Proof of Corollary 1. Consider Case 1 without commitment. If N ≥ N , banks do not
prop up prices in equilibrium. The total credit extended at t = 1 by a single bank is given
by,
m1 = max
0,min
β
φbhR e
b
c + β(1− δ)αnbφnbP − αnbφnbR
N + 1
,
(1− α)nb
N

 .
When N ≥ N , as N increases, m1 decreases. m2 = 0 for all N ≥ N . Therefore when
N ≥ N , credit by any given bank increases as N decreases.
Total credit at t = 2 is M2 = 0. Total credit at t = 1 is given by,
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M1 = max
0,min
N β
φbhR e
b
c + β(1− δ)αnbφnbP − αnbφnbR
N + 1
, (1− α)nb

 .
This is increasing in N .
If N < N , the economy is in an equilibrium in which banks prop up house prices. The total
credit at t = 1 extended by a single bank is given by,
m1 =
1
N + 1− β (1−δ)22 − β(1− δ)2 N−12(N+1)
(
β
1− δ
2
(
φnbP α
nb+
(N − 1)
(
−φnbP αnb + β φ
bl
P e
b+(1−δ)κ
c
)
N + 1
+ β2 1− δ
2c
(φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ) + β
c
φbhR e
b − φnbR αnb
 .
m1 increases as N decreases (from the proof of Proposition 1). The total credit at t = 2
extended by a single bank is given by,
m2 =
m1(N)(1− δ)− φnbP αnb + β φ
bl
P e
b+(1−δ)κ
c
N + 1
.
As N decreases, m2 increases. Therefore, the total credit extended by a single bank increases
as N decreases.
The total credit in the economy is given by,
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M1 +M2 =
N
N + 1− β (1−δ)22 − β(1− δ)2 N−12(N+1)
(
1 +
1− δ
N + 1
)(
β
1− δ
2
(
φnbP α
nb+
(N − 1)
(
−φnbP αnb + β φ
bl
P e
b+(1−δ)κ
c
)
N + 1
+ β2 1− δ
2c
(φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ+ φbhR eb
−φnbR αnb)
)
+
N
N + 1
(
−φnbP αnb + β
φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ
c
)
.
Taking the derivative w.r.t N ,
−
(
(1− δ)2β + (1− δ)− 1)N2 − 2N − (1− δ)− 1
(N2 + (2− (1− δ)2β)N + 1)2
(
β
1− δ
2
φnbP α
nb + β2
1− δ
2c
(φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ) +β
c
φbhR e
b − φnbR αnb
)
− −φ
nb
P α
nb + β
φblP e
b+(1−δ)κ
c
(N + 1)2 (N2 + (2− (1− δ)2β)N + 1)2((
(1− δ)2β + 1− δ − 4)N4 + (4(1− δ)2β − 2(1− δ)− 12)N3
+
(−(1− δ)4β2 + (2(1− δ)3 + 5(1− δ)2)β − 6(1− δ)− 12)N2
+2((1− δ)2β − 2(1− δ)− 4)N + 1− δ) .
The second term in the above expression is always negative and this can cause the value of
the total derivative to be negative.1 Therefore aggregate credit can increase as N decreases.
The proof in Case 2 and the case with commitment follow similarly.
Proof of Corollary 2. Consider Case 1 without commitment. From Proposition 1, N is
given by,
1For N ≥ 1, the multiplier on φnbP αnb and φnbR αnb are always negative. The mathematics of when exactly
this expression is negative is tedious and does not add anything much to understanding the main mechanism
in the paper but can be made available on request. An example of this can be seen in the graphical illustration
in the paper.
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N =
min
 βc
(
(1− δ)φbhR eb + (1− δ)2cφnbP αnb + φblP eb + (1− δ)κ
)− αnb((1− δ)φnbR + φnbP )
φnbP α
nb − β φblP eb+(1−δ)κc
,
(1− αnb)(1− δ)
φnbP α
nb − β φblP eb+(1−δ)κc
 .
It is straightforward from the above expression that,
∂N
∂(φblP e
b)
> 0.
As δ increases, the denominator in the expression for N increases. At the same time the
numerator of the above expression is decreasing. To see this clearly for the first term of the
minimization, taking the derivative of the numerator of N w.r.t. δ, we get,
−β
c
(
φbhR e
b + 2(1− δ)cφnbP αnb + κ
)
+ αnbφnbR (A.1)
Recall from Proposition 1, that when banks are not propping up prices,
m1 = max
0,min
β
φbhR e
b
c + β(1− δ)αnbφnbP − αnbφnbR
N + 1
,
1− αnb
N

 .
Therefore, in the relevant range, βcφ
bh
R e
b + β(1− δ)φnbP αnb − αnbφnbR > 0 since m1 ≥ 0. This
implies that (A.3) is negative. Therefore N is decreasing in δ.
Similarly as φnbP increases, the denominator of N is increasing. Additionally in the first term
of the minimization, the numerator is decreasing: taking the derivative of the numerator of
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N w.r.t. φnbP , we get,
αnb(β(1− δ)2 − 1) < 0.
Therefore N is decreasing in φnbP .
The proof in Case 2 and the case with commitment follow similarly.
Proof of Proposition 2. For any default costs, d > 0, the total welfare under N1 is
(M1(N1) +M2(N1) + (φ
nb
P + φ
nb
R )α
nb)γ + βeb(φbhR + φ
bh
P )(1− αnb) + 2βαnbenb
− βd(M1(N1)(1− φbR)M2(N1)(1− φbP ))
The total welfare under N2 is
(M1(N2) + (φ
nb
P + φ
nb
R )α
nb)γ + βeb(φbhR + φ
bh
P )(1− αnb) + 2βαnbenb
− βd(M1(N1)(1− φbR))
Since M1(N2) = M1(N1) +M2(N1), φ
b
R > φ
b
P and d > 0, welfare is always higher under N2
than N1.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider Case 1. Since N depends on φblP and φ
nb
P , this
proposition only compares areas given an N1 and N2 s.t. N for each area falls within
(N1, N2]. Following an increase in concentration from N1 ≥ N to N2 < N , the change in
total lending is given by,
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∆M =
(
N2 +
(1− δ)N2
N2 + 1
)
β 1−δ2
φnbP αnb + (N2−1)
(
−φnbP αnb+β
φblP e
b+(1−δ)κ
c
)
N2+1
+ β2(1−δ)2c (φblP eb + (1− δ)κ)
N2 + 1− β (1−δ)22 − β(1− δ)2 N2−12(N2+1)
+N2
(
1 +
1− δ
N2 + 1
) β
cφ
bh
R e
b − φnbR αnb
N2 + 1− β (1−δ)22 − β(1− δ)2 N2−12(N2+1)
+
N2
N2 + 1
(
−φnbP αnb + β
φblP e
b + (1− δ)κ
c
)
−N1
β
φbhR e
b
c + β(1− δ)αnbφnbP − αnbφnbR
N1 + 1
.
(A.2)
Taking the derivative w.r.t φnbP ,
∂∆M
∂φnbP
= N2
(
1 +
1− δ
N2 + 1
) β 1−δ2 (αnb − (N2−1)αnbN2+1 )
N2 + 1− β(1− δ)2 N2N2+1
− N2α
nb
N2 + 1
−N1β (1− δ)α
nb
N1 + 1
.
If ∂∆M
∂φnbP
< 0, then income growth and the growth in mortgage credit can be negatively
correlated. For this to be the case, we require that,
N2
(
1 +
1− δ
N2 + 1
)
β(1− δ) αnbN2+1
N2 + 1− β(1− δ)2 N2N2+1
− N2α
nb
N2 + 1
−N1β (1− δ)α
nb
N1 + 1
< 0.
Simplifying,
(1− δ) N2 + 2− δ
N22 + 1 + 2N2 − β(1− δ)2N2
N2
N2 + 1
− 1
β
N2
N2 + 1
−N1 1− δ
N1 + 1
< 0.
The denominator of the coefficient multiplying the first term is greater than the numerator.
Therefore the first term is strictly less that the value of the second term and this expression
is always less than 0. Therefore, ∂∆M
∂φnbP
< 0.
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Looking at (A.2), we can see that all the terms multiplying φblP are always positive. Therefore,
∂∆M
∂φblP
> 0.
The proof in Case 2 and the case with commitment follow similarly.
Proof of Proposition 4. I start the proof by simplifying the problem in a similar way
to the three-period model by focusing on the bank’s choice of interest rate. Given state-
contingent repayments, state by state, a bank will charge the maximum interest rate such
that borrowers are willing to pay. Consider the interest rate a bank will charge borrowers
from generation t when the state of the world is st ∈ {R,P}. As in the three-period model,
depending on the relative values of φbhst , φ
bl
st and γ, there are various possible cases. Here,
I will work through the interest rate problem in the case in which φbhR e
b < γβ without
commitment. The other cases are similar.
If φbjste
b < γβ , where j = {h, l} represents borrower-type, a bank will charge:
Pt−1(1 + rt−1(st)) > eb + (1− δ)Pt(st).
In this case, a proportion φbjst of bank borrowers get a positive endowment and pay the
bank eb+(1−δ)Pt(st) while the remaining do not get an endowment and pay the bank gets
(1−δ)Pt(st). In expectation, borrowers repay the bank φbjsteb+(1−δ)E[Pt(st)] which satisfies
their purchasing constraint. When φbhR e
b < γβ , because of the assumptions on the income
of high- versus low-quality borrowers and in rich versus poor states, φbjste
b < γβ , ∀st, ∀j.
As in the three-period case, in the model without commitment, banks can only credibly
prop up house prices to improve their return on loans when the borrower cannot repay the
full face-value of the loan. State-by-state the bank will therefore choose a facevalue that is
strictly higher than eb + (1− δ)Pt(st).
In this case, define mt = m
h
t + m
l
t. Then, we can write the bank’s maximization problem
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at any time t as:
V (st,mt−1) = max
mht ≥0,mlt≥0
mt−1(1− δ)Pt −
∑
j={h,l}
mjtPt + β
∑
j={h,l}
mjtφ
bj
ste
b + βE [V (st+1,mt)]
s.t. mht ≤
1
N
αbh, s.t. mlt ≤
1
N
(1− αbh − αnb).
The above problem is independent of interest rates chosen by the bank. Therefore each
period a bank only decides on the amount of loans they wish to issue to each type of
borrower. Further, it is independent of the income of generation t − 1. The housing price
only depends on the total number of loans outstanding to generation t−1. In this case, the
problem is also independent of the type of loans made to high- versus low-quality borrowers
at t− 1 but in other cases, it is not.
Using the envelope theorem,
∂E [V (st+1,mt)]
∂mht
=
∂E [V (st+1,mt)]
∂mlt
= (1− δ)E[Pt+1]
This gives the following FOCs for a bank,
∂V (st,mt−1)
∂mht
= mt−1(1− δ)c− Pt −mht c+ βφbhst eb + β(1− δ)E[Pt+1].
∂V (st,mt−1)
∂mlt
= mt−1(1− δ)c− Pt −mltc+ βφblsteb + β(1− δ)E[Pt+1].
The equilibrium lending by a bank is given by,
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mht = max
{
0,min
{
mt−1(1− δ)c− Pt + βφbhst eb + β(1− δ)E[Pt+1]
c
,
αbh
N
}}
.
mlt = max
{
0,min
{
mt−1(1− δ)c− Pt + βφblsteb + β(1− δ)E[Pt+1]
c
,
1− αbh − αnb
N
}}
.
Given a choice of lending to high-quality borrowers over low-quality borrowers, it is always
dominant for a bank to make a loan to a high-quality borrower. Therefore, if,
mt−1(1− δ)c− Pt + βφbhst eb + β(1− δ)E[Pt+1]
c
≤ α
bh
N
mlt = 0.
I now show an equilibrium is always symmetric if all banks start with the same level of
initial loans m0. Consider a bank’s lending at t = 1.
mh1 = max
{
0,min
{
m0(1− δ)c− P1 + βφbhst eb + β(1− δ)E[P2]
c
,
αbh
N
}}
.
ml1 = max
{
0,min
{
m0(1− δ)c− P1 + βφblsteb + β(1− δ)E[P2]
c
,
1− αbh − αnb
N
}}
.
If all banks have the same m0, then the above equations will be identical for all banks
and they will choose the same m1. Similarly at t = 2, we can show that if all banks have
the same m1, they will choose the same m2 and so on and so forth. Given the symmetric
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equilibrium solution, I can rewrite equilibrium lending as,
Mht
N
=
max
{
0,min
{
Mt−1
N (1− δ)c− cMht − cM lt − cαnbφnbst + βφbhst eb + β(1− δ)E[Pt+1]
c
,
αbh
N
}}
.
(A.3)
M lt
N
=
max
{
0,min
{
Mt−1
N (1− δ)c− cMht − cM lt − cαnb + βφbhst eb + β(1− δ)E[Pt+1]
c
,
1− αbl
N
}}
.
(A.4)
In the above equation, αbl = 1− αbh − αnb. Given these first order conditions, I can write
an equivalent maximization problem of a representative bank in this economy. This is given
by,
V (st,Mt−1) = max
Mht ≥0,M lt≥0
Mt−1
N
(1− δ)Pt +
∑
j={h,l}
(
−M
j
t
N
Pt − N − 1
N
M jt
2
2
c− (N − 1)
N
M jt φ
nb
st α
nbc+ βM jt φ
bj
ste
b
)
− (N − 1)
N
Mht M
l
tc+ βE [V (st+1,Mt)]
s.t. Mht ≤ αh
s.t. M lt ≤ 1− αh − αnb.
The first order conditions for this representative bank give the same aggregate lending as
those of the individual banks. I can show that the above maximization of the equivalent
representative bank is a contraction mapping. Define
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U(st,Mt−1,Mht ,M
l
t) =
Mt−1
N
(1− δ)Pt+∑
j={h,l}
(
−M
j
t
N
Pt − N − 1
N
M jt
2
2
c− (N − 1)
N
M jt φ
nb
st α
nbc+ βM jt φ
bj
ste
b
)
− (N − 1)
N
Mht M
l
tc
Since Mht , M
l
t and Mt−1 are bounded, Pt is bounded and therefore U is bounded. Define
an operator,
(TV )(st,Mt−1) = max
0≤Mht ≤αbh, 0≤M lt≤1−αbh−αnb
{
U(st,Mt−1,Mht ,M
l
t) + βE [V (st+1,Mt)]
}
.
Take V to be bounded. Since U is bounded by assumption, then TV is also bounded. TV
satisfies monotonicity. Suppose V < W . Let gh(Mt−1, st) and gl(Mt−1, st) be the optimal
policy functions (not necessarily unique) corresponding to V for Mht and M
l
t respectively.
Then for all Mt−1 ∈ [0, 1− αnb],
TV (st,Mt−1) =
U(st,Mt−1, gh(Mt−1, st), gl(Mt−1, st)) + βE [V (st+1 + gh(Mt−1, st), gl(Mt−1, st))]
≤ U(st,Mt−1, gh(Mt−1, st), gl(Mt−1, st)) + βE [W (st+1, gh(Mt−1, st) + gh(Mt−1, st))]
≤ max
0≤Mht ≤αbh, 0≤M lt≤1−αbh−αnb
{
U(st,Mt−1,Mht ,M
l
t) + βE
[
W (st+1,M
h
t +M
l
t))
]}
= TW (st,Mt−1)
.
TV also satisfies discounting. Let a > 0. Then,
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T (V + a)(st,Mt−1) =
max
0≤Mht ≤αbh, 0≤M lt≤1−αbh−αnb
{
U(st,Mt−1,Mht ,M
l
t) + βE [V (st+1,Mt) + a]
}
= max
0≤Mht ≤αbh, 0≤M lt≤1−αbh−αnb
{
U(st,Mt−1,Mht ,M
l
t) + βE [V (st+1,Mt)]
}
+ βa
= TV (st,Mt−1) + βa
.
The model therefore satisfies Blackwell’s conditions and is bounded and is therefore a
contraction mapping with modulus β. Therefore, an equilibrium of this economy exists
and can be found through value function iteration.
The Hessian matrix of U is given by,
−N+1N c − N−1N c
−N−1N c − N+1N c
 .
The determinant of the Hessian is given by,
(
N + 1
N
c
)2
−
(
N − 1
N
c
)2
< 0.
The Hessian matrix is negative semi-definite since the determinant is less than 0 and
−N+1N c < 0. Therefore, for all Mht and M lt , U is a strictly concave function. Let SMt
be the set of all possible values of Mt. Then since SMt is convex, the correspondence
which gives the set of all feasible allocations given Mt is convex, and U is continuous and
bounded, there is a unique policy function associated with the above problem and V ∗ is
strictly concave. The equilibrium is therefore unique.
From (A.3) and (A.4), it is straightforward that conditional on the state of the economy,
Mt is linearly increasing in Mt−1. Furthermore, due to linearity, conditional on state, Mht
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is strictly increasing in Mht−1 when Mht−1 < αbh.
An equilibrium in which banks do not make any loans to low-quality borrowers to prop-up
prices is equivalent to an equilibrium in which ∀t and ∀s,
(
Mt−1
N
(1− δ)c− cMht − cαnb + βφbhst + β(1− δ)E[Pt+1]
)
N
c(N + 1)
≤ 0
Since Mt is linearly increasing in Mt−1 (and strictly increasing in the range Mt−1 ∈
[
0, αbh
)
,
then ∃ T s.t. a series of T consecutive R shocks that will eventually give MT = αbh (as long
as V (R,M0) > 0). Since the incentive to prop up prices is highest when outstanding loans
are the highest, if at T + 1, in either state, a bank does not want to prop up prices given
that they expect no other banks to be propping up prices, then for any series of shocks
banks make no loans to low-quality borrowers. Substituting in Mt−1 = αbh into the above
condition, such an equilibrium exists when,
(
αbh
N
(1− δ)c− cMht − cαnb + βφbhst + β(1− δ)E[Pt+1]
)
N
c(N + 1)
≤ 0
Since banks will always make high-quality loans before low-quality loans, this implies that
Mht = α
bh. Substituting this in,
αbh
N
(1− δ)c− cαbh − cαnb + βφbhst + β(1− δ)E[Pt+1] ≤ 0
The LHS is decreasing as N increases. Note that Pt+1(Mt−1, st) is increasing in outstanding
loans per bank, Mt−1N , and therefore as N increases, E[Pt+1] decreases. Therefore, ∃N s.t.
when N ≥ N , an equilibrium in which banks do not prop up house prices exists. When
N < N , bank will make loans to low-quality borrowers and prop up prices. The other cases
can be worked through similarly.
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Proof of Corollary 3.
The proof for this is contained in in the proof for Proposition 3. Please refer to that above.
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Appendix B
Income Growth and Mortgage Growth with Borrower Heterogeneity
In the three-period model in the main text it is clear that non-borrower income growth can
cause there to be a negative correlation between credit and income-growth when looking
at an area following an increase in concentration. However, to additionally be able to
show that a positive correlation can still exist between credit and income growth at the
borrower-level, we need to allow for borrower level heterogeneity. To illustrate the two
results simultaneously, it is enough to allow borrower-level heterogeneity at t = 2 and look
at t = 2 credit when concentration changes. At t = 2, let there be a proportion αbh of high-
quality borrowers who get an endowment with probability φbhR . Then we get the following
graphs for credit at a borrower-level versus an area-level as concentration changes.
Figure 17: Income and Mortgage Credit Growth: Borrower Heterogeneity
The figure on the left plots total credit, measured by the number of households who get a mortgage, against the level
of concentration in the mortgage market for different income growths between t = 1 and t = 2. The figure on the
right plots credit received by high-quality borrowers versus by low-quality borrowers inside the area with lower-income
growth against the level of concentration. As we move along the x-axis, N increases and concentration decreases.
The parametrization is as follows: δ = .01, αnb = .2, φblP = .2, φ
bh
R = 1, φ
nb
R = 1, eb = 2 ,κ = .45, γ = 4, b = 9.8,
αbh = .01, φbhP = .41 . φ
nb
P is varied to get changes in income growth across the two plots - it is equal to .73 is the
high-income growth area and .7 in the low-income growth area.
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Appendix C
Calibration of Benchmark Model
Data Description: The fraction of sub-prime borrowers is from a research report by the
Financial Inquiry Commission using data from Inside Mortgage Finance. U.S. house price
changes are calculated from Federal Reserve Economic Data. The home-ownership rate is
taken from the U.S. Census Bureau. The default rates on prime and sub-prime loans are
taken from a research report by the U.S. Census Bureau. The fraction of cash-only house
purchases are from RealtyTrac. The private benefit of home-ownership is hard to measure
in the data and therefore I choose a value of γ so that it does not determine any equilibrium
quantities.
Table 12: Configuration of Model Parameters: Benchmark Model
Description Symbol Value Source/Target
Fraction of high-quality borrowers αbh .5 Loans to prime borrowers
Fraction of non-borrowers αnb .06 Cash only house purchases
Low-quality shock rich state φblR .9 Default rate sub-prime loans boom
Low-quality shock poor state φblP .75 Default rate sub-prime loans bust
High-quality shock rich state φbhR .98 Default rate prime loans boom
High-quality shock poor state φbhP .94 Default rate prime loans bust
Discount Factor β .99 Standard
Depreciation δ .02 Standard
Number of banks N 2 Mortgage market concentration
Borrower endowment eb 2.4 House prices, sub-prime fraction
Construction cost c 5.6 House prices, sub-prime fraction
Likelihood of rich state q .5 House prices, sub-prime fraction
To limit the number of free parameters, γ ≥ 2.6, φnbR = φnbP = 1.
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Table 13: Aggregate Moments: Benchmark Model
Model Data
Fraction of sub-prime borrowers in boom .12 .12
Fraction of sub-prime borrowers in bust .05 .05
Default rate sub-prime loans in boom .10 .12
Default rate sub-prime loans in bust .25 .25
Default rate prime loans in boom .02 .02
Default rate on prime loans in bust .06 .06
Fraction of cash only house purchases boom .09 .13
Fraction of cash only house purchases bust .10 .22
House price increase boom .52 1.43
House price decrease bust -.11 -.20
Change home-ownership rate boom .07 .05
Change home-ownership rate bust .07 .02
In the model without commitment, since the banks charge a face-value slightly higher than eb + (1− δ)P2,
I consider a mortgage as delinquent when borrowers repay the banks less than eb + (1− δ)P2.
Table 14: Counter factual Analysis: Benchmark Model
N=2 N=4
Fraction of sub-prime borrowers in boom .12 0
Fraction of sub-prime borrowers in bust .05 0
House price increase boom .52 .22
House price decrease bust -.23 -.03
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Calibration of Model with Dispersed Lenders
Data Description: The data is as before. The GSE market share is calculated from the
Federal Reserve and Federal Housing Finance.
Table 15: Configuration of Model Parameters: Lender Heterogeneity
Description Symbol Value Source/Target
Fraction of high-quality borrowers αh .5 Fraction of prime/sub-prime borrowers
Fraction of non-borrowers αnb .06 Fraction of cash only house purchases
Low-quality shock rich state φblR .9 Default rate sub-prime loans boom
Low-quality shock poor state φblP .75 Default rate sub-prime loans bust
High-quality shock rich state φbhR .98 Default rate prime loans boom
Low-quality shock poor state φbhP .95 Default rate prime loans bust
Discount Factor β .99 Standard
Depreciation δ .02 Standard
borrower endowment eb 1.4 house price boom/bust
Elasticity c 5.8 house price boom/bust
Number of banks N 2 Mortgage market concentration
Borrower share of dispersed banks s .6 Mortgage market concentration
Likelihood of rich state q .5
To limit the number of free parameters, γ ≥ 1.4, φnbR = φnbP = 1.
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Table 16: Aggregate Moments: Lender Heterogeneity
Model Data
Fraction of sub-prime borrowers in boom .11 .12
Fraction of sub-prime borrowers in bust .07 .05
Default rate sub-prime loans in boom .10 .12
Default rate sub-prime loans in bust .25 .25
Default rate prime loans in boom .02 .02
Default rate on prime loans in bust .06 .06
Fraction of cash only house purchases boom .18 .13
Fraction of cash only house purchases bust .20 .22
House price increase boom .63 1.43
House price decrease bust -.06 -.20
Change home-ownership rate boom .08 .05
Change home-ownership rate bust .02 .02
GSE Market Share ’07 .42 .42
In the model without commitment, since the banks charge a face-value slightly higher than eb + (1− δ)P2,
I consider a mortgage as delinquent when borrowers repay the banks less than eb + (1− δ)P2.
Table 17: Counter Factual Analysis: Lender Heterogeneity
N=2 N=4
Fraction of sub-prime borrowers in boom .11 0
Fraction of sub-prime borrowers in bust .07 0
House price increase boom .63 .45
House price decrease bust -.06 -.01
145
Appendix D
Figure 18: GSE share of all outstanding US mortgage debt
The above figure plots Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s share of all outstanding US mortgage debt. Source: Federal
Reserve and Federal Housing Finance.
Figure 19: GSE total dollar exposure to the US housing market
The above figure plots Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s total dollar exposure to the US housing market. Source: Federal
Reserve and Federal Housing Finance.
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A.2. Appendix to Chapter 3
Proof of Propostion 5. To begin the proof first note that, P
′
(xm) = K
′′
(xm) > 0
in both the decentralized and the SP equilibrium. The equilibrium condition for the SP
equilibrium requires,
r
′
m(x
sp
m) =K
′
(xspm)(r
′
f (x
sp
f )(1− φ) + φ) +K
′′
(xspm)x
sp
m(r
′
f (x
sp
f )− 1)
−K ′′(xspm)φ(B + xspm)(r
′
f (x
sp
f )− 1)
The equilibrium condition for the decentralized equilibrium requires,
r
′
m(x
dc
m) = K
′
(xdcm)(r
′
f (x
dc
f )(1− φ) + φ)
Substituting the SP equilibrium quantities into the RHS of the decentralized equilibrium,
K
′
(xspm)(r
′
f (x
sp
f )(1− φ) + φ)
If xspm > φ(B + x
sp
m), then,
r
′
m(x
sp
m) > K
′
(xspm)(r
′
f (x
sp
f )(1− φ) + φ)
The LHS of the above equation is decreasing in xm which the RHS is increasing in xm.
Therefore xspm < xdcm .
Conversely, if xspm < φ(B + x
sp
m), then,
r
′
m(x
sp
m) < K
′
(xspm)(r
′
f (x
sp
f )(1− φ) + φ)
The LHS of the above equation is decreasing in xm which the RHS is increasing in xm.
Therefore xspm > xdcm .
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Proof of Propostion 6. When r∗g = K
′′
(xspm)(φB − (1− φ)xspm)(r′f (xspf )− 1) and b∗ = 0,
the household’s first order condition is,
r
′
m(xm) +K
′′
(xspm)(φB − (1− φ)xspm)(r
′
f (x
sp
f )− 1) = P (r
′
f (xf )(1− φ) + φ)
When b = 0, P = K
′
(xm) in equilibrium. Substituting that in,
r
′
m(xm) =K
′
(xm)(r
′
f (xf )(1− φ) + φ) +K
′′
(xm)xm(r
′
f (xf )− 1)
−K ′′(xm)φ(B + xm)(r′f (xf )− 1)
For this equation to hold, xm = x
sp
m and xf = x
sp
f since it is identical to (3.2). For the
government to have a balanced budget, τ = rgx
sp
m . Substituting this into household utility,
we see that the utility is the same as that of the constrained social planner.
Proof of Propostion 7. At optimal,
x∗f = ω + φBP − P (1− φ)x∗m (A.5)
This gives us
P =
x∗f − ω
φB − (1− φ)x∗m
(A.6)
At that level household doesn’t invest anymore in xf since r
′
(x∗f ) = 1. Looking at the
household’s FOC, we also require that,
r
′
m(x
∗
m) + rg
P
= 1 (A.7)
This gives us an rg of
rg =
x∗f − ω
φB − (1− φ)x∗m
− r′m(x∗m) (A.8)
and it gives us a b of,
K
′
(x∗m) =
x∗f − ω
φB − (1− φ)x∗m
+ b (A.9)
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therefore b is,
b = K
′
(x∗m)−
x∗f − ω
φB − (1− φ)x∗m
(A.10)
We know that at x∗m, K
′
(x∗m) = r
′
m(x
∗
m) and therefore we can rewrite b as,
b = r
′
(x∗m)−
x∗f − ω
φB − (1− φ)x∗m
= −rg (A.11)
Therefore, expansionary supply-side policy (positive b) have to be accompanied by
contractionary demand-side intervention (negative rg) to achieve the optimum. b is positive
when,
r
′
(x∗m)−
x∗f − ω
φB − (1− φ)x∗m
> 0 (A.12)
Rewriting,
r
′
(x∗m) >
x∗f − ω
φB − (1− φ)x∗m
(A.13)
Under this subsidy scheme the household’s utility is given by,
U = rm(x
∗
m) + rf (x
∗
f ) + rgx
∗
m − τ − l + (P b + b)x∗m −K(x∗m)
where l = φ(B + x∗m)P b = ω − P bx∗m − x∗f . For the government to have a balanced
budget, τ = (b + rg)x
∗
m. Substituting this into household utility and using the fact that
P b = K
′
(xm)− b, the above simplifies to,
U = rm(x
∗
m) + rf (x
∗
f )−K(x∗m)− x∗f + ω
We see that the utility is the same as that of the unconstrained social planner.
Proof of Propostion 8. When the household can invest as it likes and is not financially
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constrained, the household chooses x∗f s.t. r
′
(x∗f ) = 1 ∀ b, rg. This can be proven by
contradiction. Suppose the household chooses an xf < x
∗
f . Then taking a loan of xf − x∗f
and deviating to x∗f will provide higher terminal wealth and therefore an xf < x
∗
f cannot
be optimal. Suppose the household chooses an xf > x
∗
f . Then reducing its loan by x
∗
f − xf
and deviating to x∗f will provide higher terminal wealth and therefore an xf > x
∗
f cannot be
optimal for the household. In the analysis that follows, superscript d refers to a demand-side
quantities, while superscript s refers to supply-side quantities.
A demand side intervention rg that generates x
′
m will be associated with household utility
Ud given by,
Ud = rm(x
′
m) + rf (x
∗
f ) + rgx
′
m − τd − ld + P dx
′
m −K(x
′
m) (A.14)
Substituting in for τd and ld = P dx
′
m + x
∗
f − ω, this simplifies to
Ud = rm(x
′
m) + rf (x
∗
f )− x∗f + ω −K(x
′
m)
Similarly, a supply side subsidy b that generates x
′
m is associated with household utility U
s
that is given by,
U s = rm(x
′
m) + rf (x
∗
f )− τ s − ls + (P s + b)x
′
m −K(x
′
m)
Substituting in for τ s and ls = P sx
′
m + x
∗
f − ω, this simplifies to
U s = rm(x
′
m) + rf (x
∗
f )− x∗f + ω −K(x
′
m)
Therefore, the representative household has the same utility under both supply and demand
subsidies.
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Proof of Proposition 9. In the analysis that follows, superscript d refers to a demand-
side quantities, while superscript s refers to supply-side quantities. Say we want to achieve
a level of x
′
m. Then a demand side intervention will require rg such that,
r
′
m(x
′
m) + rg = K
′
(x
′
m)r
′
f (r
d
f ) (A.15)
A supply side intervention will require b such that,
r
′
m(x
′
m) =
(
K
′
(x
′
m)− b)
)
r
′
f (r
s
f ) (A.16)
Using the fact that l = 0 and that τ = rgx
′
m, the utility of the household under demand-side
intervention is then given by,
Ud = rm(x
′
m) + rf (x
d
f )−K(x
′
m) + ω − xdf (A.17)
Similarly, the utility of the household under supply-side intervention is given by,
U s = rm(x
′
m) + rf (x
s
f )−K(x
′
m) + ω − xdf (A.18)
Using the budget constraint and that fact that in equilibrium P d = K
′
(x
′
m) and P
s =
K
′
(x
′
m)− b, we see that,
xdf = ω −K
′
(x
′
m)x
′
m
xsf = ω − (K
′
(x
′
m)− b)x
′
m
(A.19)
We can rewrite (A.23) as,
U s = rm(x
′
m) + rf (x
d
f + bx
′
m)− xdf − bx
′
m −K(x
′
m)
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Since r
′
f (x
d
f + bx
′
m) ≥ 1 and r
′′
f < 0, when b > 0, rf (x
d
f + bx
′
m) − xdf − bx
′
m > rf (x
d
f )x
d
f .
Therefore U s > Ud. Conversely, when b < 0 rf (x
d
f +bx
′
m)−xdf−bx
′
m < rf (x
d
f )x
d
f . Therefore
Ud > U s and demand taxes pareto dominate supply taxes.
Proof of Proposition 10. In the analysis that follows, superscript d refers to a demand-
side quantities, while superscript s refers to supply-side quantities. Say we want to achieve
a level of x
′
m. Then a demand side intervention will require rg such that,
r
′
m(x
′
m) + rg = K
′
(x
′
m)r
′
f (r
d
f ) (A.20)
A supply side intervention will require b such that,
r
′
m(x
′
m) =
(
K
′
(x
′
m)− b)
)
r
′
f (r
s
f ) (A.21)
Using the fact that τ = rgx
′
m, the utility of the household under demand-side intervention
is then given by,
Ud = rm(x
′
m) + rf (x
d
f )−K(x
′
m) + ω − xdf −K
′
(x
′
m)(x
′
m −B) (A.22)
Similarly, the utility of the household under supply-side intervention is given by,
U s = rm(x
′
m) + rf (x
s
f )−K(x
′
m) + ω − xdf − (K
′
(x
′
m)− b)(x
′
m −B) (A.23)
Using the budget constraint and that fact that in equilibrium P d = K
′
(x
′
m) and P
s =
K
′
(x
′
m)− b, we see that,
xdf = ω −K
′
(x
′
m)x
′
m +K
′
(x
′
m)(x
′
m +B) = ω +K
′
(x
′
m)B
xsf = ω − (K
′
(x
′
m)− b)x
′
m + (K
′
(x
′
m)− b)(x
′
m +B) = ω + (K
′
(x
′
m)− b)B
(A.24)
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Following the same steps as in the proof of propostion 9, we can show that in this case
demand subsidies pareto dominate supply-side subsides and supply taxes pareto dominate
demand taxes.
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